

Maurizio Barozzi

SECOND WORLD WAR

*"War of blood against gold"*

JUNE 10, 1940

*Genesis and  
causes of the Italian  
war*



*"Reconstructing history, when the archives of the defeated countries have been literally turned upside down, while those of the victors' military and state are largely secret, is a daunting task."*



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# INTRODUCTION

**&lt;&lt;The salvation of the Fatherland is the supreme law>>**

(Roman maxim)

*Whether we like it or not, historical research should transcend considerations of morality or law, as these are entirely secondary and misleading aspects, if not propaganda, and instead adhere to a simple postulate well known to historians and researchers, even if various interests often lead them to ignore it:*

*in wars, when it comes to nations, there are absolutely no 'good guys' or 'bad guys' nor, ultimately, except in a temporary and contingent sense, are there 'victims' or 'aggressors', because the state of war - and not peace - is the recurring state of human beings and therefore of peoples.*

*It is no coincidence that today's "good guys" and victims of aggression, as historical conditions and power relations change, often become tomorrow's "bad guys" and aggressors. Certain categories of judgment belong, if anything, to the ethical and ideological sphere, just as considerations of a "moral" nature can then be applied retrospectively to the overall view of history, but cannot influence historiographical research.*

*As Francesco Lamendolia wrote:*

*"more or less all historians agree that, for every conflict that has occurred in human history - from the Peloponnesian War to the Hundred Years' War and the Napoleonic campaigns - it is impossible to separate unequivocally, without margin for uncertainty and without residue, the mutual rights and wrongs of each of the two sides in the conflict." (F. Lamendolia: "Who started World War II?" - Arianna Edizioni).*

*World War II is no exception.*

*War, in fact, is the "continuation of politics by other means," it is inherent in the archetype of "man" and represents the will to power of peoples, the clash, rise, and decline of civilizations, and the interests of their respective states (Marxists would say: economic groups).*

*Geopolitical necessities, ideological conflicts, and economic interests that lead to war transcend, like it or not, moral aspects and the rights of peoples.*

*The word "war" has a very generic and extensive meaning, because it also perfectly encompasses those conflicts that are not clearly visible but which determine the resolution of financial and social conflicts, where the clash, often violent and coercive, is transposed onto an economic and financial level, in order to bend the will of others or to aim at conquering spaces and markets to the detriment of others.*

*Not to mention the permanent state of war between criminal organizations, secret services, etc., in short, all situations that attest to a human archetype based on self-assertion, domination, conquest, and the maintenance of power, even through the use of more or less sugarcoated or justified violence.*

*This is 'human nature', fortunately balanced by many other virtues and generous and positive aspects in man. The statement that **'if you don't want to carry your own weapons, you end up carrying those of others'** is not propaganda, but an immutable reality of existence.*

*Of course, sympathizing and siding with the weakest, with the victim of the moment, and so on, is a generous and innate component of human beings, and war propaganda is well aware of this, always seeking to present its own "sacrosanct" wars (how many false flags have determined the casus belli!) in a context of law and justice, or as a reaction to someone else's aggression. However, the objective truth of historical facts and events cannot be reduced to a simple matter of law and transcends all these moral aspects. To give an example, all the borders of nations, as they appear on today's maps, have been established over the centuries through wars, aggression, redrawing, forced displacement of peoples, even genocide, or treaties often imposed by force.*

*Everything else is just stories.*

## **WARNING**

This historical analysis attempts to adhere as closely as possible to commonly known and sufficiently verified data, events, and facts.

We have made one **exception** to describe what probably happened behind the scenes between Mussolini and Churchill at the time of our entry into the war (June 10, 1940).

**It is a decisive factor in assessing our entry into the war, which revolves around the famous events of Mussolini's missing correspondence. Therefore, in the field of historiography, this "secret" cannot be objectively proven, given that all documentation on the matter has been destroyed and the archives of the victorious powers are off limits. However, there are various corroborations and**

**testimonies and can be deduced from a whole series of circumstances and from the logic of the events themselves. It cannot have been otherwise.** Deliberately, instead, not are here taken into consideration many details and more or less secret information and episodes that took place behind the scenes of history, where we have limited ourselves to mentioning the work of certain "Consortia" or *Lobbies*, not specified in detail, but always referable to the great power and interests of that *International Banking Fraternity*, the powerful *brotherhood* known by the euphemistic name of High Finance, which had its *Temples* on the axis of the *City* of London and *Wall Street* in New York, which played its part in triggering the war.

We have made this exception because the actions of these lobbies, lodges, and power elites, and their consequences, although carried out behind the scenes, are evident and partly documentable.

This does not mean, however, that historical events are not, or cannot be, only those that are "hidden" or, conversely, those that appear on the surface, because they interact in human phenomena, not only unpredictable events, causes and contributing factors, but reactions and counter-reactions (heterogenesis of ends), which add up and often remain inscrutable.

We have chosen to follow a *calm* and, as far as possible, proven historiographical methodology for the simple reason that it is already difficult, in itself, to get people to accept a refutation of 'politically correct' historiography, a legacy of Allied war propaganda, through commonly known facts and elements. On the other hand, delving into counter-information that takes into account hidden elements and information that is not available to everyone or cannot be easily proven would run the risk of confusing or not being understood by many readers.



## 1<sup>a</sup> INTRODUCTION

### **TAMED VERSION OF WORLD WAR II**

*"Nations that boasted possessions, dominions, and power on a global scale, increased and extended by the spoils of the Great War, will accuse Hitler's Germany of aiming for world domination."*

Simplifying and summarizing what is peddled by *official historiography*, World War II would have depended on the ambitions of global domination of an exalted Hitler who, supported by militarism (initially hesitant, but then increasingly convinced by Hitler's recurring successes) and by German big industry (eager for expansion), had for years, with his ruthlessness, had an easy game against the democratic nations, thanks also to the *naïve* British policy of *appeasement* in the 1930s.

But Hitler, according to this story for the naïve, intoxicated by the successes achieved with his coups: remilitarization of the Rhineland, Anschluss in Austria (desired, among other things, by the vast majority of Austrians), Sudetenland, and occupation of Czechoslovakia, etc., was no longer able to control himself in his conquests of neighboring countries (which were not "conquests" but rather reappropriations of what had previously been stolen from Germany), and ended up invading Poland, provoking the legitimate armed reaction of the great democracies.

A similar scenario is drawn up for the US, which was, it is said, grappling with the *fanatical militarists* who had seized power in Japan and were threatening markets and trade in Southeast Asia, seeking to subjugate and occupy Asian nations, starting with China. This version reverses facts and responsibilities and legitimizes American interference, bullying, and claims in distant places that, if anything, should have been a matter for Asians.

Finally, Italy, thanks to a megalomaniac dictator and despite not being in a position to sustain a war, took the classic step beyond its means, deluded by Germany's astonishing victories, and threw itself headlong into the abyss of conflict.

In short, for years, we have been fed nothing but the old *Allied war propaganda* with the usual distinction between *good and bad*, between *warmongering aggressors* eager to dominate the world and *peaceful democratic nations under attack*.

None of this, however, corresponds to the truth and how things actually went, because the causes of the war, the events that led to it, and its overall dynamics had other motivations and unfolded in a very different way.

Today, also in light of what happened after the war, with the globalist structures and institutions, in line with the domination of high finance over states, which were imposed on almost all the nations of the world, we can identify the moment of 'rupture' in the delicate global balance that definitively determined the decision to wage war against the fascist states of Europe. This happened, more or less, around 1937 when Germany, lacking gold and currency, tried to set up international trade on the basis of 'barter', i.e. taking raw materials from producing countries and paying for them with high-tech finished products. In practice, the aim was to replace gold and currency with "labor power and technology," thereby eliminating the profits of banking intermediaries.

**This type of trade, which began with a few countries, including some in South America, and which other countries seemed willing to follow, was supplemented in Germany in June 1939 by a law that placed the German Reichsbank under the aegis of the state (it would report directly to the Führer) and the state also reappropriated the issuance of currency. The signs of this act had forced the resignation, in January 1939, of the Freemason Hjalmar Schacht, who had contributed greatly to the development of German finance (in 1945, his "brothers" in Nuremberg saved him from the gallows).**

**It was the beginning of the end of the so-called 'seigniorage', i.e. the commission given by individual states to central banks, in private hands, to issue currency and charge interest on it. This system was further refined when, in 1913, the *Federal Reserve System* was launched in the United States, placing the immense and wealthy American state under an invisible but evident banking dictatorship.**

This brings us to one of the real reasons for that war: a nation that refuses to go into debt, that seeks to cut out banking intermediation in international trade, and that, above all, interrupts the seigniorage of *the so-called central banks*, is a mortal threat to the bankers.

Winston Churchill himself declared in 1960:

*<<Germany's unforgivable crime before World War II was its attempt to detach its economy from the world trading system and to build an independent exchange system from which world finance could no longer profit.*

But even British General J. P. C. Fuller, a historian of that war, realized that:

*<<What drove us into war against Hitler was not his political doctrine; the cause this time was his successful attempt to create a new economy. The prosperity of international finance depends on issuing interest-bearing loans to nations in economic difficulty. Hitler's economy*

*meant his ruin. If he had been allowed to complete it successfully, other nations would certainly have followed his example, and the time would have come when all states without gold reserves would have exchanged goods for goods; thus, not only would the demand for loans have ceased and gold would have lost its value, but financial lenders would have had to close shop. This financial gun was pointed particularly at the United States.*

These considerations were echoed in 1992 by James Baker, US Secretary of State, who declared: "[World War II] *was just a preventive economic measure.*"

It was probably these new political and financial policies being implemented in Europe that were the real straw that broke the camel's back and accelerated events towards war. These intrusions by the state into the realm of high finance could not be tolerated because they would have literally dismantled and "ruined" the global power of *the International Banking Fraternity*, which had worked so hard over the last three centuries to achieve the positions of power and seigniorage it had attained. Now it was time to let the cannons do the talking!

Ultimately, after much deliberation, the details and true historical assumptions that led to the First and Second World Wars reveal, without a shadow of a doubt, two fundamental reasons, never explicitly stated, but easily recognizable upon careful historical examination and observation:

1. the possession or control of energy resources, particularly oil.
2. power, now on a global scale, which allowed for speculation in world finance. This interference with sovereign states and deliberately indebted nations and dynasties had to be defended and expanded by any means necessary, especially after the launch of ***the Federal Reserve System*** (1913), which had guaranteed a diabolical mechanism of speculation, control, and transnational and supranational banking power, placed in the hands of large private banks.

These two specific geopolitical conditions, translated into concrete terms and names, can be summarized in three names: the Rothschilds first and foremost, then the Rockefellers and the Morgans, who were the great financial dynasties that controlled global finance and ownership of large oil fields. Around them revolved a handful of other large families who controlled large banks and credit institutions.

It was these "powers" that planned and determined the First and Second World Wars, as a single act to be carried out in two stages, which was supposed to bring the entire planet to the point of realizing the globalist ideological presuppositions that we see today being attempted everywhere.

In short, translating all this into political terms, we can only repeat a passage from a famous interview with Professor Antonio Pantano, in which he said:

*"World War II was carried out to erase the true concept of the 'state', which arose in Italy from the ashes of the attempt at a 'liberal state' generated by the oligarchic 'nomenclature' of the 'old 18th-century regime': an elitist paternalism seasoned with the holy water of Christianity and the incense of Masonic lodges.*

*The new modern and social 'state' was an intuition that matured in the minds of a few, which Mussolini brought to fruition. A modern state. The people and the government in a single spirit>>.*

And indeed, if we consider the model of the state that was imposed by fascism and National Socialism in Europe, a sovereign state where ethical and political aspects took absolute precedence over economic and financial aspects and interests, we see how this model is the exact antithesis, the mortal danger to the interests of high finance.

Gradually, perhaps for the first time in history, democracy aside, the people were truly brought into the state (the antithesis of every previous dynastic or aristocratic institution post-feudal society): the people in all their economic, social, military, professional, artistic, and craft components (corporations), creating a national popular context with the consent of the masses.

In this way, Fascism, having overcome the period of compromise during *the twenty years*, with the RSI (Italian Social Republic) created, for the first and only time in Italy, a socialist republic, bypassing Marxism and bringing labor to the forefront of production and company management (socialization).

Only Mussolini's brilliant intuition could succeed in taking into account the ontological differences between people, putting them at the service of the common good (a principle of mutuality antithetical to any individualistic right wing).

These 'novelties' and revolutionary precedents, which established themselves in Italy and more empirically, but perhaps more effectively, in Germany (although in Italy the RSI defined them permanently by law), represented an epoch-making event, a danger that those who controlled the resources of the earth and the nations of the globe could not afford to tolerate, especially since, after the Great War and the First World War, having secure control of international finance and the main energy resource: oil, they had begun to create transnational and supranational organizations and companies, believing it possible to initiate a process aimed at establishing a new world order.

But at this point, before proceeding further, it is necessary to introduce an interlude to complete the picture of the causes and origins of the Second World War.



## 2<sup>a</sup> INTRODUCTION

### D INTERESTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE 20TH CENTURY

*&lt;&lt;In the causes that led to the two great world wars, we cannot ignore the role of certain financial "power elites" who, having achieved enormous power in the City of London and Wall Street in New York, while at the same time becoming a monopolistic capital also interested in controlling all the planet's energy sources, aimed at a future World Government&gt;&gt;.*



When identifying the causes that triggered the First and Second World Wars, we cannot limit ourselves to a single interpretative perspective, given that history is always a consequence of causes and reactions, often unpredictable and therefore not everything can be attributed to "conspiracy" theories. However, it is clear that in these two great conflagrations, in

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\* History and human nature itself are also governed by what is improperly called "conspiracy theory," since plotting, conspiring, or simply concealing the truth can be found in every aspect of human life: from the personal to business and society, to the so-called "secret" services, to crime, and of course to states. However, as events unfold, there is always a heterogenesis of ends, of contrary or unpredictable reactions, so that causes and contributing factors add up and change the overall picture of the facts. This is why "conspiracy theories," although important, are insufficient for interpreting history.

When conspiracy theories construct theorems that cannot be proven, they lead nowhere, and the theorem backfires on those who formulated it.

These two massacres were largely influenced by economic and financial situations of enormous significance.

There is an important book, based on the analysis of texts not available in Italy, which summarizes some of these aspects relating to the two world wars very well. The book, by Gian Paolo Pucciarelli: "*Segreto Novecento*" (Secret Twentieth Century), published by Capire Roma in 2014, reconstructs all the secret events that took place behind the scenes of twentieth-century history and is a fundamental text, especially given the lack of similar research in our country.

Here we can only give a brief overview that supplements and clarifies our essay, and for the evaluation of the two world wars, it must be kept in mind, at least as a "working hypothesis," for their comprehensive interpretation.

The author reveals and shows us how the Banksters, a handful of atavistic, rich, and powerful families of high finance, now constituted as monopolistic capital, already at the dawn of the last century, with their interests mostly centered in the Anglo-American geographical area, on the axis of the City of London and Wall Street in New York, move their pawns to boycott and destroy any other geopolitical reality that could harm their power.

In the modern era, the terms of the dispute and of the operation obviously focus on the possession or control of raw materials, among which oil stands out. Discovered in the mid-19th century, oil is increasingly replacing other energies that are indispensable for production and transport. The possession of oil-producing areas therefore becomes a priority and indispensable, leading in a short time, after a competitive phase, to an agreement between Rockefeller's Standard Oil and the British APOC for the global division of the Middle Eastern areas, where research indicates the presence of enormous deposits.

To defend and extend this interference, high finance, under the patronage of the powerful Rothschilds and after agreements that reconciled divisions with the Rockefellers, the Morgans, etc., transformed itself from a money lender into **monopolistic financial capital**, has no qualms about unleashing wars, revolutions, and tragedies for entire peoples if this allows it to liquidate states and geopolitical and economic realities that could hinder or compete with it.

The most striking example, the author shows us, is that of Tsarist Russia, a society that was still very backward, but whose territory, rich in raw materials and oil, and the advances in science and technology at the beginning of the 20th century, could allow it to achieve impressive economic development, elevating it to a dangerous competitor of the trusts, of the Anglo-American monopoly capital in the hands of the banksters, the sole rulers of the markets on which they impose goods and prices, and therefore it must be wiped out.

The simple introduction of Russian oil onto the markets at rock-bottom prices would be enough to blow up all the Anglo-American monopolistic projects of the banksters.

The very prospect of the Bolshevik revolution, which will in fact shift the geopolitical and economic needs of communist Russia in a direction that is objectively incompatible with that of large monopoly capital (communist state capitalism can never be competitive with capitalist liberalism), would be useful to high finance for its strategies of Euro-Asian domination and also as a bridgehead for the future destruction of Germany and thus for control of the European continent (it is no coincidence, as the author points out, that in the Soviet economy, the majority and priority destination of the state budget would be the arms sector).

And so, American banks activate all channels of financing for Lenin, Trotsky, and the Bolsheviks, whose socio-political upheavals are advantageous to these strategies.

The author then exposes the real interests behind the Great War: the uncomfortable and competitive position of the Kaiser's Germany for Anglo-American monopoly capital, especially in the Middle Eastern oil sector; the upheavals dictated at Versailles by diplomats controlled by Freemasonry and finance.

In this great hustle and bustle, in these dealings, before and after the world war, the Federal Reserve (1913) was created, which not only took over all US finance, but also created a system, the Federal Reserve System, capable of controlling money supply and interest rates by private individuals, to which almost all central banks on the planet would adapt.

Also significant was the creation of organizations and institutes such as the **Council on Foreign Relations**, which, alongside the British **Royal Institute of International Affairs**, completed the Anglo-American axis across the two oceans, acting transversally and above the states, dictating national policies, preparing and selecting the personalities, politicians, and technicians who would 'lead' the individual nations. With the Second World War, the **World Bank and the International Monetary Fund** were added to these institutes, completing the global control of high finance.

It is the globalist project that takes shape.

Another significant project, made possible by the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and American intervention in the war in 1917, was the creation of the State of Israel, not only to promote Zionism, but also to establish a stronghold for the defense of the oil-rich areas of the Middle East.

The liquidation of the Tsars and the Central Empires took place behind a great carnage, both revolutionary (the Bolshevik revolution) and military: World War I, skillfully managed and financed by the nascent "power elites": monopoly financial capitalism and Freemasonry, which, after financing the opposing military arsenals of nations and dynasties, whose assets, like those of the Tsar, were pledged to the Rothschild banks in London, led them towards the inevitable war that those arsenals were intended for.

The author then shows us the face of these power elites, describing their men, the structure of the Rothschild banks with their branches across half the world, their trustees, and the oil financial groups.

It is the power elites, following the instructions of the Jewish organizations themselves, who will exacerbate anti-Semitism in Germany, as they had already done at the time of the bloody pogroms in Russia, in order to push the numerous German Jews to emigrate to Palestine to give substance and support to the nascent Jewish state. The terror spread in Russia at the beginning of the last century was necessary to push many Jews to emigrate to America on condition that, once they arrived and were immediately settled, they would support the Democratic candidate Wilson, a puppet in the hands of finance, to get him elected.

From this perspective, Jewish and financial lobbies are not averse to financially supporting Hitler and the NDSP, a support that is also of interest to some large monopolies in the oil (Standard Oil of New Jersey), industrial (Ford), and chemical (IG Farben) sectors, where business does not discriminate. Once again, the dark side of historical events, which are never as clear and straightforward as they may appear on the surface, is brought to light.

Of particular interest is the author's reconstruction of the great stock market speculation of 1929; the strangulation of Weimar Germany and the reconstruction plans supported by interested American financiers, all part of a very specific project of financial domination; the rise to power in the US of the Wall Street man, Roosevelt; the subsequent attempts by Nazi Germany to curb banking intermediation and impose a system of international trade based on barter (raw materials in exchange for finished and technologically valuable products); the German attack on Russia in 1941, which we now know was a desperate attempt to preempt a similar Soviet attack, which had been planned for some time and was at a very advanced stage, and which was preceded by a couple of weeks.

Stalin was well aware of the German attack plans; in fact, the spy Sorge had even provided him with the timing of this attack from Japan, but the distrustful Georgian, partly distracted by Hess's 'strange' trip to England, which could reasonably have led him to suspect an anti-Soviet agreement between the Germans and the British, and the unsolvable problem of not being able to attack the Germans immediately before completing his offensive deployment, nor out of the blue, bring the Soviet armed forces back to defensive positions, forced Stalin to procrastinate, to pretend nothing was happening, hoping to have at least a couple of weeks before being attacked and thus be able to precede the Germans as he had long planned.

To complete the picture, the author reveals *corporate banking* and its plan for world domination, covering a myriad of topics and hidden plots, including the perverse mechanisms of the infamous "public debt," a gift from the Federal Reserve System Bank, imposed on nations.

The author also offers many interesting considerations on Italy, which, due to its geographical position and after the opening of the Suez Canal and the discovery of oil fields in the Middle East, became extremely important, indeed strategic, for the British. These considerations can be summarized as follows: the British use of Italy to dominate oil routes. Strong interference in our politics to bring our country into the war alongside the Entente and against the Central Powers. Subsequent interest in our country having a stable regime. At the forefront of these prospects are Great Britain and Freemasonry.

From here, we see clear support given by the British to the interventionist Mussolini and then to fascism. Mussolini, like any revolutionary (see Lenin and Hitler), accepted this support and funding, but having the geopolitical interests of the nation at heart, and these interests being opposed to those of Britain, he gradually and inevitably found himself in decisive opposition to them. We know the rest.

Gradually, therefore, between actions and reactions, the fronts of what would become the Second World War began to take shape: on one side, the old world on the threshold of unprecedented domination and interference in economics and finance, the press and Freemasonry, behind the veneer of democracy; and on the other, emerging nations and peoples desperately seeking raw materials and living space, and a life perspective that was not that of slaves in a "Big Brother" society, as "someone" imagined creating.

The fact that the events as a whole had great hidden forces behind the scenes is demonstrated by the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939, which ended up involving other nations, leading to a confrontation similar to that which then occurred in World War II, where Germany and Italy, out of geopolitical necessity and to counter the Soviet presence in that area, found themselves supporting the reactionary monarchist forces in Spain, which, once the civil war was won, placed power in the hands of greedy capitalists and pretenders, while, on the other side, all the Masonic subversion on the planet, international Jewry, the Soviets, and with the not-so-discreet support of England, America, and France, supported the Republican front.

For the Germans, this intervention was excellent preparation for war, especially for the air force, while for Italy it was a considerable financial drain, coming right after the war in Ethiopia, which had a strong impact in the months that followed.

### 3<sup>a</sup> INTRODUCTION

## HITLER'S PLAN FOR WORLD DOMINATION?



*Hitler knew history and its laws very well and therefore knew that in order to recover what had been extorted from him at Versailles and to defend Germany in the future, he had to make the nation a great power. In the international scenarios he envisaged and hoped for, there was domination in Central Europe, territorial expansionism for raw materials in the East, and a global agreement with the British.*

*Ultimately, his dreams of domination were inferior to those of the other great powers which, being thalassocratic in nature, concerned world domination. His parody in Charlie Chaplin's "The Great Dictator," in front of the globe, is pure propaganda invention.*

Let us therefore return to the subject of World War II. Without wishing to consider the post-war arrangements, oppressive and heavily unfair, imposed on Germany by the 1919 Versailles Conference, which amounted to outright robbery of the German people, who already had the *right* and *duty* to take back what had been stolen from them and to reject, as soon as their forces allowed, what had been imposed on them by the force of arms (because otherwise we would stray into *idealistic* assessments that are not relevant here), it must certainly be stated that even from a simple but comprehensive and objective observation of the German military structure (equipped with *continental-type* armed forces) and the strategic objectives of its international policy (expansionism to the East), it is clear that there was no plan for possible *world domination* by Hitler.

Hitler's geopolitical vision was to achieve political, economic, and military supremacy on the European continent (domination of Central Europe) and to expand geographically into the territories of the East (Soviet Russia). Resolved to use military force if necessary, he thought or hoped, indeed this was the main condition of his plan, that he could achieve and, above all, maintain these objectives through a global agreement with Great Britain. He would have guaranteed the British their empire, whose geopolitical role he believed was also functional to the protection of Europe, and, not surprisingly, he even welcomed the role of 'guardian' that Great Britain exercised in the Far East.

At the same time, and until the United States had risen to a position of hegemony and interference in the European context, Hitler thought he could maintain a relationship of mutual commercial interest and mutual political disinterest with this immense nation, disregarding their hegemony in Latin America and the Pacific.

Beyond what is known today about Hitler's policy and international relations at that time, all this is also unequivocally indicated, as mentioned, by the type of German rearmament and the resulting composition of its armed forces on land, sea, and in the air on the eve of the war. Lacking an adequate navy for a project of world imperialism, there was not even any plan or provision for an adequate arsenal to sustain a long-lasting war on several fronts in Europe, let alone a global war for a nation that **was** not even a thalassocratic power. **Not to mention Germany's absolute lack of oil reserves. Are you kidding me?!**

Unless Hitler was literally insane, and with him the entire German political and military class, it would have been ridiculous and disastrous to plan for world hegemony while at the same time equipping itself militarily for a short-lived continental war with rearmament programs at sea (an indispensable prerequisite for a global strategy) limited to a local context and which, at best, could have been incentivized in the future to guarantee Germany the recovery of its former colonies taken from it in the previous conflict. perhaps be incentivized in the future to ensure Germany's recovery of its former colonies taken from it in the previous conflict. But in any case, a German colonial policy was not even in the Führer's thoughts at that time.

That Hitler then played with fire and Hitler pushed things to the brink of war is another matter, but the fact remains that 'that conflict' was deliberately planned and orchestrated by the great Western democracies, behind which acted the *International Banking Fraternity*, supported by international Freemasonry, whose strategies of destruction and domination in Europe had long been in place, so much so that the two world wars, *First and Second*, were nothing more than two acts of a single conflagration divided by a twenty-year armistice (a living symbol of this *strategic* continuity could be seen in Bernard Baruch, the all-powerful Jewish financier, private advisor to six American presidents starting with Wilson, and creator of the *War Industry Board*, the centralized planning body for war production).

Having made this observation, it should also be noted that it all ends up as a farce, because the country that actually had an empire to exploit and defend in the four corners of the earth, and therefore had to act on a global scale, was Great Britain (but France was no slouch either, with its colonial possessions and other areas where it exercised influence), while the other power, the USA, was already thinking (and put it into action in 1939) about

launch of an extremely costly and immense rearmament plan – *on both oceans* – with the aim of achieving true world domination.

Soviet Russia itself, despite being in fact a form of bureaucratic state capitalism masked as communism, was nevertheless animated by an internationalist ideology and therefore its logical premise was the export of communism to every corner of the earth and the global recomposition of states and nations, conquered by socialism and placed under the leadership of *the Great Mother USSR*, which, however, clearly showed that it was reviving and expanding the expansionist dreams of the Tsars.

When the European crisis began to reach a state of considerable tension, the USSR showed that it wanted to embark on an obvious dynamic expansionism that Stalin never renounced, so much so that today it is widely assumed that the more or less secret but obvious aid given in some way to the rebirth of the German armed forces in the 1920s, also carried with it the hidden and subtle strategy of using Germany as a battering ram for a war in Europe, in order to then attack it at the opportune moment and thus occupy the maximum amount of territory and strategic points on the continent.

It was no coincidence that Hitler's attack on Russia on June 22, 1941, was crowned with incredible initial success, made possible by the fact that the attack took the Soviet armies by surprise during the implementation of their own offensive strategic deployment (which could not be corrected in time, even though the Soviets had learned of the Germans' invasion plans at the last moment), in anticipation of an imminent attack on Germany, thus being preempted in the aggression by a few weeks.

This whole situation is also attested to by the historical events of those years, which show us a Great Britain not only committed to imposing, by hook or by crook, its hegemony in Africa, the Middle and Far East (particularly India) and the Mediterranean, but also, as always, actively pursuing its age-old policy of preventing the emergence of a militarily and economically strong hegemonic entity in central Europe.

With these assumptions, in the two-year period 1934-1935, it was precisely British policy that, at least in part, allowed Germany to grow politically and militarily, given that, in any case, the Germans had committed themselves, with the naval agreement of 1935 and as proof of a strategy that was essentially not anti-British, to keeping their navy well below that of Her Majesty.

British policy at the time was driven by the desire to keep the European continent fragmented and divided, while also hindering any excessive development of *'friendly'* France.

Only after this type of British policy, aimed at dividing Europe, was considered outdated and the unexpected great capacity for German recovery and the dynamic force of National Socialist policy were acknowledged, was it reversed, and from 1936 onwards there was a growing rearmament and commitment to countering the rebirth of Germany.

## 4<sup>a</sup> INTRODUCTION

### **THE INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO IN 1939**

*"In the two post-war periods following the global massacres, the historical and geographical upheavals imposed on Europe highlighted the voracity and greed of the victorious nations, but at the same time, the creation of transnational and supranational institutions and bodies aimed at bypassing, restricting, or eliminating national sovereignty was not accidental, but responded to a Masonic plan aimed at a future world government."*

If we look at maps of Europe before and after the Great War of 1914-1918 (see the next paragraph), we can see what a dramatic upheaval in geopolitical situations, a sure cause of future wars, was brutally imposed on Europe at the end of that conflict.

And these upheavals were all orchestrated in accordance with a precise plan, which unfolded through various strategies aimed at the annihilation of European civilization.

On the one hand, there was a plan of a *Masonic* nature, so to speak, which led to the creation of the League of Nations and the first *globalist* organizations such as the CFR, etc., which can be interpreted as anti-European in an ideal sense, because it was permeated by a *globalist* ideological premise of overcoming national entities. On the other hand, there was a strategy based on classic nationalistic principles, anti-German in the strict and contingent sense, because it tends to encircle Germany and prevent its rebirth, thanks to a series of nations, especially Slavic ones, artificially created and inflated at the expense of Germany itself, the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the former Tsarist Russia.

This creation was so unfair and artificial and a harbinger of uncontrollable tensions that it could only have lasted as long as Germany and Russia remained in a state of post-war economic and military inferiority.

In some cases, these absurd changes implemented by the Treaty of Versailles are presented as the naivety of US President Wilson and his pacifist utopias and related tactics for the self-determination of peoples.

But apart from the fact that Wilson was merely the executor of a well-identified Masonic lobby that controlled him, this is not the case at all, because the strategies of 1919 were implemented with full knowledge of the facts and with a view to designing a *globalist*, transnational program aimed at overcoming and subordinating states and national identities to International High Finance (which obviously does not represent only a financial aspect

financial aspect) whose natural outcome we see today with the *New World Order* after the fall of the Berlin Wall and which we would like to see converge tomorrow into an ideal and planetary "*Universal Republic*."

Not to mention the thousands of kilometers <sup>2</sup>of colonies and various possessions plundered through war from the Central Powers and the Ottoman Empire or extorted, as *mandates*, from those democratic nations which, already in possession of enormous colonial territories, had assured that they had entered the Great War with no intention of territorial conquest!

If we then consider many other events and developments in the second half of the 1930s, we also realize how the British policy of *appeasement* pursued in those years, far from being the policy of *the naive* or of those who loved peace at any cost (the British, of all people!), but rather an appropriate *delaying* tactic, dictated by the need to mediate with the various factions within the country (not all of which were warmongering and anti-German), a policy towards Germany that was acceptable to these factions, but above all it was essential to maintain the desired division of the continent and, if necessary, to prepare for rearmament and political and propaganda maturation aimed at striking and destroying the reborn Germany once and for all.

Chamberlain and Churchill, the "dove" and the "hawk," ultimately, if one looks beyond the contingent and propagandistic aspects of their policies, represent two different sides of the same coin, and both are expressions of historical, political, and military situations that are completely different, but with the same goal to be achieved, albeit in different ways and according to the needs of the moment: the destruction of German hegemony in Europe. Churchill then also became the executor of a much more far-reaching plan of destruction and domination.

The Munich Agreement (September 1938), urged behind the scenes by the British themselves on Mussolini, marked the end of the appeasement policy: from that moment on, with England sufficiently capable of sustaining a conflict and certain of future US support, its attitude suddenly changed direction and began to stir up the *winds of war* in order to achieve its long-established strategic objectives.

The incredible, hypocritical, and extremely dangerous "guarantee" offered to Poland in March 1939 and confirmed in August perfectly reflects the change in British strategy that had already taken place.

Moreover, apart from the need that arose after the First World War to eliminate the various forms of Fascism in Europe, which were dangerous precedents and examples for the real masters of the planet (essentially international finance), it should not be forgotten that there was also a plan, which failed after the end of the First World War, to disrupt, divide, and ultimately destroy Europe forever, a reservoir of people, cultures, and traditions, a hotbed of inexhaustible reactions and will to power that those who pursued dreams of world domination absolutely had to destroy.

## Map of the truth 1

To get a tangible view of the victors' lies, just look at these maps and remember that these shameless victors claimed to have fought two world wars for the rights of peoples, and not to gorge themselves on territories and mandates.

**This is THE MAP OF EUROPE ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1914)**, when, let us never forget, the British had an immense empire, the French had vast colonial territories, and the United States, which already controlled and exploited its "backyard" or South America, after the false flag of the Maine (1898), a pretext for their war against Spain, had embarked on an expansion in the Pacific, towards the Philippines and beyond:



## ***Map of the truth 2***

**And here, with THE MAP AT THE END OF THE GREAT WAR (1918 – '19),** what kind of dismemberment was imposed on Europe, with the creation of artificial nations, divided by ethnic groups in atavistic war with each other, a Poland resurrected and constituted with territories stolen from Russia and Germany, several million Germans cut off from their homeland and forced to live under foreign governments, a Czechoslovakia created with a jumble of heterogeneous peoples.

The defeated nations were deprived of their colonies, and the British and French empires expanded, gorging themselves on stolen colonies or mandates extorted to control important areas (especially for oil), mainly at the expense of the former Ottoman Empire.



### Map of the truth 3

And finally, here is **THE MAP AFTER THE LAST POST-WAR PERIOD, post-1945**, a war that the Allies had claimed, with their *Atlantic Charter*, had not been undertaken to expand their possessions.

Quite the contrary: three-quarters of the planet was plundered and Europe was dismantled and divided between two masters: the United States and the USSR.

The worst fate befell Germany, which was literally cut up into pieces, and after the Germans, already decimated by the war, suffered the genocide of over 3 million inhabitants at the end of the war.

Finally, Italy was deprived of everything, especially its few colonies, particularly oil-rich Libya.

And to think that the government of the South, after the infamous betrayal of September 8, 1943, had also declared war on Germany and Japan, and the Allies were considered liberators!



## 5<sup>a</sup> INTRODUCTION

### GERMANY TOWARDS WAR

*&lt;&lt;Hitler's policy was based on confrontation and possible conflict with the Western powers, even though his goal was agreement, and so he forced events, but it is certain that in any case it had already been decided some time ago that Europe had to be disrupted and National Socialist Germany destroyed. War would have been inevitable&gt;&gt;.*

Hitler's Germany, in any case, had wanted with all its might a national redemption after the humiliations and deprivations that followed the Great War and now, having risen in fact and in law to the status of a great power, it cultivated the goal of domination in Central Europe and the dream of expansion into the rich territories of the Soviet East, which alone would have allowed it to sustain and maintain, even in the future, a role as a great power in complete security.

If the British had a vast global empire, which was well accepted by Hitler, who found it mutually beneficial as a barrier to the East, an empire accumulated and strenuously defended over the centuries through wars, violence, deception, and massacres; if the French possessed vast colonial territories and if the United States, already rich in all material and energy resources, could act undisturbed on the American continent and in the oceans, Germany would not have given up those continental geopolitical objectives for any reason in the world.

Hitler was nevertheless aware that time was working against German aspirations, because within a few years it would allow Western nations to achieve overwhelming economic and military superiority over the Germans, while at the same time the Soviet Union, an indecipherable and threatening colossus, showed clear and inevitable expansionism towards the Baltic States and the Balkans, and a possible attack on Germany could certainly not be ruled out.

For the Führer, the choice was obvious: either to postpone and renounce what he considered to be indispensable expansionism in the East, given the military dangers that this presented (even a war on two fronts), or to go for broke, running the risk of finding himself, as indeed happened, in a conflict that soon became global in scope.

But today we know perfectly well that, in either case, whatever his choice had been, in the more or less near future and certainly in conditions that were weaker for him, he could not have avoided the clash with England and/or the Soviet attack.

National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, even aside from these contingent geopolitical aspects and contrasts, were in any case destined to be destroyed sooner or

because their undemocratic institutions, accepted and exalted by their respective peoples to the point of forming, as already mentioned, a sort of popular national state, the pre-eminence given in principle to their states, to ethical and political aspects over economic and financial ones, the safeguarding and enhancement of their cultural, racial, etc., could not be tolerated in the long term by the large international brotherhoods and lobbies that controlled world politics, just as today, when "globalism" and its ideology can now be said to be triumphant, no type of state that tends to act with national sovereignty and even proposes a timid hint of eugenic and anti-multiethnic policy is tolerated.

As is well known, Hitler wanted to take the risk of proceeding anyway with the objectives he had set himself, hoping that the first phase, that of the conflict with Poland, which was also supposed to eliminate the absurdity of the territory of Danzig separated from the mother country and the violence, which had become uncontrollable, of the Poles towards the Germans trapped within the borders arbitrarily divided at Versailles, could remain localized.

In this case, his plan was that, after reshaping the geographical situation in the east, Hitler could then turn his attention to the Soviet 'problem'. However, he did not calculate well that it was now in the West's interest to push things to the point of war, partly because, psychologically, after the inevitable German occupation of Czechoslovakia (March 1939) and the protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, the international situation had changed. Even from faraway America, a whole underground diplomatic effort was underway to manipulate Poland into inducing Germany to go to war.

Previously, in fact, all the steps and coups that had allowed Hitler to recover the positions and territories taken from him in 1919 could not be attacked propagandistically in front of public opinion, because they were logical and, we might say, legitimate. In March 1939, however, as an inevitable consequence of the Munich Agreement, Hitler entered Prague, albeit under an agreement extorted from Czech President Hácha, placing enormous German interference on what remained of Czechoslovakia.

The next step was Lithuania's request for the return of Memel to the Germans. Now, therefore, everyone knew that the problem of Danzig and its corridor would come to a head.

Only then did Western propaganda, having offered Poland a subtle political and military guarantee while encouraging its already warmongering character, have the favorable conditions to lump everything together and present Germany's intentions regarding Danzig, perhaps the most legitimate of all, as a usurpation and a desire for indefinite and unlimited conquest on the part of Germany.

The fact that England was now able to face the risk of a military confrontation did the rest and inevitably led to war.

Rivers of ink have been spilled to recall those days in late August and early September 1939, reconstructing the frantic meetings, the last-minute diplomatic steps, etc. Perhaps this was to demonstrate Germany's warmongering attitude that led to war in Europe, when the exact course of events is perfectly attested to in an anecdote handed down to us by Paul Carrell, alias Paul Otto Schmidt, official interpreter at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin.

At the Chancellery, when war was already raging in Poland, the Germans received the British ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of their divisions that had crossed the Polish border. The interpreter, standing at a certain distance from Hitler's desk, translated the British ultimatum, frozen in place:

*<<After a moment that seemed like an eternity, he turned to von Ribbentrop, who remained motionless in front of the window. "And now?" Hitler asked with an angry look, as if to imply that Ribbentrop had misinformed him about the likely British reaction. Von Ribbentrop replied in a low voice: "I expect that in the next few hours the French will send us an ultimatum with the same terms."*

This revealed the gamble that the Führer had taken. Despite having modified, or at least postponed, his plans for Russia, reaching an agreement with it (Molotov-Ribbentrop, August 23, 1939) to cover his back and hoping that it would also serve as a deterrent to the Western powers, he had ended up blowing it all up, but it was proof that total war in Europe had been stubbornly desired and sought after by the Western powers, not by the Germans.

Regardless of how events unfolded, however, diplomatic vicissitudes, and the tactical and strategic intentions of nations, there is no doubt that certain "forces" at the global level, representing those who wielded enormous power, above all international finance, strengthened by the power and extent of the British Empire and the enormous financial and industrial potential of the United States, which at that very moment converted to a war economy and began to produce weapons and military equipment in frightening quantities, and also strengthened by a human reservoir present in the countries subjugated or controlled by these thalassocratic nations, had decided unequivocally to destroy Germany.

And let us not forget the enormous human and military potential represented by the Soviet Union, despite its 'uncomfortable' position due to the presence of communism, which it threatened to export. However, it was well known that, once the transitional agreements and 'deviations' of the moment had been overcome, it would ultimately find itself on the opposite side to Germany.

Therefore, the mechanism of Germany's destruction by war, already set in motion, would not have stopped and would have unleashed global carnage.

But we are straying from our commitment not to dwell on "hidden" aspects that are easily intuited but difficult to prove.

## 6<sup>a</sup> INTRODUCTION

### ROOSEVELT'S FALSE NEUTRALITY



*&lt;&lt;The United States of America, as demonstrated in all the decades following World War II, with its enormous industrial capabilities and possession of raw materials, was the quintessence of international gangsterism, usurious financial power, and warmongering disguised as pacifism. A monster about to make the leap to become a great power on both oceans, dominating the planet &gt;&gt;.*

On the other side of the ocean, Roosevelt's American administration (which would turn out to be a true criminal emerging from the financial world), closely controlled by Masonic and financial lobbies (demonstrating the subtle and hidden threads that linked it to the strategies in place in Europe), was already inaugurating that *dirty* policy of hypocritical and mendacious propaganda, false pacifism, constant blackmail and provocation, and paramilitary interventions at all times and in all places (China), which was to lead the country, otherwise psychologically reluctant if not downright opposed, to embark on another bloody *crusade* to defend the so-called *free world* against *barbarism and tyranny*, in short, a world war, or rather, a premeditated carnage planned overseas and deployed along the London-New York axis that we have mentioned several times. A carnage that would also have solved the serious economic and employment crisis in the United States, which had never been remedied after the speculative collapse of the stock markets in 1929, thanks to the war industry.

Despite the seizure of documents by the victorious powers, there is ample evidence of the behind-the-scenes work carried out by American diplomats, particularly in Poland on the eve of the war, to trigger the conflict in Europe. It was no coincidence that in Paris, the American ambassador William Bullitt, a staunch supporter of Roosevelt, openly rejoiced at the outbreak of the long-awaited conflict.

Once the war was underway, it is well known that Roosevelt sent his Assistant Secretary of State Benjamin Sumner Welles to Europe on an exploratory mission to find a solution to the conflict.

It was an obvious sham, a ploy valid only for internal and propaganda purposes to show the world Roosevelt's desire for peace (while behind the scenes he was working for war and, for the benefit of public opinion, he made

*the angel of peace*) and at the same time point out Hitler's warmongering obstinacy. Summer Welles also arrived in Italy on the eve of Mussolini's departure for his meeting with Hitler at Brenner, and was received by the Duce on March 16, 1940. The American, without fear of bordering on the ridiculous, proposed the possibility of removing the causes of war by admitting, at the appropriate time, the countries least provided with raw materials to participate in those where others abound. Mussolini obviously tried to transform that insipid American pacifist attempt into a concrete peace mission, and the undersecretary was largely inclined to agree. However, the following day, Roosevelt, in an intercontinental phone call, ordered him not to proceed in that direction. It was enough for him to show the Americans, in the delicate and subsequent presidential elections of November 1940, where he had made a solemn commitment not to send Americans to war, that with the dispatch of his undersecretary of state to Europe, he had "*done everything possible*" to find a peace agreement.

From law to law, specifically enacted to sell and transfer weapons to the Anglo-French, from one treacherous act to another, from blatant or disguised violations of neutrality, etc., everything was devised in the US to bring about entry into the war.

And so the mainstream press and cinema, controlled by certain lobbies, and even Walt Disney and Warner Bros. cartoons, were mobilized to show the public the "monsters" of fascism, America in danger of being invaded, and to encourage Americans to destroy them.

It was due to Hitler's firm imposition on the navy and the Luftwaffe not to respond to US provocations, even when they consisted of treacherous naval attacks, that the US had to wait until December 1941 to enter the war and provoke the Japanese attack, thanks to a pre-litteram '9/11', which was Pearl Harbor.

All historians who have analyzed the political and military attitude of the US from 1939 until the moment of its actual entry into the war (December 7, 1941) have had to acknowledge that, in fact, the Americans, who called themselves *the arsenal of democracies*, were already at war with the Axis and supported the British in every way while continuing to declare themselves "neutral".

Laws were immediately enacted to sell, supply, and export weapons and war material to Germany's enemies, and various devices were put in place to get them out of the United States in defiance of the laws in force.

The shamelessly favorable attitude towards one side of the belligerents progressively increased in the following months and became blatant after Roosevelt was re-elected President for the third time in November 1940, having solemnly and publicly promised that he would never send American boys to die in the European war.

**At this point, the US could already be said to be at war, as every means, every insult, every affront was being used against the Axis countries: ships, aircraft, and logistical bases were made available**

**to the British so that they could monitor, spy on, and intercept the movements and operations of its enemies, and the data was communicated.**

As if it were legitimate, ships are stopped and, if necessary, confiscated and interned under any pretext, while the limits of American territorial waters are arbitrarily extended. Attacks and treacherous shelling of German ships are not uncommon, under the most shameless excuses.

Hitler finds it difficult to restrain his generals, who would like to react, at least to return fire, but the Führer understands very well that this is precisely the American intention: to provoke a serious incident, a pretext for immediately entering the war.

After all, American history is a compendium of deceit and falsehoods that conceal a criminal desire for domination and plunder. Leaving aside the criminal events that led to the destruction of the Native Americans, the Redskins, always behind deception and falsehood, we remember other decisive events, such as the false attack on the Maine, which in 1898 allowed the US to attack Spain, with military operations that had been planned and prepared for some time, and to project itself to total control of the Pacific, as far as the Philippines and China.

In 1915, there were then maneuvers to facilitate the sinking of the Lusitania, a civilian steamship, but secretly carrying war material, sent into danger, even though it was full of passengers and tourists, in waters known to be dangerous, hiding the warnings to facilitate the accident that would allow the major American press, controlled by financial lobbies, to mount a crusade for intervention in Europe, which then took place in April 1917.

It is pointless to recall the maneuvers and boycotts that forced Japan into the desperate attack on Pearl Harbor, an incursion that was then deliberately ignored by the American administration, or rather hidden, since it had been intercepted, causing the damage and deaths that outraged the Americans and allowed Roosevelt to declare war on the Japanese, obviously involving the Axis.

In the post-war period, in 1964, everyone knows about the infamous staging invented by the Americans about an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. A 'clash', a phantom aggression, which allowed the US to extend its intervention in Vietnam to the level of a full-scale war.

And what about the sensational and bloody attacks of September 11, 2001, in America, a monstrous setup, an obvious inside job, which cost the lives of about 3,000 American civilians, but was very useful for starting a series of wars of plunder and conquest under the pretext of terrorism?

Finally, the false flag operation concerning Saddam Hussein's famous weapons of mass destruction, which obviously did not exist but were useful for destroying and occupying Iraq, does not even deserve a mention, so obvious is it.

## 7<sup>a</sup> INTRODUCTION

### ITALY FORCED INTO WAR



*&lt;&lt;Even a second-rate historian cannot fail to note that Mussolini's Italy had only one interest: maintaining peace in Europe and a balance of power between the British and the Germans&gt;&gt;.*

And finally, we come to Italy (whose entry into the war is the subject of our essay). Italy, a clay pot among iron pots, was forced, willingly or unwillingly, to enter sooner or later due to its geographical location, its threatened interests in the Mediterranean and Africa, and its regime, which years earlier had been admired for having defeated Bolshevism and was now suddenly no longer tolerated because of its dirigiste approach to government and the state, where ethical and political considerations took precedence over economic and financial ones, a real disaster for international finance (in this regard, it is worth noting that in 1939, in the US, the temple of international finance, serious consideration began to be given to how to get rid of Mussolini, if necessary by assassination, perhaps under a false flag).

Italy was literally dragged into the conflict through the closure of all diplomatic channels, threats and blackmail and, finally, as we shall see, also enticed *by British deception*. **The British demand during the period of our non-belligerence was, up to a certain point, to keep us in check with empty promises, then to threaten us by striking at our maritime trade with the seizure of merchant ships (especially coal ships, which caused serious damage to the nation). Beyond words, the British demanded command of the Mediterranean.**

**In February 1940, after British diplomacy had forced Italy to sell arms and ammunition to the British, effectively wanting to force it out of neutrality (leading to the reversal of the Pact of Steel, which would also have laid the groundwork for the liquidation of fascism), after our government's refusal (although some military equipment had been sold to the British and French to support our finances), the British ambassador 'informed' us that the British fleet would block and confiscate our coal-carrying merchant ships, which were already subject to detention and arbitrary inspections.**

And so it happened from March 5, while on May 1, 1940, the British even had the shameless audacity to proclaim a "naval blockade" of the Italian coast, with the excuse of preventing, completely out of thin air,

of possible Italian attacks on the British navy (only on May 23, 1940, with the deterioration of their military situation, did a British expedition arrive in Rome to inform the Italians of the suspension of the naval blockade and show themselves to be more accommodating).

Even the pro-Western and anti-German Ciano, who in the previous months had hoped for a reversal of alliances, so much so that he cursed the nighttime curfew drills that were being carried out in the country and which he saw as an obstacle to a rapprochement with France and England, was dismayed by the British attitude towards our ships, which, in fact, pushed Italy into war.

On March 2, 1940, Ciano wrote in his diary: *"I receive Sir Noel Charles. I take this opportunity to tell him that control over coal belongs to that category of decisions that push Italy into the arms of Germany."*

These hostile acts were not mirrored by a similar British attitude towards other countries that were neutral at the time, so much so that many have suggested that, in reality, the British, at least from a certain point onwards, were determined, for mysterious reasons, to force Italy into the war.

The Marxist-trained Resistance historian Ernesto Ragionieri emphasized that Mussolini's decision to bring Italy into the war in June 1940 was closely linked to a British policy that he himself described as genuine "blackmail." Ragionieri writes in his *La Storia d'Italia (The History of Italy)*, published by Einaudi:

*<<The decision to intervene alongside Germany was made between February and March 1940. In that short period of time, Italy was subject to threefold and concentric pressure: economic pressure from England, political pressure from the United States, and political-economic pressure from Germany. It was the latter that prevailed and definitively influenced Mussolini's choice.*

*As the Russo-Finnish War drew to a close, England accelerated the implementation of all economic blockade measures which, within the framework of the "drôle de guerre," could constitute a decisive means of pressure. These included an embargo on ships transporting coal from Germany to Italy, which accounted for two-thirds of German supplies.*

*England, for its part, declared itself willing to cover most of Italy's coal needs, but, since Italy lacked the necessary foreign currency, it demanded war material worth a total of £15 million in return. The British blockade thus presented Italy with the same dead-end alternative that Mussolini's policy had led it to: accepting British blackmail would have meant a drastic reduction in Italy's already precarious war potential and, in practice, abandoning any ambition of becoming a great power; rejecting it meant giving up even the limited room for maneuver that Italian politics had carved out for itself with its declaration of non-belligerence.*

In any case, the alternative that clearly presented itself was either to betray the alliance with Germany and openly side with the Anglo-French, obviously renouncing our geopolitical claims, or to remain in limbo, waiting to be struck sooner or later.

**Aware of our intrinsic structural and, consequently, military weakness, Mussolini could have wished for anything except a European-wide war.**

Let's take a step back and note that Mussolini's entire policy, after the sectoral wars in North Africa and Spain, which had bled our finances dry, a policy that was also projected onto *the* costly and peaceful *E42 exhibition*, had always been aimed at seeking a framework of international security to protect the enormous efforts made in all fields by the regime in order to accelerate growth, Italy's power and prestige.

**It is no exaggeration to say that if it had not been for the social reforms and major works of the twenty-year period, despite all their shortcomings, contradictions, and in some cases pathetic displays of rhetoric, Italy would probably have remained an underdeveloped and backward country like certain countries in southern Europe or the Balkans.**

Grappling with these problems, Mussolini, who then definitively turned towards an alliance with Germany, left no stone unturned, even conducting surveys of Roosevelt (there is rightly talk of a heated correspondence with Churchill, but it is also necessary to consider the presence of important documentation regarding US-Italian relations). The presence of many immigrants in the United States, to whom Roosevelt was sensitive for electoral reasons, and the predictable American interest in undermining and occupying Britain's positions in Europe and Africa, could have been a card for Mussolini to play.

But Roosevelt was nothing more than a weapon, not even a particularly secret one, that cosmopolitan and Masonic high finance, with solid roots in America, had in store to proceed with the dismantling of the Fascist states in Europe and the destruction of Europe itself, and so the 'American card' played itself out.



## 8<sup>a</sup> INTRODUCTION

### **THE PACT OF STEEL AND THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP**



*&lt;&lt;It is incredible how historical unpredictability, determined more than anything else by a perfidious will that, from behind the scenes, is planning a world war and precluding any reconciliation of differences, creates paradoxical situations: Italy, which has an interest in acting as arbiter in the conflicts between Germany and the Anglo-French, ends up forming a strong alliance with the Germans. Russia and Germany, driven by a mutual destructive will , are entering into a pact*

*with secret clauses of enormous implications&gt;&gt;.*

And so it was that Italy, relying on Germany's assurance that it would restrain its policy until "the risk of war" for at least three years, entered into an alliance with Germany, ratified in **the Pact of Steel** (May 22, 1939). This pact was negotiated by Ciano with too much levity and was extremely "dangerous" because it provided for Italy's **automatic** intervention alongside Germany in the event of war.

Today we know, from the precise recollections of Edda Ciano Mussolini, of her father's despair when he had entrusted Ciano with the difficult task of negotiating a very different pact with the Germans and instead found himself bound by the clauses that Ciano had ended up negotiating, but honestly, based on the Duce's mandate, it is difficult to see how he could have achieved a different outcome.

For Mussolini, that pact was supposed to be another weapon to put pressure on the hostile policy of the Anglo-French, increasing our bargaining power, relying on German "military" cover and believing that the opposing sides could remain in static equilibrium. It was no coincidence that, on the eve of signing the pact, Mussolini let the British and French know that he was also willing to negotiate with them and, in this sense, encouraged a Vatican initiative for a global conference in Europe.

Furthermore, by binding Germany and Italy to the war effort, the Pact of Steel, with its deterrent effect, could function as an indirect instrument of peace.

In short, Mussolini was playing at those tables, carrying out a certain bluff, but Ciano was certainly the least suited to devise and impose at the same time,

assuming it was possible, maintaining the deterrent implicit in the pact itself towards the Anglo-French, at least a hidden safeguard clause.

But the Duce did not take into account that time was now running out and that the winds of war were blowing behind the scenes, because the Germans, at any cost, wanted to achieve their goals of expansionism in the East before the enemy grew stronger, and the Westerners, even more so at any cost, wanted to destroy Germany, liquidate fascism, and subjugate Europe.

Even a historian who is certainly not 'soft' on Italy, such as David Irving, acknowledges this:

*<<Since Hitler had avoided informing Mussolini of Operation White (the attack on Poland, ed.), the Italians seemed quite happy to sign a formal alliance pact with him. On May 6 (1939, ed.), Ribbentrop assured Italian Foreign Minister Ciano that Italy could count on a period of peace lasting at least three years. On the 22nd, Ciano came to Berlin to sign the Pact of Steel, and two days later, in Rome, General Milch signed a separate pact for the air force. Milch, however, returned to Hitler with the warning that Mussolini had emphasized that Italy would not be ready for war until 1942. In a memorandum to the Führer, the Duce even mentioned 1943.*

Thus, towards the end of August, when Hitler, thanks to the recent pact with Stalin, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - Ribbentrop pact that covered his back and ensured him the necessary supplies of material, had prepared the attack on Poland, counting also on **the deterrent** that the presence of Italy at his side, militarily weak but still constituting a vast strategic area to control, **would deter the Anglo-French from attacking him** by honoring the "guarantee" given to the Poles, Italy, on the other hand, shirked its obligations under the Pact of Steel, specifically the 'explosive' Article 3, which established the 'automatic' intervention of Italy alongside Germany.

Meanwhile, Ciano met with the ambassadors of France and England and gave them assurances that Italy would not enter the war: a blatant and extraordinarily rapid breach of the Pact!

The same national interest had practically prevailed in both countries: Hitler in disregarding his commitments to respect Italy's need not to be dragged into war for three years, as he had promised to do, and Mussolini in not respecting the Pact of Steel to the letter and therefore declaring himself ready to go to war, regardless, alongside Germany, especially since this was perhaps the only way to prevent the Anglo-French from unleashing war in Europe.

As is well known, in order to declare itself ready for war, Italy presented the Germans with a pretextual request for supplies that was so exaggerated that it was described as '*killing a bull*', knowing full well that the impossibility of fulfilling it would allow it to take refuge in the formula, albeit an unedifying one, of 'non-belligerence'.

An objective examination of the "breach" of the obligations set forth in the treaties can only conclude that this breach was mutual

given that the Germans, by signing the *Non-Aggression Pact* with the Soviets on August 23, 1939 (which, moreover, included heavy secret clauses), followed by the *Friendship Treaty* and trade agreements, had derogated from the commitments of the "Pact" with Italy, which in cases such as these provided for prior consultation. This was all the more so given that Italy also had its own interests in Eastern Europe.

In fact, on closer inspection, the Germans, with that "alliance" with the Soviets, had also circumvented the *Anti-Comintern* Pact, evading not only Italian interests, but also Spanish and Japanese ones. Tokyo in particular was shaken by this, given that the military clashes, or rather a kind of "undeclared war," between the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the Soviets on the border with Mongolia, where the Japanese suffered heavy losses, were not yet over.

But we will consider these aspects in more detail later, when we analyze the geopolitical needs of the nations involved and understand why Mussolini had to maneuver in a certain way.

**In any case, the real criticism that can be levelled at the Duce is not that he ultimately led us into war, since this was inevitable, but that he perhaps demanded too much from a people of *spaghetti eaters* and *mandolin players*, accustomed for centuries to servility towards foreigners. One wonders whether Italians were capable of sustaining a minimum of political ambition for their homeland and yearning for a certain independence, facing the tasks and risks that this path would present, or whether it would have been better to leave the whole country reduced to the status of a tourist resort, an immense spa of sun and sea, at the servile disposal of the masters of the world, offering them 40 million *waiters, prostitutes, and clowns*.**

In conclusion, today, with the benefit of hindsight, we can say that Hitler's geopolitical vision of a Euro-Asian space to be conquered in the East, which in fact became "Euro-Atlantic," aiming at a "global agreement" with the British, was impracticable. Although he was aware of Masonic power and international Judaism, he underestimated, as he admitted in his last days, the fact that behind the geopolitical interests of individual states, behind the London-New York axis, with Paris as a corollary, there were forces at work, particularly of a financial nature, which, consolidated in the use of power over the centuries, aimed at the destruction of Europe and its civilization (and therefore not only of the fascist states). Ergo, any 'accommodation' with the British was impossible.

Mussolini, on the other hand, who perhaps even more underestimated the impact of these 'financial' forces, sought to pursue a limited geopolitical policy of a partially Euro-African or 'Euro-Asian' nature, perhaps more in keeping with the historical moment and certainly more suited to our national interests.

Germany and Italy, however, each went their own way, pursuing their own national interests, underestimating the fact that the "enemy" would never, under any circumstances, allow them to survive.

**JUNE 10, 1940**

## REASONS FOR OUR INTERVENTION

*<<Now everyone wants to fire the first shot. The King, the General Staff, the leaders. As paradoxical as it may seem, I am the only pacifist left, I alone! [Mussolini to his son Vittorio].*



Today, more than 70 years after June 10, 1940, it is no easy task to trace the real reasons behind Italy's entry into the war, given that the Allied powers seized our state and military archives, while at the same time not making their own archives fully accessible (except for secondary documents

documents that are gradually declassified after a certain number of years), is certainly not an easy task.

Moreover, as we have seen in the extensive *Introduction*, we are also forced to work in the face of a "domesticated historiography" that seeks to present World War II as the result of Hitler's dreams of world domination when, on the contrary, it is undoubted that if Hitler played with fire, bringing the crisis in Europe to the brink of war, it is equally true that it was the "democracies," bolstered by immense future support from the United States, who, after achieving the time necessary for rearmament through a cautious policy of appeasement, stirred up the winds of war by exploiting Poland and decisively aiming for confrontation.

Starting from this premise, which is clearly overlooked but historically irrefutable, it must be borne in mind that any historical analysis that seeks to trace the causes of a global conflict must also find confirmation in the broad geopolitical lines of history.

**Just to mention one example, note that if Russia, instead of "joining the banquet" of war by entering Poland on September 16 (as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), had done so at the same time as the Germans on that fateful September 1, 1939, it would have been problematic for the Anglo-French to send an ultimatum and declare war on Germany alone.**

And so everything could have changed.

But it did not change, because it had been planned that things would go a certain way and, after all, Russia and Germany, apparently allies, actually wanted to destroy each other.

Historians base their historical reconstructions on 'documents', reports and various types of evidence, also taking into account the personal 'diaries' of the protagonists.

But this is not enough. **Diaries**, as we know, are already altered at source, as those who write them know that one day they will be used to judge their actions, but they are also often falsified when they are published. Ciano's diaries, for example, had some pages rewritten by the author himself around the summer of 1943, who evidently wanted to give a certain interpretation, in his defense, of the events of 1939-1940, exaggerating the Germans' failures and minimizing his own.

If we look beyond contingent details, divergent ideologies and interests, etc., we will find that the slow but inexorable "engine" of history is **geopolitics**, where states and nations divide, clash, and unite behind major geopolitical interests, the only ones that can guarantee future development and military security over time for the antagonistic poles of the earth: the continental and thalassocratic (sea-based) realities.

This assessment is absolutely true for the past, but perhaps a little less true since the 20th century, a century of enormous progress, especially in the field of transport and communications, with a tendency to "globalize" the economies and cultures of the planet. Transnational lobbies and consortia have come heavily into play, tending towards world domination free from ethnic and geographical references, globalization, in fact, because they are backed by a cosmopolitan financial power never seen before.

**In any case, the correspondence between military, economic, and ideological developments and trends and geopolitics remains an essential prerequisite for confirming the accuracy of historical analyses.**

It is on this basis that we will attempt to explain many obscure aspects of our participation in the war.

Mussolini was well aware that we had to enter the war, but conscious of our intrinsic weakness, he tried to take advantage of every expedient to risk as little as possible. If he had had a "metahistorical" vision of the conflict underway, which unfortunately he did not have at the time, he would have realized that Italy, a strategic geographical expression, and Fascism, a historical example that posed a serious threat to the masters of the world, were doomed to perish.

Consequently, it would have been more appropriate for us to enter the war by throwing everything we had and could do into the military effort, instead of, as we shall see, economizing and seeking "agreements."

But here too, the fateful question arises: with whom, politicians, institutions, and the military, could Mussolini wage a war to the bitter end, when 'pro-British' forces prevailed in the monarchy, Confindustria, the military, the navy, and the clergy?

Yet Mussolini must have realized that Fascism represented a revolutionary innovation that usurocratic democracies could not tolerate, not least because its "example" was perfectly achievable, not a utopia like Marxism, and therefore dangerous. Fascism was, in fact, a revolution that had affected every aspect of social and human existence.

Just think about how they managed to keep fascism alive!

But let's go back to 1940: as we know, Italy entered the war with a formula coined by Mussolini, that of *a "parallel war,"* essentially detached from German strategies (this was the formula that the Duce also explained to the King:<< *not for Germany, nor with Germany, but for Italy alongside Germany*>>).

It was clear that this "parallel war," which differed from German interests and objectives and, as we shall see, despite the secret "agreement" that would be reached with Churchill at the last moment, still had its own obligatory anti-British and not necessarily anti-French strategy.

The evident and secret "agreement," in fact, which was reached at the last moment between Mussolini and Churchill (an agreement hidden in the famous "Correspondence" made to disappear by the British) and which determined a mild start to our war operations, has led many to suspect that, all things considered, Mussolini's entry into the war was, paradoxically, more against Germany than against England and, moreover, various statements made by the Duce would suggest, as has been suggested, the hypothesis of Mussolini being a "secret enemy" of Hitler.

In reality, the idea that Mussolini may have been a "secret enemy of Hitler" is a forced interpretation of certain facts, analyzed without knowledge of the geopolitical background, because things are not at all as they appear, just as the opposite is not true either, namely that Mussolini was a tool in Hitler's hands.

These are all conjectures made by those who speak without knowing the background and geopolitical context of the time.

**It is true, however, that Italy played its strategic cards, up to and beyond its entry into the war, independently of German interests, and Mussolini agreed at the last moment to Churchill's "secret proposal," not to sabotage the German war effort, even though it did in fact damage the chances of victory, but simply because that agreement seemed to solve all our problems at a stroke.**

**After all, since Italy had to enter the war anyway, doing so with or without British consent did not make much difference.**

The geopolitical lines and strategic background behind major international events are not easily perceived from the outside and cannot be used to make moral judgments.

To give an example, when in 1936 Italy found itself isolated in its African war and was cornered by the Franco-British coalition, which led to sanctions and what followed, not everyone knows that, at the same time, a whole series of initiatives and agreements were taking place behind the scenes of diplomacy.

Thus, Italian military intervention was partly implemented through tacit agreement with the French (who were opposed to it, not only because of ideological prejudices, but also because they feared that Italy, preoccupied with other commitments, would withdraw from its role of keeping Germany in check), but also through secret agreements with the British, who ended up granting conditional consent, which helped to avoid a clash with the British, who could easily have prevented our ships from passing through to Djibouti (it seems that Mussolini had to sacrifice oil concessions we had in Iraq to appease the British).

Germany, on the other hand, openly supported Italy, and this support was significant because it allowed our country to emerge from isolation.

But even here, not everyone knows that Germany was not acting out of charity or ideological solidarity towards us, but was simply exploiting the golden opportunity that presented itself on the international stage, where the Ethiopian war was reshuffling the cards and shifting the center of gravity of politics to the Mediterranean and Africa, allowing Germany to venture into the planned political and military actions that would lead it to overturn the heavy conditions and ties that had been imposed on it at Versailles.

To this end, Germany's interest was essentially that our "African war" should last as long as possible, which is why, while the Germans supported us politically, economically, and diplomatically, they also secretly supplied weapons to the Negus's army in order to prolong the war.

**The machine guns firing at us were also German, and these "supplies" were not only commercial in nature, as was customary in such cases, but were also intended to prolong the war as long as possible.**

**We returned the "favor" years later when, during our non-belligerence, we secretly sold military parts to the Anglo-French to raise cash and earn currency.**

# MUSSOLINI'S GEOPOLITICS

Mussolini's geopolitical strategy, in any case, remained as far as possible, despite the ups and downs of a difficult alliance between partners (Italy and Germany) with unbalanced economic and military potential, a necessarily anti-British geopolitics, and it could not be otherwise given the unyielding British hostility towards us and their interests diametrically opposed to ours in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean (which the British considered 'their' lake) and in Africa (Italy's position and policies of 'participatory colonialism' with the natives in Africa could, in the long term, constitute a real loose cannon for the British balance of power in that part of their empire). Geopolitics was therefore essentially anti-British, while at the same time remaining distinct and cautious towards the Germans.

However, our statement of an "anti-British" geopolitics, which already manifested itself, albeit mildly, in the agreements and recognition of Soviet Russia in 1923-24 and in the Corfu crisis of August 1923, where the British took a dim view of our intervention to protect the offense received (the assassination of General Tellini) in an area of interest to them, requires clarification, because history is not as linear and clear as it might appear.

## ***The ridiculous hypothesis of 'Mussolini as a British agent'***

Today we know that after Caporetto, the British, concerned about our internal front, financed Mussolini and his newspaper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, aware that it was the only force that could be counted on to prevent Italy from collapsing.

Mussolini accepted that funding, after all, it was a country allied with us in the war, as all revolutionaries do, for example Lenin, who was financed by Wall Street, which was interested in the collapse of Russia, and Hitler, who was financed by various banks, including Jewish ones.

On closer inspection, Lenin was also supported by the German Kaiser, who was interested in Russia's military collapse and its exit from the war. Lenin's collaboration, in this case, however, resulted in heavy clauses imposed on Russia in the peace negotiations with the Germans in Brest-Litovsk in 1918.

However, funding for Mussolini and fascism continued even after the March on Rome (see the research by G. Fasanelle and M. Cereghino, *Nero di Londra*, Ed. Chiarelettere 2022), and even in the early years of the regime, the British had an interest in not interfering. The fact is that an Italy, a natural aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean, with a strong government, avoiding the possibility of Bolshevik revolutions, was also in the British interest for the stability of oil routes in the Mediterranean.

So there was nothing extraordinary or compromising about this; on the contrary, the British were also aware, as Fasanelle and Cereghino themselves wrote in a previous book, *Colonia Italia*, Ed. Chiarelettere, 2015:

***"London discovers anti-British fascism. In a Secret Service report, the account of a conversation that took place in 1923 between Mussolini and Indian independence activists: 'Italy will never be prosperous and powerful as long as the British control the Mediterranean.'"***

The fact is that in the 1920s, Mussolini, having risen to the top of the state, moved on the international stage with the intention of maintaining a certain balance in Europe and thus smoothing out imbalances and injustices that were too obvious, such as the outcomes of Versailles and harbingers of warlike reactions that were not convenient for us, recovering some positions that had been denied us in the "peace treaty" and, in any case, to maintain the former wartime alliance with the French and British.

However, from his very first diplomatic steps at the Lausanne Conference in November 1922, it became clear that the British had no intention of fulfilling the commitments they had signed up to in the London Pact in 1915 to have us on their side in the war and then failed to fulfill at Versailles in 1919.

In any case, Mussolini, due to the aftermath of his culture formed during his anarcho-socialist period, his experiences and traditions, in particular his irredentism and the interventionist period (with the corollary of all the propaganda against the Germans, the "Krauts"), moved in the wake of what was the Entente and therefore with a view to an alliance with Great Britain.

He instinctively feared Pan-Germanism, fearing that German domination of Europe could lead to the loss of what little had been gained in the Great War. With this in mind, he planned to use France, albeit an enemy or rival, as a bulwark to prevent the Germans from reaching the Tyrrhenian Sea or the gates of western Italy, while Austria would constitute a further barrier to prevent them from reaching the Brenner Pass.

These guarantees failed when Austria reunited with Germany (the Duce opposed the Germans over Austria, to the point of sending a division to the Brenner Pass near the border in 1934, but in 1938 he was forced to accept reunification, given the collapse of any common international policy with his former allies and the Anglo-French actions decidedly hostile to us, while we could only find support in Germany). Then, in 1940, there was the unexpected collapse of France, which forced us to hasten our intervention in the war so as not to let Hitler, breaking through on that front and reaching the Tyrrhenian Sea, win alone and across the board.

Many "idealists," convinced by certain ideological similarities between fascism and National Socialism, will consider Mussolini's policy of power balance in Europe to be inconsistent with those ideals.

But history, the needs of peoples, and the geopolitical interests of nations do not always follow "ideals." After all, on the other side, Hitler also adhered strictly to German interests.

At the same time, however, geopolitical needs led the Duce to take an interest in and defend Italy's position in the Mediterranean, to resolve the problem of raw materials and demographic expansion in Africa and, therefore, inevitably, to clash with British interests.

And just when he tried to achieve these primary objectives, in the mid-1930s he found himself opposed above all by the British, who also reneged on previous assurances that, within certain limits, they would accept Italian expansion in Africa.

The alliance with Germany, certainly facilitated by ideological similarities, gradually came about thanks to these contradictions, whereby the agreements that Mussolini was making with the Germans (even including the Pact of Steel) were not so much strategic in nature as they were intended to encourage the British to pay more attention to Italy's needs and increase its bargaining power. so they always intended to leave the door open to possible future agreements with the British, perhaps in a changed general context that now had to take into account the recognized position of power achieved by the Germans in Europe.

In practice, Mussolini deluded himself, unable to do otherwise, that somehow a mutually satisfactory agreement could be reached with the British, which is why he always left open a more or less secret diplomatic channel that could pursue these goals.

After all, Mussolini, taking into account our geopolitical problems as an island and peninsula, could not completely trust the Germans, even though he could count on Hitler's sincere assurances that he would even guarantee our positions in South Tyrol. **But geopolitics extends over time, and no one could guarantee what direction Germany would take in the future after the Führer's death.**

And we cannot blame the Duce if we read the pages of Joseph Goebbels' diary on May 10, 1938, when he and Hitler passed through Merano. Goebbels writes: " << " *In the background, we see some South Tyroleans in tears. It breaks our hearts. Farewell. Forever?* >>".

And in that question lay a whole future, after Hitler's death, that no one could guarantee.

Mussolini's anti-British geopolitics was therefore, in the objective situation of national interests at stake, not so much an immediate political objective of the Duce, who in fact, through diplomatic channels, especially through the pro-British ambassador and friend of Churchill, Dino Grandi, was pursuing the path of an agreement.

But all this only up to a certain point, because when this goal, due to piracy and the British desire to dominate the Mediterranean, failed to materialize, **Mussolini resolutely stuck to defending national interests and ended up finding himself at arms with the British and perhaps even opposed or in bad blood with**

**some elements of fascism and, above all, of the economy, finance, the monarchy, etc., who, on the other hand, being Anglophiles regardless and always, would in any case have pursued, even at a loss, the path of keeping Italy in the British orbit.**

The objective need for an anti-British geopolitical strategy and, at the same time, the political and diplomatic necessities of the time, in a context of our great economic and military weakness, must be kept in mind, both to fully understand the events and because, as we shall see, this contradiction conceals the feasibility of a secret and temporary "agreement" of mutual convenience between Italy and England at the time of our entry into the war. the feasibility of a secret and temporary "agreement" of mutual convenience between Italy and England at the time of our entry into the war.

### ***The cursed British legacy in Italy***

In historical analyses of our country's relations in Europe, we must always bear in mind, as we shall see in the next paragraph, that the British were extremely interested in controlling Italy, a natural aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean.

When, in the mid-19th century, plans for the opening of the Suez Canal became a reality, which then took place in 1869, the British (but also the French) immediately sensed the great strategic importance of the Mediterranean, especially as the importance of oil in industry and transport was also emerging and, consequently, that of our peninsula as a natural bridge between the Mediterranean and Africa.

It was at that point that support for Italian independence was no longer merely tactical or idealistic-Masonic, but became operational and strategic.

So we accomplished the Risorgimento under the aegis of Freemasonry and with the not-so-secret support of the British.

As a result, trade agreements, economic and banking transactions, cultural circles, businesses, publishing, everything had such a strong British influence that it developed under those auspices, and in 1940 we found ourselves entering the war with the British, where quite a few generals, industrialists, and publishers, partly due to various family ties, did not like this choice.

**Today we can say, to the eternal shame of our compatriots, that the British did not even need many spies in Italy, as they could count on many of their 'friends', relatives, and associates.**

**We can safely say that the betrayal of September 8 was not an exceptional or random event!**

# THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY ACHIEVED IN THE INTERESTS OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH

*&lt;&lt;The fact that the unification of Italy was achieved under Masonic and Anglo-French supervision, determining the development of our economy and finance, in addition to the cultural influences that resulted from it, had disastrous consequences a century later when, in 1940, we entered the war against the Anglo-French&gt;&gt;.*

To express a concrete historical and geopolitical consideration about our country, we must start from this fact: Italy's independence and unity came about through Franco-British action and through Freemasonry.

This legacy would have decisive consequences on the political, cultural, and economic characteristics of 20th-century Italy.

Despite this, however, once Italy had formed as a nation, our sacrosanct geopolitical interests could not fail to emerge, especially in view of the fact that we had a serious demographic problem, which had always been solved only by emigration, and an absolute lack of raw materials. The solution to these problems lay in Africa, but this affected British interests.

There is no doubt that when, in 1915, Italy withdrew, not very elegantly, from the thirty-year Triple Alliance with the Central Powers to join the Entente and fight the Great War alongside the Anglo-French, we did indeed resolve some irredentist problems in Trentino and the Adriatic (among other things, renouncing those such as Nice, Savoia, Corsica, etc. with respect to France), but we helped the wrong 'side', because our geopolitical enemies, more than the Central Powers, were the British, who claimed dominion over the Mediterranean sector, which was even more vital for us.

Then, in 1919, at the Versailles Peace Conference, the Allies reneged on many of the promises they had made, even though they had signed the 1915 Treaty of London.

For historical reasons, partly cultural, Mussolini (a socialist who had been exiled to Switzerland, then frequented and embraced the cause of irredentism in Cesare Battisti's Trentino) found himself among the "interventionists" who pushed for intervention in the war as the fulfillment of the Risorgimento, against the Central Powers. It was Freemasonry and the Anglo-French themselves who provided funding and support for these positions.

Subsequently, 'ideological' criticism was levelled at Mussolini for his interventionism, which was in fact pro-Anglo-French, but we must take into account certain historical and cultural traditions, the fact that history does not leap forward, and above all the fact that **at the time almost all the revolutionaries and the agitators were in the camp**

**interventionist and Mussolini, having perceived the war as an epoch-making turning point to overturn the old systems and cultures, could only find the human material suitable for this purpose in that field.**

**Many were surprised that when Fascism was born in Piazza S. Sepolcro, at least eighty of the hundred or so people present had Masonic cards in their pockets. The fact is that at the time, Freemasonry was not only a sect and a lobby, as Catholics saw it, but also a cultural phenomenon. Practically speaking, Italian culture was steeped in Catholic, aristocratic, or Masonic influences. And the agitators and revolutionary tendencies were all in the Masonic camp. That is why Fascism, emerging as a new and revolutionary phenomenon, with its roots in Interventionism, found itself surrounded by many Masons, who then had to choose: either Fascism or Freemasonry.**

But later, with the advent of fascism and despite this historical legacy, the true geopolitical interests of the nation could not be evaded or stifled, and so Italy set out to conquer the Empire with major demographic and construction projects in Libya. And it was inevitable that we would find ourselves facing our true enemy of all time: the British.

But how can it be countered, given the country's extreme economic and military weakness?

Not to mention that decades of trafficking and the Masonic influence in Italy, behind which our economy and finance had grown, if not been born, and considering also the House of Savoy, which had always been Anglophile, made a real fight, an all-out war against the British, extremely problematic.

**Mussolini therefore had to juggle, play cunningly, bluff, seek all possible avenues, hope that the balance of power in Europe would not be too markedly disrupted, always bearing in mind the real interests of the nation. The alliance with Germany was also part of this practice.**

The weakness of this international policy lay not so much in the fact that England would never come to terms with giving up its interests in the Mediterranean and Africa, especially as oil routes became strategically important, but in the fact that by 1937, the strategy of eliminating fascist, anti-liberal states from Europe, which demanded control of economic and financial sectors in the interests of the nation, had taken shape and gained momentum, thus heralding dangerous departures from the strategies of a future world government to which they aspired. and anti-liberal states that sought control, in the interests of the nation, of the economic and financial sectors, thus heralding dangerous disconnections from the strategies of a future world government to which, above all, the large financial lobbies overseas were looking.

That being the case, and perhaps Mussolini was not fully aware of it at the time, no real agreement could be reached or forced with the British, who were tied to the City, either in terms of mutual national interests or, even less so, in terms of the forces at play behind the scenes.

**Or rather, a real agreement with the British was possible, but only at the price of renouncing our geopolitical prospects and our vital interests, reducing fascism to mere folklore.**

But no matter how hard he tried to reach an agreement with the British on peaceful coexistence, no matter how many secret deals he made with them, the objective reality of geopolitical conflicts was always there to call everything into question. It was no coincidence, for example, that when the Axis was first formed in October 1936, Mussolini also adopted a pro-Arab policy, so much so that when hostilities broke out between the Palestinians and the Zionists and the British, Mussolini not only took the Arab side, but also provided substantial aid (it is estimated that between 1936 and 1938 Mussolini financed the Grand Mufti to the tune of £138,000) and even set up the first European broadcasts in Arabic on Radio Bari.

It should also be added that this Italian policy in the area had some inconsistent aspects, as shown by the "aid" Mussolini gave to Jabotinsky's Jewish Zionist teams, where the Duce believed that the Jews, who were also willing to carry out acts of anti-British terrorism, would cause damage to the British in the Middle East and therefore it was worth supporting them in this sense.

Finally, it cannot be ignored that although the government was pursuing a policy of demands that was unwelcome in London, and which would have required the support of the entire nation to sustain it, in reality the British were well established in our country, where they controlled and were present in various key sectors, from the economy to finance, journalism, dynastic circles, the military, and so on. It was a subtle, well-concealed but substantial presence, an incredible ball and chain for those who wanted to free themselves from the British (see the excellent book by Giovanni Fasanella and Mario Cereghino: *Colonia Italia*, Ed. Chiarelettere 2015, based on many declassified documents

And this was clearly seen when things took a turn for the worse for us during the war.

# HITLER'S GEOPOLITICS

*Although Hitler's affection for Mussolini was sincere and he would have honored his commitments to Italy, and although the Fascist and National Socialist revolutions were part of the same vision of life and the world, the goal of Hitler's policy was a global agreement with the British, and at that point Italy would have been strangled between the two giants. Mussolini could not fail to take this into account.*

Certainly Mussolini, in addition to the spread of the conflict, also feared that the British and Germans would reach an agreement on a global scale (which was very different from a European agreement, also desired by Italy, that would avoid or interrupt the conflict already underway).

In fact, Hitler's Germany had a classic geopolitical vision, simple so to speak, aimed at a space in the East, the only way for a continental power to dominate the continent and secure energy and food sources. In practice, this was a Euro-Asian geopolitical vision, with Russia seen as a vital space to be conquered and subjugated, but then directed towards a global agreement with the British, which ended up becoming a Euro-Atlantic geopolitics.

From this perspective, Italy was considered an indispensable ally to cover southern Europe, and in this sense, Hitler was even willing to give up South Tyrol (a bone of contention with the Italians) for good.

However, this geopolitics was complicated by the Führer's Pan-Germanism, which was based on racial grounds (largely "biological" in nature) and therefore more suited to the German people (and we know how many complications this racist view caused in the occupied territories in Russia). but above all, as mentioned, he also cultivated another ambitious dream, or rather a specific goal, that of reaching a large-scale agreement with the British, considered "brothers of the same race": Germany would have the continent, England the Empire, also guaranteeing it its strategic points such as Gibraltar, Suez, Aden, Singapore, Hong Kong, Cape Town, and the Falkland Islands.

Hitler's personal aide, Fritz Wiedemann, recalls that the Führer said:

**<<If I had to choose between Great Britain and Mussolini, the choice would be clear: Italy is certainly closer to us ideologically, but politically I see a future only alongside Great Britain>>.**

These were choices that had been made long ago and to which the Führer always adhered. In 1928, Hitler wrote clearly that it was necessary to promote an understanding with Great Britain and its Empire in order to dictate the history of the entire planet **together**. But he did not take into account the principles of geopolitics, according to which the British, a thalassocratic power, would remain enemies of Germany, a terrestrial power.

An agreement with Great Britain, Italy's main and irreversible enemy, which opposed our presence in Africa in every way, contested the "fourth shore," claimed to dictate law in the Mediterranean, an area of vital interest to our country, and opposed us equally in the Balkans.

As we have seen, there is an indisputable historical fact: the British, with a view to controlling the Mediterranean and Southern Europe, had contributed to our Risorgimento, while at the same time placing a heavy burden on the autonomy of our foreign policy, but above all, with the opening of the Suez Canal in November 1869, Italy had become strategically crucial to British interests.

But Hitler's desire to come to an agreement with the British was so great that in August 1940, in the midst of the war, General Leeb, after a conference held by Hitler with the newly appointed field marshals, wrote:

***<<...Germany does not want to crush Great Britain because that would mean conceding the entire continent to Japan, India to the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean to Italy, and global trade to the United States>>.***

Note the reluctance to grant Italy what was actually its right: the Mediterranean! So much so that one day in 1941, Hitler pointed out that the alliances in place were more alliances of convenience than anything else, adding:

***<<The German people know that our alliance with Italy is only an alliance between me and Mussolini. We Germans have sympathies only for Finland. We could find some sympathy for Sweden and, of course, for Great Britain.***

***A German-British alliance would be an alliance between two peoples! Great Britain should just keep its hands off Europe, it could keep its empire, and if it wants, the whole world>>.***

Hitler's geopolitics, influenced by Karl Haushofer, effectively became **Euro-Asian** in terms of the living space that Hitler wanted to secure in the East, but it took on a **Euro-Atlantic** character that was profoundly different from the **Euro-African or Euro-Asian character** desired by Mussolini.

And Hitler pursued this "global agreement" until the very end, counting on the fact that the emergence of two global superpowers, the USA and the USSR, which had risen in a very short time to the rank of thalassocratic powers (the USA) or essentially terrestrial powers (the Soviets), with aims of world domination, would force England to review its recurring policy of attacking and destroying the emerging European nation on the continent:

from Louis XIV to Napoleon to Wilhelm II, England, in fact, a thalassocratic nation, had always acted, and could not do otherwise, in this sense: dividing its adversaries, betraying alliances and recomposing them, attacking them or allying itself with continental or maritime nations (such as Italy in the First World War).

But the fact is that this hope went against geopolitical trends, whereby a nation on the sea was destined to go against those on land.

Hitler, in what was called his "testament," even though some passages were later edited, wrote significantly in self-criticism:

*'Let us turn our minds for a moment to the conditions of Pitt's time [William Pitt the Younger, May 28, 1759 – January 23, 1806, was a British politician. He served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from December 19, 1783, to March 14, 1801, and then from May 10, 1804, to 1806].*

*From England's point of view, he was perfectly justified in refusing to negotiate with Napoleon. By maintaining a firm stance in impossible circumstances, he ensured that his country would be able to play the role that it did in the nineteenth century.*

*It was a policy aimed at making the country's existence possible. Churchill, by refusing to come to terms with me, has condemned his country to a policy of suicide. He has made the same mistakes as generals who wage war according to the principles of the previous war. There are now elements that cannot be adapted to such a scheme of things. The new crucial factor is the existence of those giants, the United States and Russia. Pitt's England ensured the balance of world power by preventing the hegemony of Europe... that is, by preventing Napoleon from achieving his goal. Churchill's England, on the other hand, should have allowed the unification of Europe if it wanted to maintain the same balance of power.*

*At the beginning of this war, I did my best to act as if I believed Churchill was capable of realizing the truth of this grand policy; and in his moments of lucidity, he did indeed understand it. But for a long time now, Churchill has tied himself hand and foot to the Jewish chariot. My aim in trying to come to terms with England was to avoid creating an irreparable situation in the West. Later, when I attacked in the East and cut into the communist abscess, I hoped that by doing so I would rekindle a spark of common sense in the minds of the Western Powers.*

*I offered them a way to contribute to an act of catharsis without lifting a finger, whereby they could safely entrust the task of ridding the West of its infestation to our hands alone. But the hatred these hypocrites harbored against a man of good faith was stronger than their sense of self-preservation. I had underestimated the power of the Jews' domination over Churchill's England. They preferred, in fact, to perish of starvation than to welcome National Socialism among them. If forced by force, they could have tolerated a facade of anti-Semitism on our part. But our absolute decision to eradicate Jewish power, branches and roots, throughout the*

*world was too tough a meat for their delicate stomachs to digest!*

*Pitt's genius lay in implementing a realistic policy in harmony with the conditions of the time, which enabled his country to make a truly extraordinary recovery and secured its world supremacy in the nineteenth century. The slavish imitation of this policy, which Churchill is now pursuing*

*- without taking into account the fact that conditions are not at all the same - is pure nonsense. The fact is that the world has progressed since Pitt's time! For a whole century, changes did indeed come slowly, but the First World War accelerated the pace, and the present war has brought us to the final reckoning!*

*At the beginning of the 19th century, from the point of view of power, only Europe mattered. The great Asian empires had slipped into a sleep that resembled the sleep of death. The New World continued to be nothing more than an outgrowth of the old world, and no one could reasonably have foreseen the prodigious destiny reserved for the thirteen British colonies that had just won their freedom... Thirteen! I am not superstitious, but this episode tempts me to become so! That new state developed so immeasurably over the course of a hundred years that by the beginning of the twentieth century it had already become a world power...!*

*During the decisive period between 1930 and 1940, the situation was completely different from that which had existed in the days of Pitt and Napoleon. Europe, exhausted by a great war, had lost the pride of its supremacy and its dominant role was no longer recognized. It remained one of the centers of attraction on earth, but it was steadily losing its importance in the face of the growing power of the United States of America, the Russian-Asian colossus, and the Empire of the Rising Sun.*

*If fate had granted aging and weakened England a new Pitt instead of this Jewish-dominated, half-American drunkard, the new Pitt would have immediately understood that the traditional British policy of balance of power now had to be applied on a different scale, this time on a global scale. Instead of maintaining, creating, and stirring up European rivalries, England should do everything possible to promote and achieve the unification of Europe. Allied with a united Europe, it would still retain the possibility of playing the role of arbiter in world affairs.*

**In this situation, according to historical law, Italy, although allied with Germany, if the Anglo-German global agreement had gone ahead, with the British having interests that were completely opposed to ours, such an agreement could only have been against Italian interests.**

# MUSSOLINI'S DRAMA

*<<Here we have two empires fighting, two lions. We have no interest in either of them winning outright. If England won, it would leave us with nothing but the sea to swim in. If Germany won, we would feel the weight of it. One might wish that the two lions would tear each other apart, leaving their tails on the ground, and then go and pick them up... [Mussolini to Giuseppe Bottai].*

The above significant concept, expressed by Mussolini to Bottai, captures the difficult situation he found himself in:

- as an ally of Germany, he could only hope for German military success, but at the same time he hoped that this success would not be too excessive (above all, he hoped that France would be weakened, but not totally defeated and occupied);
- interested, for our own security, in peace in Europe, could only urge an agreement—an armistice between the Anglo-French and the Germans—but at the same time ensure that this "agreement" was not an Anglo-German monopoly and projected on a global scale;
- Finally, he had to be present in the theater of war to avoid Italy's exclusion from the definition of the war's outcome, but at the same time he was unable to face a war of that magnitude, and so on.

This was the drama that the Duce was experiencing at the time, especially as the leader of a nation that was "rebellious" towards certain difficult choices, partly because, as the heir to the Masonic Risorgimento, it had an industry, finance, and a large part of its culture (except for the Catholic culture, which was opposed in another sense) and publishing, in tune with the Anglo-French, and then there were the interests of the House of Savoy and the Vatican, which were certainly not "Italian"!

And we can imagine how much the British relied on their "friendships" with the House of Savoy, but today we also know, from declassified British documents, how the British had always financed or bribed journalists, writers, and cultural circles to maintain a pro-British stance (see: Mario J. Cereghino and Giovanni Fasanella: *Colonia Italia*, op. cit.).

The consequences of this complex and precarious situation became apparent almost immediately, as early as the fall of 1940, a few months after our intervention, when Mussolini, after the first defeats of the Italian army, found himself practically alone in defending the interests of the nation, while many old Anglophile "affections" reemerged.

One need only read what he had to say to Hitler during their meeting at the 'Wolf's Lair' in August 1941, at the height of the offensive against Russia. On that occasion, the Duce confided to the Führer, who was shocked:

*"Tell me what you would do if you had officers who had doubts about the regime and its ideologies... and who said, while you were talking about your ideology or reasons of state, that they were monarchists and owed allegiance only to the King?"*

This also explains Mussolini's contradictory and vacillating behavior during the previous non-belligerence and everything else, given that he could not count on a solid and compact base around him.

Yet perhaps all that was needed was a decisive, all-out offensive by our navy, which at that time (summer 1940) certainly had superiority in the Mediterranean, to create a situation that was extremely favorable to the Axis war operations and guarantee our future supplies in Africa. Admiral Andrew Cunningham, commander-in-chief of the British fleet in the Mediterranean, wrote significantly, although perhaps exaggerating the size of our naval forces a little:

*"If the Italian force had acted with greater determination and attacked the British ships, it would certainly have secured dominance of the Mediterranean.... It would have been enough for a few merchant ships loaded with cement or explosives to be sunk in the Suez Canal or off the port of Alexandria to paralyze British naval operations.... But then, if after the defeat of France, the Italians had attacked with battleships and cruisers, we would have had to retreat."*

But as we shall see, in part the "agreement" with Churchill in June 1940 and then, above all, the actions of Anglophile circles, of those Freemasons awakened from the "slumber" into which Fascism had relegated them during the twenty years of its rule, and of treacherous generals, prevented all this from happening.

Returning to our politics, which, as we have seen, were inevitably "cautious and vacillating," in April 2010, the historical journalist Fabio Andriola published an article in the magazine *Storia in Rete* ("May God save me from my enemies, I'll guard myself against my friends") showing how Mussolini, still in the midst of war, was also wary of a possible German attack (which he had taken into account and feared) and in any case remained cautious and ambiguous with regard to the Axis policy.

This is a story that needs to be rewritten and shows how the Axis was in propaganda, but not in reality, and in fact, while Mussolini's geopolitics were essentially anti-British, at the same time, the Duce feared the establishment of German hegemony in Europe and therefore acted accordingly.

Andriola, in fact, recalled Italy's "strange" (to say the least) behavior, not only during the period of our *non-belligerence* (when, caught in a disastrous financial situation, there was even a limited sale of war material to the Anglo-French), but even until 1942

, when we were busily building imposing fortifications (confidentially nicknamed the "*linea non mi fido*" or "I don't trust line") in Cadore, Carnia, and Tarvisio, the "Vallo Littorio" in the north-northeast to protect Italy from a possible German invasion.

**Incredibly, while fighting a war alongside Germany, Italy, which had begun work at a frenetic pace at the end of November 1939 during its non-belligerence, was at the same time preparing and equipping itself as if, sooner or later, it would have to face its friendly nation.**

The hierarch Tullio Cianetti, who visited those construction sites in the summer of 1940, wrote in his diary that he had begun to wonder whether they were working for the Axis war effort or against it. What was happening?

What were the consequences of this "dual-track" policy which, for example, on December 16, 1939, after Ciano's speech to the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations (inspired by Mussolini), distanced itself from the Germans' reasons for war and recalled their commitments (unfortunately not put in writing) which were not kept, not to force war in Europe for at least another three years, risked damaging the alliance with Germany?

The answer lay simply in the maxim of the ancient Romans, according to which: **"the salvation of the Fatherland is the supreme law,"** but unfortunately, today we can say that the consequences were disastrous.

Mussolini, meanwhile, knew full well that, especially after our non-participation in the war effort alongside the Germans at the end of August 1939, in breach of the Pact of Steel, the alliance with Germany had sunk to its lowest ebb and, indeed, at that moment, in Germany, perhaps a military campaign against Italy, extending as far as South Tyrol, would have been the most popular of all, so much so that some German generals, hostile to Italy and contrary to the Führer, even went so far as to describe Mussolini as "half-negroid."

But above all, in the early months of our belligerence, our intervention in the war had not yet been decided and therefore, as our neutrality continued in the explosive situation and with the foreseeable strategic and military changes in Europe, it could not be entirely ruled out that the Germans themselves would have a military need to invade and occupy our territory.

This was another reason why the Vallo Littorio was given priority and substantial funding.

Ultimately, history can be analyzed in its specific contingent developments, or summarized and framed "outside of time and space," that is, in a meta-historical dimension.

In the latter case, to stay on topic, it is perfectly legitimate to frame fascism and National Socialism as a product of European civilization, a manifestation of "Tradition" in *recent times*, suited to *the century of the masses* where a common vision of life and the world

led Italy and Germany to wage a "war of blood against gold" against the democracies of the liberal West and Soviet Bolshevism.

**From this perspective, our war would have been sacrosanct regardless, not least because the enemy had every intention of destroying us.**

However, this is precisely a meta-historical discourse that affects the ideological field, whereas in the historiographical field, events must be seen from another perspective, where ideological factors and party ideals often do not go hand in hand with geopolitical interests and reasons of state, where men pass away, but nations remain, meaning that, in that alliance, the ideological similarities between fascism and National Socialism did not play a predominant role in the course of the war.

A war that, as we have seen, was influenced by Germany's obsession with reaching an agreement with the British. There is no doubt about these assumptions in German politics, both considering their geopolitical strategies and diplomatic approaches at the time, until the war was well underway, and the many testimonies that exist on the subject.

Schwering Von Krossing also recalls that Hitler took into account the words of a dying Marshal Hindenburg: "*Do not trust the Italians*," words which, as historian David Irving points out, would have been the basis for his eventual choice between Great Britain and Italy.

However, all this does not detract from the fact that, in historical terms, transcending details and contingencies, June 10, 1940, was ultimately what the former combatants of the FNCRSI stated in their leaflet:

**<<Blood against gold; labor against speculation and intrigue; Anglo-Saxon and Soviet slave owners against proletarians who wanted the fruits of their labor>>.**

Franco Cardini writes:<< *That "proletarian and fascist Italy" evoked in terms that were at once laconic and rhetorical was not presented as victorious and powerful. On the contrary, it sided with the poor, the "wretched of the earth," the exploited.*

***Behind the Duce, cloaked in his gold-braided uniform, loomed the shadow of the young Benito Mussolini, socialist agitator and interventionist: the war destined to overturn the destinies of the world, topple the thrones of the powerful, and exalt the fate of the dispossessed. A war that was truly the continuation of that of 1914-1918, the settling of accounts that it had failed to close, the reaction against the deceptions and injustices of the "unjust peace" of Versailles. A war whose declared aim was to break the geopolitical prison of the Mediterranean that enclosed a young power within the lake guarded by the two gates of Gibraltar and Suez, firmly in British hands.***

## A REFERENCE TO THE MUSSOLINI-CHURCHILL "CORRESPONDENCE"

*&lt;&lt;Those who stubbornly or maliciously deny the existence of compromising secret correspondence between Mussolini and Churchill cannot adequately explain the facts and events surrounding our entry into the war&gt;&gt;.*

Let us now consider another matter, that of the "correspondence" between Mussolini and Churchill, documents of enormous importance for decoding all these events and which, as we know, Mussolini took with him on his last trip to Valtellina, but once captured, after various vicissitudes, ended up in the hands of the British, who made it disappear.

Today, many observers are gradually identifying the true contents of the Churchill-Mussolini correspondence, except that, perhaps, they still cannot say certain things clearly (it is not good for one's career to diverge too much from the ideological lines of the anti-fascist imagery that underlies the "regime").

But, of course, and even worse, there is no shortage of those who deny the existence of these documents, who take advantage of both the lack of objective evidence and the presence of several forgeries that end up devaluing the research.

However, for the events surrounding the "Correspondence," there are at least three texts that are essential reading, to which we refer you: F. Andriola: *Mussolini Churchill il carteggio segreto (Mussolini Churchill: The Secret Correspondence)*, SugarCo 2007; then U. Giuliani Balestrino: *Il carteggio Churchill Mussolini alla luce del processo Guareschi (The Churchill-Mussolini correspondence in light of the Guareschi trial)*, Ed. Settimo Sigillo 2010; and R. Festorazzi: *Mistero Churchill (The Churchill Mystery)*, Ed. Macchione 2013.

In reality, apart from a whole series of papers, letters, memoranda, secret agreements, etc., all concerning the years prior to the war, **due to the importance it assumed in our decision to enter the war in June 1940, we are interested in what happened between the Duce and Churchill at the level of underground diplomacy, where a certain "convenience" arose with the British behind a mutual state of necessity that occurred at the very moment of our entry into the war.**

Historians are still essentially divided between those who, naively or in bad faith, continue to deny the existence of this 'Correspondence', while another minority goes beyond all imagination and even suggests a precise Italian-British alliance against Germany, bordering on outright betrayal.

In reality, it was instead an "agreement" made in passing, at a particular moment, profitable and functional (although it later proved catastrophic) for our war policy

and, on the contrary, a ploy by Churchill to implement an unacknowledged war strategy and therefore, once achieved, it was not to be revealed by either side.

As already mentioned, everything stems from our historical and geopolitical situation, where it is well known that Mussolini was working to elevate Italy to the rank of a medium power in the Mediterranean and Southern Europe, finding the solution to the demographic and raw material supply problems (our atavistic structural deficiency) in the African colonies. Under these conditions, determined by geography, the only way to safeguard Italy's independence was to play the role of a medium-sized power.

**The tragedy was that our geopolitics could only be an expression of a maritime power, but at the same time with an eye on the continent: insular and peninsular.**

For an economically weak nation, lacking in energy resources and militarily weak, and moreover with East Africa disconnected, this was a real tragedy. But the biggest tragedy was the unyielding aversion and relative interference of the British.

Summing up the situation, Mussolini said the following to his doctor Georg Zachariae during the Italian Social Republic: << *England, which has many interests in the Mediterranean as a route of communication with Egypt and India, was envious of the influence Italy was gaining in the Mediterranean basin, the Balkans, the Near East, and Africa. **British hostility could certainly not deter me from my plans, because it would have been better to leave Italy to its fate***>>.

Franco Cardini writes, perfectly summarizing the situation at the time:

*<<If we consider that unified Italy had been founded eighty years earlier with the not entirely disinterested support of France first and then England, who sought to place their commercial and port pawns on a peninsula that, with the opening of the Suez Canal, would become an important Mediterranean port on the route to the oceans, Italy's entry into the war in 1940 takes on a perspective that is not usually considered: that of the country's definitive liberation from a subordinate role in the European political landscape.*

*The tragedy was that this plan was destined to fit into the context of an even stronger and more tragic subordination: that to Nazi Germany. Here, the skilled juggler Mussolini, who until then had had the luck and ability to build the myth of Italian power on a series of well-played coups and bluffs – the last of which was his role as mediator in the Munich Agreement of 1938 – now found himself having to confront the real unresolved issue of his policy>> (F. Cardini: *A reflection on the seventieth anniversary of Italy's entry into the war*).*

If our geographical position required us to focus our geopolitical attention on the peninsula and the islands, it is equally true that the solution to our demographic problems

and lack of raw materials required us to pursue a geopolitical strategy aimed at dominating the Mediterranean and the 'fourth shore', precisely where the British denied us this dominance. War against them, therefore, would have been the most just and sacrosanct, but by what means?

Mussolini, therefore, starting from our national interests, which were essentially anti-British, and having failed in every attempt to reach an agreement with the British, chose to become Germany's junior partner, hoping in this way to project the future of his geopolitics into a Eurasian perspective. What had not been possible in 1915, with the betrayal of the Triple Alliance and the choice of the Entente with the Anglo-French, became valid and necessary again at the end of the 1930s.

**The fact remains, however, that the extreme weakness of our country meant that, like all junior partners, it hoped for the continuation of a state of equilibrium, without absolute rulers and avoiding war as much as possible.**

Previously, in fact, this was precisely how he had acted in *Locarno* in 1925, then with the *Four-Power Pact* of 1933 (in practice, Mussolini proposed a European directorate of the "big four": England, Germany, France, Italy, excluding Russia, but this construction was torpedoed by the Anglo-French, who first signed but then refused to ratify the pact, revealing a criminal desire to deny the growth and role of our country); *Stresa* 1935, where Mussolini, worried that the Germans would arrive at his doorstep (there had also been the crisis in Austria), tried to set up a front to curb Germany's resurgence, but here he was held back by the British desire to come to an agreement directly with the Reich and at the same time deny us space in Africa; then the search for *the Little Entente* and a *Balkan Entente*, such as to temper Germany's military growth beyond certain limits (always sabotaged by the British) and finally *Munich* 1938 (where the 'European directorate of the four great powers' was effectively established, but was short-lived because it was only achieved in response to extraordinary contingent needs).

All this is historically indisputable, and the most recent studies in the field of historiography attest that Mussolini, while apparently gambling, always sought, until the very end, a negotiable way to recompose the European framework, proposing a revisionism of the unfair clauses of Versailles and forcing the British and French to accept a rebalancing of the balance of power in the Mediterranean in our interest.

The ultimate goal of this policy, which took the form of a balance of power in Europe, was to achieve a genuine and concrete international conference that could also temper or otherwise redirect the growing power of Germany. With these same goals in mind, he then maneuvered, after the war had unfortunately begun (September 1939), with the formula of "non-belligerence."

**How much that 'non-belligerence' must have weighed on him, in fact, an obvious disengagement from the obligations of *the Pact of Steel* and**

**the "war propaganda" that fascism had always advocated, is easy to imagine. But there was no other choice.**

During our belligerence, moreover, when it became clear to everyone that special agreements between the Germans and the Soviets allowed the latter to expand towards the Baltic states, endangering also those of the Danube and the Balkans, if not the Turkish areas of influence themselves, Mussolini, accepting the wishes of these states, attempted to set up an international political project called *the "block of neutrals."*

In practice, Italy would have represented the interests of neutral countries in an area that had always been of interest to us. Hitler, who initially seemed favorable to the idea in order to explore every possibility for resolving the conflict with the British, almost immediately realized that this would give Italy a certain hegemony in those areas, tying his hands, and therefore decisively crushed this initiative.

On January 3, 1940, in a letter sent to his German ally, victorious in Poland, following Ciano's December speech to the Chamber, which was imbued with anti-German sentiment, Mussolini, after condemning the German alliance with the Soviets and warning the former not to go any further in that direction, also tried to persuade him to preserve an independent Polish state as a reasonable way out with the Anglo-French, even on the assumption, as the Duce wrote with foresight, that the United States would certainly intervene in the future, unable to allow the defeat of European democracies.

Hitler, irritated, did not respond and remained in gloomy silence for over two months.

But while Mussolini had been logical and far-sighted, his analysis was nevertheless incorrect, because the agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov, albeit fraught with enormous implications, was certainly not pro-Soviet, but rather constituted a transitional phase to prevent war in the West or, at the very least, if this was inevitable, war on two fronts, drawing on the indispensable resources that the agreement with the Soviets allowed. In reality, the German strategy, although hidden, aimed at expansionism in the East and therefore anti-Soviet, remained in vogue, just as Stalin had immediately agreed to that pact with the 'devil', not only because of the advantages of all kinds that it provided, but also because he assumed that in this way Hitler would surely throw himself headlong into war against the Anglo-French. Stalin's goal was the destruction of Germany, not to contribute to its victory.

Moreover, with hindsight, we can say that Mussolini's "peaceful" intentions were logical and sensible, but unrealistic, because the Western powers were thinking of anything but peace and had a single, stubborn goal: the liquidation of the fascist states and the disintegration of Europe (which they achieved at Yalta). What's more, behind the Western powers were the great international consortia that had long pursued world financial domination, supported by that vision ideology that today we call

"globalism." But these are all considerations that we can make today "in hindsight," while at the time of those events, it was much more difficult to give them their proper value and importance.

Hitler, after a long and angry pause, in a changing military context, replied to Mussolini and pointed out to the Duce that the "trade agreement" he had reached with the Soviets was indispensable in the situation in which Germany found itself. So, albeit verbosely, but with great lucidity, he stated:

*<<The outcome of this war will also decide the future of Italy! If this future is considered in your country only as the perpetuation of a European state of modest pretensions, then I am wrong. But if this future is considered as a guarantee of the existence of the Italian people from a historical, geopolitical, and moral point of view, that is, according to the requirements imposed on your people's right to life, the same enemies who are fighting Germany today will be your adversaries>>.*

Returning to any controversial documents, generically referred to as "Correspondence," that Mussolini and Churchill may have exchanged, especially at the time of Italy's entry into the war, it is difficult to verify their actual existence and historical significance today, as these documents are not available.

In truth, as we shall see, in addition to some testimonies on the subject, collected in some way over the years, but which may have relative value for historiography or be called into question, there would be a series of telephone **interceptions** and correspondence, carried out secretly by the Germans on Mussolini, which make it clear that, in fact, the Duce did have these sensitive documents.

These wiretaps on Mussolini were provided in 1973 by German SS General Karl Wolff, sold at a high price and published 20 years later by Ricciotti Lazzeri in his book *Il sacco d'Italia (The Sack of Italy)*, Ed. Mondadori 1994, but there are doubts and some certainties, particularly regarding some copies of letters and phrases in the telephone calls, that there are forgeries or alterations.

Many details, in fact, show that there are some forgeries and that passages were altered or added, perhaps to justify Wolff's actions, while at the same time creating a product to be sold at a high price.

For example, a letter from Mussolini to Hitler dated November 14, 1944, in which the Duce quotes a speech by Vittorio Emanuele III in Naples that never actually took place, is clearly false due to the unrealistic information it contains.

Also false, but this had already been established some time ago, is Mussolini's famous desperate letter to Churchill, published by the weekly magazine *Epoca* in 1956, which Mussolini allegedly entrusted to Franz Spiegler, the German officer assigned to Petacci, on April 24, 1945, in which the Duce invited the British to do something together to face the "danger from the East."

In our opinion, a letter sent by Mussolini to Hitler on February 28, 1945, in which he discusses the Yalta Conference and puts forward completely unrealistic proposals, is also highly dubious, at least in large part.

In short, there was very little to be trusted in what Wolff (and Spoegler) had provided.

(See: <http://www.tuttostoria.net/Documenti/DOCUMENTI-FALSI-CARTEGGIO-PRESUNTO.pdf>).

It is therefore difficult to determine which texts are wholly or partly falsified.

However, overall, and in particular the telephone wiretaps that refer to the "Correspondence," can be considered at least partially reliable, despite some possible manipulation, also by virtue of cross-referencing with other testimonies or known facts and, above all, as we shall see, with the "strange" initial passive conduct of our war, which proves that it was not a "strategic error" or a "political-military incapacity," but that there was some "agreement" behind it to act in that way. of our war, which demonstrates that it was not a "strategic error" or "political-military incompetence," but that there was some "agreement" behind acting in that way.

Finally, in our opinion, Mussolini was aware or sensed that his phone calls were being intercepted, but perhaps this did not bother him too much; on the contrary, he may have believed that letting it be known that he had certain documentation increased his bargaining power.

### ***An important testimony on the "Correspondence"***

In the mid-1990s, **Luigi Carissimi Priori** di Gonzaga, head of the Political Office at the Como police headquarters immediately after *the Liberation*, gave testimony that is now considered decisive by many historians, including *those involved in the Resistance*.

It was testimony from an important figure in the Resistance, which no one had the courage to refute. Carissimi-Priori even claimed to have been able to read this correspondence, which he had stolen in Como from a safe managed by the communists (secretary Dante Gorreri) and containing documents stolen from the famous "Mussolini column" in Dongo, and provided a whole series of circumstances regarding its disappearance and the possible preservation of a photographic copy to this day.

In reality, Carissimi-Priori was able to read about 62 pages, mostly letters, all written before Italy entered the war, containing offers and proposals made by Churchill to Italy. From other testimonies, we know that these documents were then handed over, apparently sold, by the communists to the British.

In any case, however, the significant part of the correspondence that interests us here is another, namely what happened when we entered the war, around June 10, 1940. It should be a couple of very delicate letters, with the terms of a certain "agreement" between Italy and Great Britain.

Perhaps these were the very letters that Mussolini carried in a leather envelope in his jacket pocket on April 27, 1945, and showed, as we shall see later, to Elena Curti, his natural daughter who was with him in the famous armored car, as she has testified several times.

To understand and evaluate what happened, bear in mind that

- a. after the collapse of France, Italy absolutely had to enter the war, both to prevent damage and to be able to count for something in its eventual recomposition.
- b. However, Italy was absolutely incapable of sustaining a war, especially if it were to be prolonged, nor would it have been convenient for it to do so.
- c. The military situation suggested that the Germans and British would probably agree on a peace that was convenient for both, but in reality this was not the case.
- d. Our entry into the war, however, was scheduled for June 5, 1940, but it seems that the Germans asked us to postpone it for a few days.

### ***CHURCHILL AND HIS HOBBY OF PAINTING***

With the excuse of taking a little rest and indulging his passion for painting, Winston Churchill, defeated in the July elections that removed him as prime minister, arrived in Italy on September 1, 1945, strictly incognito (under the name of *Colonel Warden*) to spend, at least officially, a period of rest on the shores of Lake Como. He was accompanied by his daughter Sarah, an actress at the time, his personal valet, Sergeant Thompson of Scotland Yard, and was guarded by about twenty men from the Queen's 4th Hussars Regiment.

He stayed at Villa *Apraxim* in Moltrasio, owned by Donegani, an industrialist involved in the correspondence affair and former headquarters of the British intelligence services, devoting himself to painting but also wandering here and there on the shores of the lake.

On September 7, he went to have tea in Domaso at the home of Ermanno Gibezzi, the new director of the CARIPLO branch where documents belonging to the Duce that had been requisitioned in Dongo had been deposited for a few days. A few days later, with an inquiring air, he returned to Domaso to Villa Miglio. He visited the barracks of the Guardia di Finanza (Italian Finance Police) in Menaggio, in the courtyard of which, while talking to Lieutenant Colonel

Luigi Villani (another key figure in those events), he was also photographed.

On September 11, he wrote cryptically to Alexander, but today we can easily decipher the meaning: *"I hope for a strong focus on the color front and that the preparatory bombings will begin soon... final attack scheduled for the 15th-16th"* (in fact, coincidentally, it seems that on the 15th the Communist Party sold the famous documents). He was also reported in Cernobbio, Argegno, Muronico, and Osteno, on the Italian shores of Lake Lugano.

On September 13, he also seems to have passed through Venegono (Varese), where he had the opportunity to thank Donegani.

Less than forty-eight hours later, after the happy event of purchasing and transferring the documents from the Communists, he left for London!

In a private letter, he wrote: *"On my return, I brought with me 15 paintings, the result of these fifteen days of sunshine...."* But on that return to London, he certainly had something else with him!

On October 28, 1945, the Geneva weekly *'Voix Ouvrière'* published a full-page illustration showing Churchill sitting in front of a fireplace throwing papers into the flames....

Churchill returned to Italy in July 1949, staying at the Grand Hotel in Gardone Riviera on Lake Garda. He visited Villa Gemma in Maderno, formerly the residence of Mussolini's minister Carlo Alberto Biggini, who had been entrusted with a copy of the correspondence.

All this hustle and bustle on the part of the British Prime Minister himself, coupled with the hyper-efficiency of the British secret services, should come as no surprise, given that a report drawn up by the British secret services towards the end of the war clearly stated: *"Since some of the material may be compromising for the Allied governments and high-ranking Italian officials , it is in the interest the Allies to secure the archives."*



**Side note:** an excellent book on the events surrounding the "Correspondence" Fabio Andriola "Secret Correspondence between Churchill and Mussolini SugarcoEdizioni 2007.

## AND THEN CAME THE WAR

This brings us to the war (September 1-3, 1939), a conflict in which Italy could not remain neutral indefinitely without giving up everything, indeed even running great risks. Whether one of the two contenders prevailed or whether, on the contrary, they reached a large-scale agreement, Italy, without having fought, would suddenly have had to give up all its ambitions. As the conflict continued and spread, however, there was also a real risk that one of the



contenders, for strategic military reasons, could invade our peninsula to use it as *an* ideal *aircraft carrier* in the Mediterranean or a bridge to attack Germany from the south.

On September 1, 1939, when the German training ship *Schleswig-Holstein* had already opened fire on the Polish fortress of *Westerplatte* at dawn, German troops had crossed the border, and the Luftwaffe was preparing to take off to bomb Warsaw, Mussolini, his face tense, presided over the Council of Ministers at 3 p.m. at Palazzo Venezia and effectively implemented the decision, previously communicated to the Führer (and obviously not well received), that Italy would not enter the war.

It was *non-belligerence*, an inevitable decision, which was met with applause and relief by the ministers and fascists present, but which exposed us to the ironic smiles of enemies and allies who recalled our "*waltzes*" of 1914, but everyone was careful not to point out: for the Germans, their strategic and secret plans in terms of timing and military objectives for the implementation of *Lebensraum* or living space, completely disregarding Italian timing and needs; while for the Westerners, the dirty and blatant use of Poland as a ploy, a fuse solely intended to trigger war with Germany, so much so that they did not send a single man to 'die for Danzig'!

Mussolini, who had already told journalist Bruno Spampanato: "**<< s only Italian interests, worth the blood of an Italian,**" procrastinated our intervention until it was impossible, even though he had finally decided on it at the end of March 1940 (as amply documented), but operationally considered, barring unforeseen developments at the time, around September of that year (indeed, the previous forecast had been for the spring of 1941). Beyond that, especially if the war had intensified, it would have been suicide. In practice, Mussolini's policy, which was perfectly in line with our interests and needs, had been aimed up to that point both at avoiding intervention in the war and, at the same time, at

avoid breaking away from the alliance with Germany, which would have been a leap in the dark and would have thrown us into disarray.

But even now that Mussolini had 'decided' to intervene, in his heart he hoped that 'something' could ultimately prevent this extreme step.

Following the Brenner summit with Hitler in mid-March 1940, when the war had not yet reached the Western front, Mussolini wrote in a confidential *"Panoramic Memorandum to the King"* dated March 31, 1940:

*<<If the most unlikely of eventualities occurs, namely a negotiated peace in the coming months, Italy will be able, despite its non-belligerence, to have a say and not be excluded from the negotiations: but if the war continues, to believe that Italy can remain uninvolved until the end is absurd and impossible. Italy is not tucked away in a corner of Europe like Spain, it is not semi-Asian like Russia, it is not far from the theaters of operation like Japan or the United States; Italy is in the midst of the belligerents, both on land and at sea. Even if Italy were to change its attitude and hand over its weapons and baggage to the French and British, it would not avoid immediate war with Germany, a war that Italy would have to fight alone.*

*It is only our alliance with Germany, a country that does not yet need our military support and is content with our economic aid and moral solidarity, that allows us to maintain our current state of non-belligerence.... Italy cannot remain neutral throughout the war without resigning from its role, without disqualifying itself, without reducing itself to the level of a Switzerland multiplied by ten.*

*The problem is therefore not whether Italy will enter the war or not, because Italy will inevitably have to enter the war. It is only a question of when and how: it is a question of delaying our entry into the war for as long as possible, compatibly with honor and dignity:*

- a) to prepare ourselves in such a way that our intervention will determine the outcome;*
- b) because Italy cannot wage a long war, that is, it cannot spend hundreds of billions, as the countries currently at war are forced to do.*

**Mussolini therefore stated that, unless we reneged on our alliance with the Germans, our only option was a 'parallel war' with Germany, in accordance with our interests, which can be summarized in the following objectives:**

*Freedom on the seas, window on the ocean, Italy will never be an independent nation as long as Corsica, Bizerte, Malta, and, as walls of the same prison, Gibraltar and Suez, remain bars of its Mediterranean prison. Once the problem of its land borders has been resolved, if Italy wants to be a truly global power, it must resolve the problem of its maritime borders: the very security of the Empire is linked to the solution of this problem>>.*

**Therefore, a "parallel war" with Germany and essentially against England.**

Mussolini's analysis realistically reflected the delicate situation at the time, a picture that was certainly valid until the German invasion of Scandinavia (early April 1940), which brought the war directly to the West, but which would no longer be relevant after the resounding success of the operations against France. In fact, the negotiated peace that Mussolini had theoretically ruled out at the end of March could now, after the collapse of France, which upset the military balance, and Germany's lack of interest in continuing the war against Great Britain, with the latter finding itself in serious difficulty, again theoretically, perhaps become possible and therefore put our interests at stake.

But in any case, the arrival of war at our borders would have made it necessary to review the timing of our intervention, not only to avoid losing positions in areas of interest to us, but also because if the Germans had entered Paris, our intervention would no longer have made sense and might even have been harmful.

The fact is that on April 9, the Germans entered Denmark and Norway, narrowly preceding the British invasion of Norway and Scandinavia, but above all, they showed that they could defeat the British even in operations at sea.

When, the following month, in the days after May 10, the start of the German offensive on the Western Front, France collapsed unexpectedly and to such an extent that our intervention could no longer be postponed because the Germans, who since 1938 had reached the Brenner Pass without firing a shot and had also reappeared in the Adriatic (who could rule out possible nostalgia, albeit still unexpressed, not only for South Tyrol, but even for the Habsburg *Lombardy/Veneto*, all geographical and historical areas of vital Italian interest which, with the exception of Hitler, Vienna and Berlin had never forgotten?) Now, with France swept away, they were threatening to interfere in the Tyrrhenian Sea as well, putting at risk the balance that guaranteed our geopolitical position on the continent (let us not forget that South Tyrol and French territory itself were a protective bulwark for Italy).

In this case too, historical laws show that ideological alliances and agreements alone, without exerting influence on the territory, are never a guarantee, and the Germans had always acted without taking too much account of our interests in Central Europe and especially in the Balkans, areas of Italian interest.

**Today, with hindsight, we can see things from a meta-historical point of view and give due consideration to ideological and existential aspects, but at the time, the "supreme interests of the Fatherland" prevailed – and this was true for everyone.**

Considering all the interests at stake at the time, with Italy wanting and needing a period of peace, while everyone else was thinking about and planning for war, how can we blame Mussolini when, in January 1939, he said to Bruno Spampanato:

*<<Germany still needs a year or two to wage war. The democracies need two or three, because even the democracies are thinking of a war that will push the Reich back to the positions of Versailles. We need three or four years to be ready to join forces with whoever suits us best.*

Today we know that this formulation was incorrect, because the democracies and those behind them wanted to destroy not only Germany but also fascist Italy, a future obstacle to a globalist New World Order (which we can now clearly see and touch), but at the time, all the contenders acted and behaved according to their geopolitical interests, and Italy could only do the same.

And things, as we have seen, turned out in such a way that **we had to enter the war immediately**, even without financial backing and with an army that was not up to the task. Only the navy could have played its part (but it did not).

On May 27, 1940, the British Expeditionary Force, ignoring the desperate appeals of the French and leaving them in trouble, began re-embarkation operations on the beach at Dunkirk.

On May 29, 1940, the day after Belgium's surrender and with the French and British in retreat, Mussolini was delegated by the King to take command of the armed forces.

**He was therefore invested with a command that was more "formal" than anything else, one that would have been highly prestigious if things had gone well, but the strategic and operational conduct of the war, with all its shortcomings (and betrayals), was in fact in the hands of Pietro Badoglio, Chief of the General Staff, who was in turn assisted by the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy, Domenico Cavagnari, the Air Force, Francesco Pricolo, and the Army, Rodolfo Graziani.**

It was to these leaders of the imminent operations that Mussolini said that day that he had initially planned for Italy to enter the war around the spring of 1941, but then the rapid pace of events overwhelmed all predictions. In fact, the Germans had quickly won in Norway and Denmark (April 1940) and Mussolini was forced to bring forward the planned intervention to September of that same year, but now:

*<<The current situation does not allow for further delay, because otherwise we run greater risks than those that could have been caused by premature intervention... On the other hand, if we delay two weeks or a month, we will not improve our situation, while we could give Germany the impression that we are acting after the fact, when the risk is minimal...>>.*

**This was the famous meeting in the Duce's office where our entry into the war was officially decided. The stenographic report also informs us that there were absolutely no objections whatsoever from the generals present!**

Those who, even today, in the face of the evidence, accuse Mussolini of megalomania and recklessness, should instead reflect that Mussolini's decisions were all carefully considered, weighed up and based on excessive caution, even to the detriment of the nation's public opinion.

were all carefully considered, weighed up and based on excessive caution, even to the detriment of the nation's public opinion.

In 1939, a confidential report by the OVRA had revealed widespread dissent towards Italy's entry into the war, but now, in the spring of 1940, the situation had been turned on its head: **public opinion and the ruling classes, including those who tended to be Anglophile, were all afraid of 'arriving late', when everything had already been decided, and losing prestige and positions (and, of course, business and interests).**

**Even Victor Emmanuel III confided to his aide-de-camp, General Puntoni, that "*Most of the time, those who are absent are wrong,*" and he did not skimp on a few jokes about *the overly hesitant Mussolini.***

Only Mussolini, however, faced with Germany's phenomenal successes and despite the intensification of British provocations against us, even with the mounting "warmongering" pressure in the country, tried to remain as rational as possible.

Yet, due to the British naval blockade against us, the president of Montecatini, Guido Donegani, had rushed to Rome to emphasize how the suspension of coal supplies was about to cause the industry to grind to a halt, leading to a catastrophe in production and serious social consequences.

<<"*Soon the cannons will fire by themselves,*" Mussolini railed, adding in dismay, "*<< , it cannot be that I, of all people, have become the laughing stock of Europe. All I do is suffer humiliation.*"

When the overwhelming German successes were intoxicating all Italians and Germany had also come to our aid by making up for the shortage of coal supplies caused by the British blockade, the Duce significantly confided to his son Vittorio:

**<<*Now everyone wants to fire the first shot. The King, the General Staff, the leaders. As paradoxical as it may seem, I am the only pacifist left, I alone!***

Finally, on May 30, Mussolini informed Hitler of his decision to enter the war, indicating June 5 as the date, which was then moved to June 10 at Germany's request.

We must duly highlight an important article by Michele Rallo, published in Storia in Rete in June 2010, entitled "*Ecco perché l'Italia andò in guerra*" (*This is why Italy went to war*), sufficiently reconstructed these situations and acknowledged Mussolini's position, as we have also attested, even recalling that Mussolini's hope and intention, in making a virtue of necessity, was to **put into practice the cunning of Bertoldo, who agreed to be hanged on condition that he could choose the tree himself: which, of course, he never found.**

And so Mussolini agreed to enter the war on condition that he could choose the moment, in the hope that this moment would never have to be found.

Let us now summarize what happened behind the scenes in the period leading up to our entry into the war.

# CHURCHILL'S CRIMINAL PLAN HIDDEN IN THE SECRETS OF THE CORRESPONDENCE



*<<Churchill always had only one goal: to extend the war to make it irreversible and prepare for American intervention. That is why he was brought to power and kept there.*

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill, after March 1939, supported by lobbies and lodges that wanted to impose end against Germany, was brought into the government by Chamberlain and made a member of the War Cabinet, appointing him First Lord of the Admiralty.

It was precisely this man, who until recently had been discredited, having gone from positions of admiration for fascism and, until 1938, of undecided aversion even to Hitlerism, and who then found himself in economic difficulties, who became the focus of the strategies of the Western power elites determined to wage war to the bitter end.

They found in him the qualities they needed to exploit him for their own ends. Indeed, in the delicate British political landscape, with vast and powerful forces certainly opposed to a new and prolonged war against the Germans, it was precisely his stubbornness, obstinacy, impulsiveness, and extravagance that provided the favorable conditions for investing in him and dispelling any prospect of peace.

Strong pressure, exerted behind the scenes by various interests, to which the venal Churchill was not insensitive, would also have made it possible to influence him despite his well-known unpredictable and *maverick* character.

From April 1940, with the war already underway, Churchill chaired the Military Coordination Committee, which included the chiefs of staff.

In this capacity, he was also responsible for the military failure of the British intervention in Norway, but despite this setback, the currents supporting him were so strong that his prestige was shaken but not undermined.

**Finally, on May 10, 1940, Churchill became Prime Minister.**

All this serves to emphasize how, even before becoming head of government, Churchill was able, if not to negotiate directly, at least to intercede through underground diplomacy with Italy during the period of our non-belligerence. It is obvious, however, that only the commitments he made and signed from the moment he became Prime Minister could be the subject of concrete negotiations and strong compromise, with international implications.

In any case, there is no doubt that Churchill held the levers of power of the British Empire at one of its most difficult and delicate moments.

It is worth remembering:

- At the end of May, there was Dunkirk, with the British forces abandoning the old continent (many suspect that the retreat from Dunkirk was not decisively crushed by the Germans, but only opposed by air, because Hitler wanted to send a "signal": not to humiliate the British so that they would be more inclined to negotiate a peace agreement).

- In the first week of June 1940, with France now heading towards capitulation, the British in Norway were also forced to re-embark following the failure of their military operations.

- Finally, on June 8, the aircraft carrier *Glorious* was sunk off the coast of Narvik.

It is clear that in such a dramatic situation, in which even *cautious* Spain declared its 'active non-belligerence', heralding a possible future intervention that would have compromised the security of Gibraltar, **Churchill certainly had no qualms about undertaking any unscrupulous, ignoble, and risky operation that would be useful for the salvation of England and the strategic objectives aimed at continuing the war at all costs.**

Churchill had been given free rein after the dramatic secret meeting of the War Cabinet held on May 27 and the afternoon of May 28, 1940, where he finally managed to impose his strategy, which at that time involved separating British and French destinies and rejecting any offer of peace from Germany. **It was from that moment on that Churchill played the most ruthless cards in his war strategy, which involved expanding the conflict with the involvement of Italy, with a view to keeping the war going in anticipation of a certain, but still distant, decisive intervention by the United States.**

Basically, until about mid-May 1940, Churchill, in his secret contacts with the Duce (the classic "underground diplomacy" typical of all nations), had initially tried to keep Italy out of the war, threatening it and at the same time promising in exchange extensive territorial concessions at the expense of France (and then France itself agreed, when it began to find itself in difficulty).

This too is well documented and, moreover, is in keeping with the spirit and letter of *the* Italian *memorandum* of understanding signed in April 1938 by Ciano and Lord Perth, the British ambassador in Rome, which bound the two nations to relations that would avoid war and mutual recognition.

But that is not all, because then the international and military situation precipitated in a few days when, due to the sudden and unexpected military collapse of the French, Churchill, supported on the London-New York axis by certain warmongering factions

warmongers, found himself needing to face a possible assault from pacifist currents that could now, in that dramatic situation and before it was too late, consider Hitler's generous peace offers advantageous and perhaps even appropriate to achieve that Anglo-German "global agreement" that Hitler had always proposed.

**Therefore, now (in early June 1940), while waiting for a certain but still distant American intervention, Churchill had an absolute need to widen the theater of war and make the war irreversible, which would have brought forward American intervention.**

It was a risky but necessary strategy, from his warmongering point of view, a strategy that led him to massacre the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir in early July, partly in order to send a message of "war to the bitter end" to Hitler and, even before that, to play a cunning and daring game with Mussolini, **inviting him to enter the war immediately (albeit against them), perhaps with an "agreement" not to "hurt each other too much" (which in fact happened in the early stages of the war) in view of a guaranteed (but false) upcoming peace table where Italy, Churchill probably argued in bad faith, would have everything to gain and its presence would also be useful to the British themselves.**

**Certainly, the agreement not to immediately launch large-scale strategic attacks would have remained uncertain, and Mussolini would not have had to worry about excessive obligations. so he could have spurred on attacks whenever and however he wanted, especially with the navy. However, we now know that, on the one hand, the SIM, with its misdirection to accredit the enemy with greater power than it actually had, and the General Staff, with its eminently defensive orders, paralyzed everything (and this, as we well know, was treason).**

**Churchill knew very well that Mussolini could no longer remain neutral, so it was better, indeed advisable, for him to "mediate" our "inevitable" intervention in some way: Italy's departure from "neutrality," which many in Great Britain preferred, even from a tactical and strategic point of view, not fearing our offensive potential at all, counting on the many favorable and complacent "channels" and favorable and complacent "contacts" they had in our country, and therefore considered it much more useful to confront us directly than to have to keep ships and troops immobilized to control the geographical areas where Italian presence or coups were possible.**

But if this decision to ask Italy to enter the war was useful and convenient for Churchill's political and military purposes, it was also useful for Italy, in order to risk as little as possible by inevitably entering the war. unfortunately, however, Churchill's 'proposal' was false from the outset, as Italy's entry into the war was not at all useful to him in order to reach a peace table, but rather to widen the conflict, and so we found ourselves in deep trouble, but 'agreement' or

not, things would not have changed, as we would still have had to go to war, except that, with our hands free, we could have immediately attacked the British in their weak points, for example in Malta and Gibraltar, Libya and Suez, which would have put the whole Mediterranean under our control, influencing the politics of Spain and Turkey.

It is not unreasonable to assume that the basis for this "agreement not to hurt each other too badly" was ideally a military extension of another old agreement that had already been proposed on the eve of World War II, around August 28, 1939, when Italy had declined the obligations of the Pact of Steel and had not declared itself willing to enter the war with the Germans, and Mussolini sent this secret telegram to the King:


***<<Your Majesty, while waiting to send you all the correspondence exchanged with the Führer, I would like to give you a preview of the conclusions. Namely, Italy will limit itself, at least in the first phase of the conflict, to a purely demonstrative attitude. The French and British have let us know that they will do the same>>&gt;.***

In practice, Mussolini hoped that in 1940, with this agreement and pending peace talks, the same situation of "fake conflict" that had existed for months after the conquest of Poland between the Germans and the Western powers, to the extent that it was defined as a *drôle de guerre* (a "funny" or "fake" war), could be repeated at our borders and in the Mediterranean.

**These "agreements," whether agreed upon or not, are historical contingencies that often occur and, in any case, are commitments that can be overturned whenever desired. However, this was not the case for us because our army, Badoglio, and Supermarina had no intention of winning the war.**

The sequence of these events, corroborated by the "strange" initial inactivity of our armed forces, although hidden behind diplomatic rhetoric, is so clear that even two researchers, Mario J. Cereghino and Giovanni Fasanella, authors of *Colonia Italia*, Ed. Chiarelettere 2015, a documented reconstruction of British interference in our country, note that **at the War Cabinet meeting on May 27, 1940, Churchill, banging his fists on the table, abruptly cut off any possibility of secret negotiations. They deduce that perhaps it was precisely the military escalation that Churchill wanted, aware of the inevitable extension of the conflict to America and Russia!**

**Side note:** A good reconstruction of those events: David Irving, *Hitler's War*, Vol. 1 and 2, Ed. clandestine, 2009.



## AN "AGREEMENT" IN APRIL 1940?

*&lt;&lt;In a frantic whirlwind of situations that changed overnight, Anglo-Italian underground diplomacy had gone from efforts to maintain our neutrality, perhaps by betraying the Axis, to false flattery for our country's role as arbiter at the peace table, to pushing it into war&gt;&gt;.*

Once his decision to go to war had been made and imposed, Churchill's problem now became that of dragging us into a conflict that he intended to widen and make unyielding, while running as few risks as possible.

For Mussolini, on the other hand, aware of our military and financial weakness and forced to go to war anyway, the problem was to run as few risks as possible.

The possibility of an *agreement* was therefore raised, which then materialized in early June 1940, probably adapting the spirit of *the "Memorandum of Understanding"* between the two nations in 1938, a spirit that we also find in Mussolini's telegram to the King on August 28, 1939 ("*...Italy will limit itself, at least in the first phase of the conflict, to a purely demonstrative attitude. The French and British have let us know that they will do the same&gt;&gt;*), but that perhaps there was, even more so, another draft agreement that, it is said, had been agreed between Mussolini and Churchill, this time present, also through Count Grandi, ambassador in London, between April 16 and 22, 1940, when Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty.

This precedent has no reliable historical basis to support it, and in fact is strongly doubted, but we report it here anyway because it gives a sense of how things might have gone.

In fact, during those days in April, it seems – and the conditional tense is a must here – that there was discussion of a secret agreement called "*Agreement*", about which it is not clear when and how it would have become effective, but which some historical researchers said had left traces in our state archives.

As mentioned, however, it is claimed that these alleged documents **are forgeries, and in fact they do not correspond to the names, dates, and circumstances that do not add up.**

**In our opinion, in those days of April, there must have been contacts regarding a possible draft agreement of this kind, but at the time it was not yet an urgent necessity for Churchill, as it became a little over a month later.**

**Paradoxically, it is not important to us whether or not it is a forgery, because we are mainly interested in the inspirational perspective of this**

**agreement, even if it is a forgery, which we will then find in the events of June 1940.**

Whether false or not, moreover, it was not yet the urgent need that Churchill had after the collapse of France in May to immediately bring our country into the war, but it indicates a "premise" that was articulated with the tempting proposals to have Italy play a "mediating" role in the event of a British defeat and an agreement not to cause too much damage in the event of war.

**It seems (since it is a "falsehood," the conditional is a must) that in mid-April 1940, while this "secret agreement" was taking shape, negotiations were still underway to keep Italy out of the conflict with attractive offers from France April 1940, while this "secret agreement" was taking shape, negotiations were still underway to keep Italy out of the conflict with attractive offers from France.**

Also in those days of April, Mussolini was also conducting secret contacts through our diplomat Giuseppe Bastianini, via inquiries with Prime Minister Chamberlain, in order to be able to make a peace proposal to Hitler, passing it off as his own, but instead it came from Chamberlain himself.

And that's not all, because as we read in some letters and messages that Churchill and Mussolini exchanged officially until the end of May, the British Prime Minister outwardly seemed intent on avoiding Italy's intervention in the war by making heartfelt appeals to the Duce, when in fact it is clear that in the War Cabinet meetings of May 27 and 28, he had already made the decision to drag us into the war.

**These situations may seem contradictory and paradoxical, but they are not uncommon or exceptional in the international arena, where it is necessary to maneuver on multiple fronts and behind smokescreens.**

**That Churchill's requests to Mussolini for Italy to remain neutral were false from the outset is demonstrated by the fact that we know full well how open Mussolini would have been, and indeed how he was secretly pushing for a peaceful solution without even imposing onerous conditions on the British, and that Churchill himself, as Prime Minister, opposed Lord Halifax, whom he had left in charge of the Foreign Office and who intended to accommodate Mussolini in this regard.**

Roberto Festorazzi (op. cit.) notes: *"It is likely that Churchill, writing to Mussolini in the early months of the war, initially persuaded him to wait and see, maintaining his neutrality. Then, as the plan to expand the conflict took shape, he abandoned him to his fate, effectively encouraging him to enter the war alongside Germany."*

Certainly, however, by the end of May, the opportunity to maintain Italian neutrality had passed, and therefore requests to that effect were only "for show."

**The secret agreement, whose authenticity was fabricated, which was endorsed by the General Headquarters and the Council of Ministers in London, provided for:**

1. Italy would enter the war alongside Germany and against Great Britain, and if the British were defeated, Italy would pursue British interests, acting as a balancing force at the armistice peace table.
2. Conversely, if Britain, with the help of the now neutral nations, were to win the war, Britain would guarantee Italy recognition of its position and a fair deal in the post-war period.
3. A mutual non-aggression agreement could be reached between the two nations at a later date.

The text of April 22, 1940, which we have summarized, was signed by W. Churchill.

On May 2, 1940, it is said (??) that King Victor Emmanuel III, informed of this "**top secret agreement**" (??), expressed his consent in a letter to the Duce, and the agreement was accepted with a document dated May 4, 1940 (??).

**Although these documents are false, we have nevertheless cited them because this Agreement perfectly reflects what may have been discussed and which then materialized in a real agreement on the brink of our entry into the war between the last days of May and the first days of June.**

(Further information on this dubious Agreement, and archive references, can be found in Filippo Giannini's book, "*Uccidete il grande Diavolo*" (Kill the *Great Devil*), published by Greco e Greco in 2014, but we would like to point out that it appears to be a forgery).

**As can be seen, Mussolini would have been offered conditions that were essential for a country that was unable to sustain a real and, above all, prolonged war, and which had an interest in maintaining a certain balance in Europe so that none of the contenders would win outright.**

**Mussolini would have been foolish and irresponsible to refuse the British invitation!**

**These are situations that often arise in times of extreme and catastrophic urgency in the international arena, where geopolitical and military interests prevail.**

Not to mention that this situation was in line with Mussolini's wishes, who, considering national interests, as F. Giannini writes in the book just mentioned, had confided: "**<< Hitler must not win too much, and above all he must not win alone.**"

In this case, that agreement was an extra card for the Duce, especially in view of the much-vaunted peace, so much so that Mussolini, even if he had wanted to, could hardly have renounced these attractive conditions, even though, as the shrewd negotiator he was, he was perhaps also aware that the British knew that Italian intervention was unavoidable.

British knew that Italian intervention was inevitable, was aware of our military unpreparedness, counted on the fact that there were many pro-British elements in Italy (even in the military, including the House of Savoy), and a strong Masonic presence. Therefore, he assessed that Churchill was playing dirty by proposing this agreement which, combined with certain military agreements to "not hurt each other too much," would have meant few risks for the British and many advantages.

Even a month later, in June, when something similar to this hypothetical agreement turned into a real working agreement, complete with a letter of compromise from Churchill (**was it that letter or those letters signed by Churchill that Mussolini carried with him until the end?**), whether or not the British were acting in bad faith, not much would have changed; the advantages of the agreement for Italy remained.

But that was not quite the case: firstly, what Mussolini had not foreseen or considered was the fact that this war had such implications and transnational interests that no peace would ever be possible (the illusion of a possibility of peace or accommodation that had also deceived Hitler), and secondly, that the loss of the war, this time, unlike all previous wars, would be devastating, definitive, and unconditional.

Churchill, realizing the deception, would not rest until he had silenced the keepers of the secret of the "entente," recovered all the papers, and made them disappear. That is exactly what happened.

**This is the 'terrible secret' of the correspondence: Churchill had asked for our intervention in the war!**

If we move from the hypothetical Agreement of April/May, or something similar, to early June, when, driven by the French collapse and with Churchill now Prime Minister, the preliminaries of an "agreement" took on operational contours and specific conditions that we still do not know, everything becomes understandable.

### ***Telephone and letter interceptions***

This is clear from reading the telephone and letter interceptions secretly obtained by the Germans on Mussolini, the contents of which show the importance of the 'Correspondence' and the Duce's intention to use it in the national interest (**we have already discussed the falsities and problems of these interceptions; here we cite those that seem realistic to us**).

- This applies to all of the telephone recordings between Mussolini and Claretta Petacci on March 22, 1945 (they are talking about Pavolini, who at that moment was unaware of the "Correspondence" and would be informed of it days later):  
*<<... he cannot understand the situation, he cannot cooperate. So I have to respect his biased point of view. He does not know what happened a few days before we entered the war.*

*I haven't talked about it with anyone. And Churchill even less so. **This story needs to be told once and for all. Who should talk about it today? Only five people know the whole story!***

- But no less important is an earlier letter sent by Mussolini to Graziani on January 9, 1945 [Mussolini wrote]:  
<< *"I have a letter from Hitler, dated January 2, 1945. His behavior does not convince me. His claim that we should retreat to the north, far north, if necessary, is a clear sign. His advice to take with me **all the documents I mentioned to him and which I proposed to use speaks for itself. I am seriously concerned.** The events of the war no longer deceive me. **I am not concerned about myself, but what worries me is the thought of seeing Italy entirely occupied by the Anglo-Americans in the near future.** At the moment, I consider it extremely important to safeguard these documents, primarily **the exchange of letters and agreements with Churchill. These will serve as evidence of British bad faith. These documents are worth more than a won war, because they will explain to the world the true, sole reasons for our intervention alongside Germany. I need to see you. I await you this evening.***
- Another letter sent by Mussolini to Graziani on April 3, 1945, evidently following a proposal, naive to say the least, by Graziani to deal with the documents in Mussolini's possession through the mediation of the King:  
&lt;&lt;[Mussolini]:...***"Your proposal is absolutely senseless! Entrust the documents to Savoy in order to win peace? Vittorio Emanuele has renounced me and will continue to betray his cronies one after the other, dismissing them after exploiting them.... The Savoy will never be able to use our cards. If they try, they will be prevented from doing so! The Savoy wants to lead Italy to defeat, to unconditional surrender, just to bury Fascism."***

See also other wiretaps: R. Lazzeri: *Il sacco d'Italia*, Mondadori 1994.

Pino Romualdi, then deputy secretary of the Republican Fascist Party, recalls:  
<<*I was aware of the existence of correspondence between Mussolini and Churchill from early 1945, having been informed of it by Mussolini himself, but I never saw any of the published letters directly. The real correspondence, however, the one that Mussolini attributed the power to justify the conduct of the Italian nation, was of a very different tenor. In*

***In fact, I know personally... it would appear that Italy's entry into the war took place with the tacit consent of the British***&>.

Essentially, Mussolini was neither clever nor naive, nor did he have to believe all the nonsense spouted by the British (among other things, he could not ignore the fact that at a possible "peace table" **the British certainly did not need our support to mitigate Hitler; on the contrary, Italy, with its interests in conflict with those of Britain, would have been an additional burden on Great Britain**). Perhaps he believed the British lie about reaching a peace table, but he found himself in the terrible situation of having to enter the war immediately.

A war which, it should be reiterated, he did not reject on principle, but feared because of our weakness and the possible outcome of a single dominant victor emerging. More than anything else, the Duce, and historians are fairly unanimous on this point, believed that Italy's entry into the war would hasten the conclusion of the conflict with a result that would not weaken the Western powers too much, thus making peace negotiations possible.

With this in mind, the Duce did not miss the opportunity to secretly *negotiate* this transitional "agreement," which Churchill offered him and which apparently allowed him to gain the most while risking very little.

**It was not, therefore, a betrayal of Germany by Italy, but rather, as is typical of all underground diplomacy in times of war (where the Roman maxim that "the good of the Fatherland is supreme" applies), an agreement with the prospect of waging a war, little more than symbolic, for a short time, before a peace (unfortunately falsely) proposed by the British. This was not too different from Hitler's attempts to reach a global agreement with the British.**

**But Churchill's was a deadly trap!**

**If we did not immediately launch major military operations at a favorable moment, it was not so much because of a tacit agreement not to "hurt each other too much" in view of peace, but above all because of the boycott by Badoglio, the General Staff, Supermarina, and others.**

All this was probably formalized a few days before our intervention on June 10, 1940, perhaps in a couple of letters from Churchill that Mussolini, as attested by Elena Curti (a witness in the armored car stopped in Musso on April 27, 1945, in the early morning), was carrying with him when he was captured in Dongo. Curti writes and has also repeated several times:

*<<Before sitting down (Mussolini had arrived in the armored car, ed.), he neatly arranged his beautiful white jacket and a short-barreled 'machine pistol', without ever letting go of a leather envelope measuring 25-28 cm by about 18 cm that he held in his hands. Once seated, he placed the envelope on his knees and rested his hands on it in a possessive manner.*



*He looked at me. "These are documents of extreme importance. They contain the truth about how things really went and who is truly responsible for the war. The world needs to know this, and it will be surprised"...*

*When the Duce got out of the armored car (to go to the German truck, ed.), he took the envelope with him. Its size allowed him to hide it under his jacket*

(Elena Curti, *Il chiodo a tre punte*, Juculano publisher, Pavia 2003).

He had already made this statement about "documents of extreme importance" linked to the fate of Italy to his aide, Brigadier Pietro Carradori, and he would later make it to the partisan *Bill*, alias Urbano Lazzaro, in Dongo.

Two other suitcases contained correspondence **prior** to our entry into the war, and therefore less important. These were probably the 62 sheets that Luigi Carissimi-Priori, then head of the political office of the Como police headquarters, managed to read. He reported the vicissitudes of a folder from this bag of documents, which ended up in the hands of the communists in Como and was then photographed at the Ballarate photo lab in Milan, with the originals apparently sold to the British:

*&And this copy exists. It still exists, it is precisely the 62 letters [in reality it seems that there were 62 sheets for an unknown number of letters, editor's note] of correspondence between Mussolini and Churchill just before, and I emphasize before, Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940. There are no letters from the subsequent period. I know, I had those documents in my hands, I read them, and so I know what was written...*

*I believe they could have been important at that time, when Italy was negotiating peace. Because before Italy entered the war, Churchill, in order to prevent Mussolini from entering the conflict alongside Germany, guaranteed him that he could also have **Corsica, Nice, and Tunisia**. This is certain...*

(See: *Nuova Storia Contemporanea* No. 5 of 2004, and R. Festorazzi *Mussolini Churchill Le carte segrete* Datanews 1998). Obviously, everything disappeared!

These are documents exchanged between Mussolini and Churchill, and given that one letter is said to date back to June 9, 1940, when **the decision to request our intervention in the war had already been made**, it must be concluded that, for some reason that escapes us, the strategy of requesting our intervention in the war, in line with a spirit similar to that of *the* alleged top-secret *agreement*, went hand in hand with other formal requests to maintain neutrality, compensated by exorbitant offers of territorial spoils at France's expense, which served as a smokescreen.

This is assuming that Carissimi-Priore's testimony is true, because we cannot even rule out that, due to some strange Masonic maneuver, his "reappearance" in the delicate climate of "glasnost" at the end of the 1990s was not orchestrated to confirm, but at the same time to diminish, the significance of the correspondence.

In any case, the sensitive documents and letters that Churchill absolutely needed to recover, on pain of not only compromising his political career but also endangering the United Kingdom's international relations, not to mention damaging the Allied propaganda image of the war, **were only those in which he asked Italy to enter the war and negotiated the conditions.**

**Obviously, in the voluminous correspondence that Mussolini took with him to Dongo, and other copies that he had photocopied and given to certain people (first and foremost Minister Carlo Biggini) so that one day it could be discussed in the interests of the nation, there was everything, including proposals for a rich reward in exchange for maintaining neutrality. A mix of proposals and agreements, at various tables, which changed all the time, even with Churchill no longer in office as prime minister.**

For example: the secret approval that England reluctantly gave Italy in 1936 (after fiercely opposing it to the point of imposing sanctions) for the war in Ethiopia (probably in exchange for Italy's renunciation of the exploitation of Agip oil concessions in Iraq), a certain consent always given to Italy for its intervention in Spain, and things of this kind.

At the height of his shamelessness, Churchill then had the courage in his two radio speeches in December 1940 and November 1942 to describe Mussolini as "*solely responsible for Italy's entry into the war.*"

All this justifies the costly and strenuous efforts of the British services in searching for these documents, efforts that forced Churchill himself to come to Italy, under the pretext of his passion for painting, visiting some locations on the upper Lake Como, where those documents could be found.

But we will discuss the interpretations put forward by historians (some of whom are mentally deranged or acting in bad faith) on the possible contents of the "Correspondence" later on, because we are now going to consider the incredible initial stages of our war, where there was a *strange* absence of large-scale military operations.

# THE "STRANGE" BEGINNING OF OUR WARFARE

*<<That there was a proposal for an Anglo-British "agreement" to regulate the start of that war is evident from many details. It is likely that this "agreement" was transcribed in some way, given the documents that Mussolini claimed to have and Churchill's great effort to recover them, but we cannot rule out that it was dictated by the circumstances and interests of the moment, as had been the case during the seven months of drôle de guerre between the Germans and the Anglo-French on the Western Front.*

*But in any case, by sticking to the secret (or not so secret) "Agreement" with Churchill and the (false) prospect of imminent peace talks, we wasted precious time and squandered some opportunities to achieve good strategic positions.*

*We could still have attacked the enemy when we wanted, but when this became clear to Mussolini, it was too late to remedy the situation, especially since not everyone was in favor of a real war against the British.*

As we know, Italy effectively entered the war without issuing any offensive strategic directives, and Mussolini's own instructions were to wait for political and military developments, perhaps considering an offensive in the Mediterranean, but the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Cavagnari, was quick to point out that this directive had to be "interpreted and clarified" (as he wished, of course!).

The only operations were those towards France, which were not of great strategic importance, and a few "movements" at sea, so much so that even the Royal Air Force was prevented from flying over French territory, even for simple reconnaissance.

The Chief of Staff, Badoglio, a Freemason and pro-French, obviously gave the sole order to "**close the doors**" both at the Italian borders and in Libya and East Africa.

In practice, unfortunately, this played right into Churchill's bad faith. Dino

Campini, former secretary to RSI Minister Carlo Alberto Biggini, wrote:

**<<If the facts allow for interpretation, if the chain of causes and effects is valid, it must be admitted that Italy began the war not to fight it, but only to insert itself into a political game>>** (D. Campini, *Piazzale Loreto*, Il Conciliatore 1972).

But the assessment of the historical journalist Franco Bandini is also interesting:

*"There is a special continuity between Mussolini's 'non-belligerent' policy and what is defined as 'warlike', without actually being so, after June 10, 1940. He entered the war fully convinced that the collapse of France would inevitably be followed by that of Great Britain, or that in any case a compromise peace would be reached by August or September of that same year at the latest.*

*He based his political and military conduct entirely on this assumption, but in doing so he seemed to remain within a well-defined perimeter, the most curious aspect of which, from a historical point of view, is that no military action was taken against British positions, except for one, namely the conquest of Somalia in August 1940.*

***It should be clear by now that, until September 1940, the Italian armed forces were cautiously moved on the assumption of a compromise peace, and along the lines of a program that had already been defined.***

*In other words, if this were not true, it would be necessary to explain how and why Mussolini could have demanded anything at the British peace table without having earned it, at least formally, with a minimum of sacrifice.*

***To argue that he entered the war to 'grab his share of the spoils' and not draw the necessary conclusions from the indisputable fact that he did not move to take it, or took only a very small share, is to fall into a contradiction in terms and attribute to Mussolini a degree of inconsistency that is excessive, at least for that period>> (F. Bandini: *Tecnica della sconfitta*, Sugar 1963).***

Bandini also makes a valid point:

*<<Let us ask ourselves what intrigues were woven during our period of 'non-belligerence': only a naive person could believe that there were none at all. German generals and leaders conspired no less than seven or eight times with the British to overthrow Hitler and end the war.*

***There was a fundamentalist wing and a conciliatory wing in Great Britain, the United States, France, and even Soviet Russia, so why not in Italy? ...>> (F. Bandini: 'Appuntamento sul lago', in *Il Tempo*, April 26, 1985).***

With extreme lucidity and impeccable analysis, the Japanese naval attaché in Rome, Captain Toyo Mitunobo, wrote:

*<<From my point of view, Italy had to be ready to conquer Malta and Tunisia, which are key points for control of the Mediterranean. Judging from Italian domestic propaganda, from the second half of May until Italy's entry into the war in June 1940, I thought that this would take place immediately after the intervention. But on the afternoon of June 10, Italy declared that it would enter the war on the morning of June 11 (at exactly midnight, editor's note).*

*This surprised me. And then on June 11, 12, 13, and 14, operations to conquer Malta and Tunisia had not yet begun. This was incomprehensible to me&gt;&gt;.*

Today we know that there were agreements with France to avoid any strategic military confrontation, and we also know about the contacts between Badoglio and the military attaché, General Parisot, his personal friend, with requests not to be attacked in depth and the acceptance of those requests.

A comment by General Emilio Faldella is also well known:

<<**For the first time in history, a war began with orders not to shoot.**

The order "28 op." from the General Staff (the Freemason and *pro-French* Badoglio) regarding operations against France was symptomatic:

<<**If French forces are encountered, do not be the first to attack; do not fly over French territory; no unit shall cross the border; remain 10 km from the border**>> (See: P. Sella, *L'Occidente contro l'Europa*, Ed. Uomo Libero, 1984).

Strangely, the documentation, compared to similar agreements with England, is decidedly lacking. And what's more, coincidentally, in the documentation returned by the Allies to Italy, concerning secret dispatches from Italian embassies, the years 1939 and 1940 are missing!

But even if the documentation is incomplete or absent, the facts speak for themselves. The bloody and inconclusive offensive in the Western Alps, where two armies, twenty-two divisions, and numerous smaller units were deployed without achieving any strategically significant results, was accompanied by an unrealistic stalemate in offensive operations in Libya towards the Egyptian border, even though the British were at a disadvantage.

At the Tunisian border, the *Fifth Army* was practically sunbathing, despite the fact that the French had had to withdraw their forces, called back home by urgent needs. It was obvious that dear Badoglio had made no preparations for war.

The Navy, on the other hand, remained cruising around the Mediterranean, carefully avoiding any possible confrontation with the British Royal Navy's *Mediterranean Fleet*, while **a large part of our merchant fleet, and not only merchant ships, not having been warned in time of the entry into war, was interned in neutral ports or seized by the enemy.**

To add insult to injury, on June 14, the dying French arrived, undisturbed by our navy, to bomb Genoa, Savona, and Vado Ligure with their ships, returning unscathed. Meanwhile, in less than twenty days, a dozen Italian submarines were sunk by the enemy.

The Royal Air Force also suffered its share of mockery when French aircraft dropped leaflets on Rome and 36 British *Whitley* bombers arrived to bomb our industries in Turin and Genoa.

Eugenio Di Rienzo summed up that 'strange' situation well in *Corriere della Sera* on September 2, 2015:

*"The strongest confirmation of the fact that, even after June 10, Mussolini did not intend to sever ties with Paris and London is, according to Emilio Gin (Emilio Gin: "The hour marked by destiny. Gli Alleati e Mussolini da Monaco all'intervento. Settembre 1938 – Giugno 1940!" [The Hour Marked by Destiny. The Allies and Mussolini from Munich to the Intervention. September 1938 – June 1940!], Nuova Cultura Editore, 2012), in the instructions given to the General Staff of our Armed Forces shortly before the outbreak of hostilities.*

*With the exception of the Italian offensive in the Western Alps, which began with an inexplicable delay on June 21, the Duce's war was, by his own admission, intended to be a replica of the "Sitzkrieg" (Sitzkrieg), which for almost a year had pitted the Allies and the Germans against each other on French soil without much bloodshed. The Army, which with a pincer movement from Libya and Ethiopia could have seriously threatened Egypt, was ordered to remain at the ready without taking any initiative. The Royal Navy, which was in a position to effectively disrupt, if not interrupt, the movements of British convoys in the Suez Canal, was ordered to open fire only if attacked.*

*The Air Force was instructed to postpone "any offensive operations until further notice" and to prohibit its aircraft from flying more than ten kilometers from the French border.*

*Furthermore, the raids on Gibraltar and Alexandria, which had been planned for some time, were canceled, and the bombing of Malta on June 11 was reduced in intensity. Until the raids carried out by 36 RAF aircraft, which struck Turin and Genoa on the night of June 12, completely illuminated as in peacetime, provoked an Italian military escalation, it was therefore the Duce's intention to limit himself to a "parade war" so as not to jeopardize his relationship with Churchill at the future peace conference, where the real war, the one against Hitler, would begin.*

Throughout the summer of 1940, despite Mussolini's subsequent wishes (evidently now aware of Churchill's strategic plan), **no military operations** were carried out against the British, except for the short-lived occupation of British Somaliland, which, as Piero Sella states in his aforementioned book, had been the subject of negotiations in the previous months.

**Yet, at that moment of extreme crisis for the enemy's war machine, despite the inadequacy of the means, there was perhaps the possibility of descending along the Nile, coordinating operations with General Graziani's Libyan army.**

With France out of the war and our troops freed up on the Tunisian border, the British found themselves defending a huge expanse of territory (Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, etc.) where Wawel's forces were reduced to the bare minimum, but

our armed forces, first under Balbo and then Graziani, did not move for at least three months.

Historical researcher Emilio Gin observes: << *There were things that could have been done in the early days of the war to make life difficult for the Allies in the Mediterranean: from the capture of Malta to the bombing of Alexandria, Egypt*>>.

Of course, given the enormous geographical distances and the shortage of resources, only short-term military operations could be conceived, but even so, if they had been decisively undertaken at that moment, with all the tactical support that the navy could provide in the Mediterranean, they could have been of extreme military importance and, above all, could have had enormous repercussions in the Arab world, which was eager to shake off British control.

Again, the writer Piero Sella, in his aforementioned *"L'Occidente contro l'Europa"* (The West *against Europe*), points out a marginal but significant episode, that of Air Force General Santoro, who was severely reprimanded by the General Staff for ordering, at the beginning of hostilities, a large formation of bombers to attack Malta!

And against Malta, which the British feared losing at that moment, absolutely nothing was done. We paid dearly for this unexpected *respite* for the British island fortress in terms of sunken ships when we had to resupply Rommel's Afrika Korps and when it served as a valuable staging point for the Anglo-American landing in Sicily!

For several months, the Axis forces had the initiative and a certain strategic superiority, as well as superiority in terms of men and equipment compared to their adversaries, but Italy completely neglected to use its military forces for large-scale operations. In particular, the Navy, which at that time boasted a good quality and number of warships, was left to cruise around the Mediterranean until it was seriously compromised on the night of Taranto (November 1940) and then ended up being cowardly handed over to the enemy in Malta in September 1943.

**Mussolini had favored the convenient and utilitarian aspect of agreeing to Churchill's proposal to enter the war, knowing full well that he would have to enter it anyway, while for a possible commitment not to "get hurt too badly right away," he knew just as well that he could do the opposite as and when it would be most useful to him. And it was precisely with our fleet that Mussolini tried to urge action, but it was like preaching in the desert.**

**So if we did not attack the British fleet at that moment of difficulty, if we did not immediately take Malta and launch serious offensives in Africa, it was not so much because of the agreement to accept the British invitation to enter the war and an implicit understanding not to "get too badly hurt" in view of a much-vaunted peace, but also and above all because of the boycott and unwillingness to wage war on the British on the part of Badoglio, the monarchy, and the Supermarina.**

Certainly, our financial resources and, above all, our means were not adequate, in terms of quantity and quality, for a long and intense war, but at that juncture, their decisive and total use could perhaps have tipped the balance in favor of the Axis.

Instead, even the few resources available were not used, and not even the not inconsiderable navy was used, at least for tactical support in some operations. The result: as the conflict continued, almost all our resources were exhausted or destroyed, with no possibility of replacement!

Due to geopolitical prudence (but also jealousy among the commanders and worse) that "advised" us not to let the Germans reach the Mediterranean and Southern Europe, any military collaboration with the Wehrmacht was rejected, including aid for the North African theater that would have allowed us to overflow into Egypt. In practice, we were left with our "arms at our feet."

The disappearance of the documentation does not allow us to identify what counter-assurances were negotiated with Churchill so that England would also abide by this mutual 'not hurting each other too much', but they must have existed and, even if the British soon dropped the mask, at least in the early days they came into force. However, it seems that there was an important British commitment.

Documents recovered by the Germans, who had entered France, attested that on May 31, 1940, the French ambassador in London, Charles Corbin, informed the Quay D'Orsay that the Foreign Office had changed its instructions, instructing its ambassador in Ankara that if Italy entered the war alongside Germany, **Turkey was no longer invited to occupy the Dodecanese islands**, the twelve Aegean islands off the Turkish coast, which had been colonized but not internationally defined by our country in 1912.

Why, as the historical writer Roberto Festorazzi rightly asks in his aforementioned book, did the British government update the instructions issued to its diplomatic network on the subject of the Turkish occupation of the Dodecanese islands just ten days before Italy entered the war?

In other words, why, by revoking the green light for the Turkish reconquest of those islands, did it want to favor Italy, which was going to war against the British?

Festorazzi answers his own question: there is only one hypothesis: **England was engaged in a powerful collusion with Mussolini, of which the question of possession of the Dodecanese was but an epiphenomenon.**

En passant, we must acknowledge the writer and historical researcher Roberto Festorazzi, who already had the merit of bringing to light Carissimi-Priore's revelations about the Correspondence, for now going beyond certain convenient historiographical interpretations and instead understanding that the secret "Entente" between Churchill and Mussolini went far beyond a misleading and impractical

request to keep Italy neutral, but went so far as to ask for our intervention in the war.

It is no coincidence that Festorazzi, in his valuable and historically important book *Mistero Churchill (The Churchill Mystery)*, Ed. Macchione 2013, cites in the bibliography this very essay of ours, published on some online sites a few years ago (both under our name and under the pseudonym *Marzio di Belmonte*), albeit in a form that was then somewhat approximate, reduced, and imprecise.

In any case, to return to our subject, Churchill's game to have us at war, under "certain conditions," was completely successful, and immediately afterwards, even though the deception was revealed, it was no longer possible to reverse our strategic intentions.

**Too many people, although unaware of certain secret 'agreements', found themselves wonderfully involved in a war without commitments and without risks, without causing excessive damage to our 'dear' British friends.**

What happened on the battlefield (or rather "did not happen") in those days of June 1940, left even **Hitler** bewildered. Although he had forgotten that, a few days earlier and for similar *geopolitical reasons*, he had in fact spared some 300,000 men of the British *contingent* at Dunkirk, he remarked to his military attaché in Rome, who then reported it:

*<<When the Duce had told him that he could not delay the announcement of his entry into the war until after June 11, he had believed that Italy had prepared a lightning strike against Corsica, Tunis, or Malta and that military secrecy naturally prevented any postponement.*

*Consequently, after the speech in Piazza Venezia, it had seemed logical to expect something to happen. Instead, no one had moved. This, the Führer had concluded, reminded him of what happened in the Middle Ages, when cities exchanged messages of defiance and that was the end of it.*

(S. Corvaja: *Mussolini nella tana del lupo*, Ed. Dall'Oglio, 1982).

But Hitler returned to this "strange" situation and its consequences in his secret notes in February 1945, notes that also give a better understanding of Churchill's interests in pushing Italy into the war:

*<<Ah, if only the Italians had stayed out of the war! If only they had remained non-belligerent! The Allies themselves would have rejoiced, because although they did not have a very high opinion of Italy's military power, they could not have imagined such weakness on its part.*

***They would have considered the neutralization of the force they attributed to Italy a gain.***

***But since they could not trust her, this would have forced them to immobilize numerous troops near their borders in order to avoid the risk of an intervention that was always threatening, always possible, if not probable.***

***For us, this meant immobilized British soldiers who would experience neither war nor victory—in short, a sort of 'strange war' that would be prolonged for our exclusive benefit>>***

(A. Hitler: *Last Speeches*, Ed. AR, 1988, here too the text is in line with historical situations, but its authenticity is questioned, as it seems that in this 'Hitler's testament', its editor Francois Genoud, working on texts that were not originals, introduced some manipulation or additions, but essentially the text, even if not found in its original form, appears genuine and the observations and theses are certainly Hitler's).

There are some important texts that, if you know how to read them, clearly illustrate Italy's strange and absent behavior at the start of the war and the "secret of the correspondence":

- Renzo De Felice: *Mussolini l'alleato, L'Italia in guerra. 1940 - '43*, Einaudi, 1990,
- Dino Campini: *Mussolini's Strange Game*, Editoriale PG Milan 1952;
- Franco Bandini: *The Technique of Defeat*, op. cit;
- Carlo De Risio: *Mussolini's Hourglass*, Settimo Sigillo 2000,
- Pietro Sella: *The West Against Europe*, Ed, L'Uomo Libero 1985; and *1939-1943: The Origins of Double Betrayal*, L'Uomo Libero No. 84, December 2018.

In conclusion, it should be added that Churchill, with Italy now involved in the conflict, soon dropped the pretense, and **Mussolini, who certainly had not believed all of the British leader's assurances and commitments, must have understood this immediately because, as documents attest, as early as the beginning of July 1940, he began to bombard Badoglio with requests to urge Balbo in Libya (and then, upon Balbo's death, Graziani) to launch a decisive offensive against Egypt, and he did the same with Supermarina, urging it to take some significant action in the Mediterranean** (on June 28, 1940, Badoglio sent a telegram to Balbo in Libya urging him to speed up preparations for the offensive, as *"the Duce is trembling with excitement... is doing everything to be ready for July 15,"* and then on July 3, he confirmed to Graziani, who had taken over the Libyan command: *"The Duce orders me to inform you that it is of vital interest to Italy that you be ready to launch the offensive on the 15th."*

**However, it was all in vain because, agreement or no agreement, in Italy, starting with the King, Badoglio, and Supermarina, as well as certain fascist hierarchies, such as the pro-Western Grandi and Ciano (the latter had perhaps written in his diary that he preferred to golf and to whiskey English, to society martial of the**

**Germans?), very few wanted to wage war on the British in earnest, but that is another matter.**

An examination of events therefore leads to the conclusion that it was not only the secret transitional "agreement" reached with Churchill regarding the timing and "manner" of entering the war against the British that determined the ineptitude and stagnation of our military operations, but rather a whole series of contributing factors, at the center of which, in addition to the sabotage of the Freemasons, was our General Staff, which held the operational and strategic keys to the war and which, for some time, in addition to failing to foresee and prepare strategic plans, had been secretly sabotaging the war effort.

The historical journalist Franco Bandini wrote that Mussolini, in weaving his plans and dealing with Churchill, had not taken into account two important elements:

*first*, that Germany now wanted to avoid expanding the war to include Italy, at least until it was involved in the war against Russia. Moreover, the German objective in those early months of the war was precisely to mend the rift with the British and to conclude an honorable peace on terms favorable to the British.

This undermined Mussolini's importance at the peace table and made our intervention unwelcome. An intervention that might have been important at the outbreak of war (September 1, 1939), acting as a deterrent to keep the French and British in check, but not after the war had started and was spreading.

*Secondly*, Churchill's real strategic goal was not the peace table, but the opposite: the expansion of the war, involving as many nations as possible, thus forcing the United States to intervene as soon as possible.

We do not know whether Mussolini, a skilled negotiator, had taken these two hidden situations into account.

But whether he did or not, it does not change the situation much: Italy could not remain absent from the theater of war and could not let Hitler win alone, but at the same time it was not in a position to enter it.

For our future, there should not have been a clear and definitive winner of the war because, in our interest, especially after the disappearance of France, it was necessary for a balance of power to remain in Europe.

From this perspective, the secret agreement with Churchill was inevitable.

The fact that, for the same reasons, it was also a cynical trap does not change anything.

**What Mussolini perhaps failed to grasp (and Hitler also failed to grasp, otherwise there would not have been the probable "rescue" of British troops at Dunkirk and the search for a stubborn reconciliation with the British) was the fact that this was no longer an old-fashioned war game.**

Now all the cards in the game were rigged, because the real reasons for the war went beyond national interests and took the form of a plan for world domination by transnational and supranational "forces" and entities, which, first and foremost, had to sweep away the obstacle of fascist-style nationalist states and then proceed to destroy Europe in order to subjugate it.

But who, at the time, was able to see clearly behind the events and understand the real strategies at play?

Who could have understood that big finance had triggered World War I, having previously financed opposing nations, given that the great slaughter, following the importance assumed by oil in those decades for industry, transport, and lighting, allowed the Rockefellers, the Morgans, and above all the Rothschilds, together with absolute control of the banking and financial world, to project big finance to the absolute conquest of the markets, engulfing and overlapping the old entrepreneurial capitalism.

This was what could not be fully understood, that international politics was no longer being played out with the old methods and situations of pure nationalism, but behind the scenes in a mega project of massive financial capitalism that was both transnational and transnational.

**Ergo, the First and Second World Wars were nothing more than the same war, the same project, developed in two stages.**

Mussolini, received by the King who had ceded it to him, annoyed but happy to offload the responsibilities of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, began the war with the national interest in mind, but above all without any real strategic plan of attack, which was feasible at that initial moment but held back by the illusion that everything would soon be over.

On June 26, the Germans entered Paris, and the British could no longer count on the help of the French fleet, which had at least remained intact, but their bases in the Mediterranean, which were deadly for us, as we would bitterly discover later: Suez, Malta, Gibraltar, had nothing to fear.

In practice, we committed suicide, but many were happy with this approach to war—or rather, non-war, as many did not want to clash with the British.

## AN ANECDOTE SIGNIFICANT

In order to gain a broader overview of the conditions in which Mussolini was forced to operate in the period leading up to our entry into the war and of the strategic changes that, for various reasons, ultimately influenced our intervention, it is instructive to draw on some of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani's memories.

In mid-April 1940, Graziani, then Chief of Staff of the Army, was tasked by Mussolini (who in turn wanted to implement a proposal put forward by the German General Staff) with developing a highly effective strategic plan. This plan envisaged that, when the Germans attacked the Maginot Line, the Italian army, consisting of 10 to 15 divisions equipped with modern weapons and vehicles supplied by the Germans, would gather at Porta Burgunda to break into the Rhone Valley and thus outflank the entire French army, deployed in the Western Alps and amounting to about 25 divisions. This was a disruptive plan that followed the one studied at the time of the Triple Alliance.

In any case, at the behest of the Duce, war would be waged according to the political strategy that had long been indicated: ***"not for Germany, nor with Germany, but alongside Germany."***

Consequently, Graziani and his entourage, benefiting from the fact that our military archives already contained traces of a similar plan dating back to the Great War, drafted a memorandum that was delivered to Mussolini and, of course, to the Chief of Staff (Badoglio).

However, when Badoglio was presented with the project, he listened without comment and invited Graziani to take no further interest in it, as he himself was taking charge of the matter!

Some time later, Graziani was summoned by the Duce, who was nervous and angry because, evidently, no concrete action had been taken on that important project. Graziani then expressed doubts about the conduct of the General Staff in accordance with Mussolini's wishes.

The Duce, in a state of anger, shouted loudly: *"If Badoglio doesn't feel like doing it, let him leave, let him leave. This is not about me, but about the supreme interests of the Fatherland!"*. He then promised to make his decisions on the matter known.

On May 29, however, at Palazzo Venezia, during the meeting with the Chief of the General Staff and the three Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces, Graziani found a calm and completely different atmosphere: it was clear that Mussolini had suspended his intentions to force Badoglio to clarify his position and perhaps even resign.

Knowing today the whole situation as a whole, it can be deduced that, given the relations between our armed forces and the institutions, in particular the House of Savoy, Mussolini could not and did not want to force Badoglio to implement a

project inspired by the Germans and including their contribution of weapons, nor could he do without the Chief of Staff in the imminence of war.

But above all, our entry into the war had probably been rethought with a war strategy, at least initially, that was completely different from the one requested of Graziani not long before.

During the meeting, Badoglio also made a point of clarifying:

*"It is therefore understood that, from today, there is a single operational command, mine. Any project or plan must go through it."*

"Certainly," d Mussolini sanctioned, endorsing those provisions.

But if Mussolini had weighed up all the pros and cons and had assessed what needed to be done in this way (perhaps also behind new and unexpected developments in *underground diplomacy* with the British), he had not taken into account that Badoglio was already a traitor in full swing and whatever he did, he did it for the benefit of his French "*friends*" and "*brothers*."

The favorable strategic opportunity was thus lost, and we know what happened instead: the Italians, already deployed in defensive positions, had to attack, due to the haste with which events had unfolded, in a frontal assault and without adequate offensive preparation, the Western Alps, which no one had thought could be overcome in this way.

The implementation of the Porta Burgunda plan, which Badoglio had boycotted, would have offered very different prospects for success. Finally, Graziani recalls:

*&lt;&lt;When, after the conclusion of the armistice with France, I went to visit the Sovereign, he said to me: "**Badoglio did not want war with France.**"&gt;&gt;.*

But if Badoglio did not want war with France, various circles did not want war with England. People have often wondered how Mussolini could have been so reckless as to take us to war without a ruling class that was convinced and united around fascism.

But the real wonder is how Mussolini managed to remain in power for so many years, despite a pro-British and deeply anti-fascist undercurrent in the nation and society.

The book by Cereghino and Fasanella, *Colonia Italia*, documents the interference, intervention strategies, and often influential personalities of the regime, industry, and journalism that the British cultivated and financed, often through corruption, to get them on their side. And often the 'sympathies' and collusion with the British were so spontaneous that it can be said that the British did not even need spies in our country, as they had open doors in every sector and friendships, if not family ties, with influential personalities. It was a paradoxical situation, where, except for Mussolini and a few others, no one had the true national interest at heart, but only their own.

# THE PARALLEL WAR AND THE END OF THE ITALIAN WAR

*"Not for Germany, nor with Germany, but alongside Germany"*  
[Mussolini]

Even after entering the war, ideally at least until 1942 (when we were forced to leave the strategic conduct entirely to the Germans, but in practice until the end of 1940), Italian war strategy, although no longer influenced *by* the secret "agreement" hidden in the "Correspondence" (but perhaps some remnants of that "agreement" continued until October 1940, with the intervention in Greece), followed its own line, that of *the* "parallel war," logical and consequential, in consideration of our geopolitical needs and the many compromises that assembled national political life between fascism, Freemasonry, the Church, industrial circles, etc. but decidedly disastrous for the outcome of the war, particularly because of our reckless intervention in Greece, which was not only the result of this ambiguous and anomalous situation determined by the "parallel war" and the desire not to see the Germans prevail in areas of interest to us, but also of obvious Masonic sabotage.

The intervention in Greece, a true offspring of the "parallel war," caused the explosion of all the delicate balances in the Balkans and expanded the war scenarios, just as Churchill had desired for his "uncompromising and irreversible war." and, due to our painful military failures, forced the Germans to intervene across the entire theater, diverting a number of resources and forces from the plans already in place for the attack on Russia.

- From the little that has emerged, unless it is another fake by Wolff who had it, there is a letter sent by Mussolini to Graziani on March 7, 1945, whose theme is the precious correspondence in the hands of the Duce and how to exploit it to force Churchill to negotiate. Mussolini writes:

*"Dear Marshal, your fears are exaggerated. Let's leave the Savoy clique out of the discussion. Whatever happens, Churchill knows that I have the ammunition ready. For this reason alone, he would accept, but he is hesitating. Or is he pretending? No! He is certainly biting his nails over his letters of October 1940, now that he is in the clutches of the Russian Bear."*

Now, this letter from October 1940, if it is not a forgery, is probably the product of secret diplomacy, which even in wartime is always active on all fronts. It could only refer to the situation in Greece, and once the war was over, it could prove compromising for the British. It is not unreasonable to believe that Churchill, who for obvious reasons was interested in seeing the Italians fall into the trap in Greece, setting the Balkans ablaze, may have encouraged

behind the scenes for Italian intervention, or rather falsely declared itself uninterested and hostile to our war initiative, which obviously led Mussolini to believe that the campaign in Greece, guaranteed to be easy by his generals and by Ciano himself, who boasted of acts of corruption towards the Greeks, would be a walk in the park.

It ended, as everyone knows:

- in October 1940, the reckless, ill-fated, and sabotaged campaign in Greece began, which in a few months proved not only much harder than anyone could have imagined, but also involved us in a series of humiliating military reversals;
- in November, our navy suffered a severe blow with the night of Taranto;
- and finally, in December, the British counterattack in Africa overwhelmed Libya and subsequently put an end to our *colonial empire* in East Africa forever.

**Well, as if on cue or at a prearranged moment, from mid-autumn 1940 onwards, a circle of individuals (Badoglio, Cavagnari, Caviglia, Ciano, Grandi, to mention the most famous names) who were already aiming for a separate peace by throwing Mussolini overboard, while Freemasonry, awakened from its slumber in various fields, had long been working to sabotage the entire war.**

It even seems that, following these initial setbacks for our armed forces and the disaster suffered by the navy on the night of Taranto, there were also high-ranking Navy officers who made contact with the British (between December 1940 and March 1941) not only to commit to not handing over our fleet to the Germans, but worse still, to **sell** our best ships at a price defined by the British themselves as derisory, obviously also requesting safe conduct for themselves and their families (Franco Bandini wrote a memorable article on this abominable event in issue 287 of *Storia Illustrata* in 1981).

**It was no coincidence that, at the end of the war, the Allies saw fit to include in the peace treaty imposed on Italy, in *Article 16*, retroactive immunity for all these traitors who had been working in favor of the Allies since then, if not before!**

In any case, our 'parallel war' soon came to an end, because from that moment on, the Germans took decisive control of the operational situation, even in areas under our jurisdiction.

First, the German Tenth Air Corps arrived in Sicily, then on February 19, 1941, the *Deutsches Afrika Korps* was formed and sent to Libya under Rommel's command. Furthermore, the Germans also had to intervene militarily in the Balkans because the situation in Yugoslavia had become explosive after the coup d'état against the Axis at the end of March 1941 (another consequence of the turmoil in Greece), which threatened to bring down an entire strategic theater.

# PAGES OF HEROISM AND PAGES OF SHAME

*"Due to Masonic and Risorgimento 'legacies', the British did not even need too many spies in our country, as there were so many of their accomplices and relatives or associates."*

While Italian soldiers and Blackshirts often wrote pages of heroism and great self-sacrifice on all fronts, given the scarcity of resources available, on the whole the Italian Army, the Navy, and especially the senior officers and generals, were not up to the task.

What certainly influenced the conduct of a terrible and reprehensible war was the Masonic sabotage practiced at all levels.

Freemasonry, awakened from the 'slumber' into which Fascism had forced it, had the task of sabotaging the war effort in every way possible, and this vile task was not particularly difficult given the 'sympathies' enjoyed by the Allies in many economic and military circles, and beyond. **This sabotage soon took on the guise of the most despicable betrayal.**

The navy sailed the Mediterranean, taking care to avoid clashes with the British, and when this happened, the first thought was to withdraw from the fight: steamships, ships, which were extremely important for our supplies in Libya, began to be sunk one by one, indicating that **it was not only the possession of the keys to decrypt our radio messages or radar that had revealed their routes, but there was also a despicable leak of information to the enemy.**

Land operations, as in Greece, were conducted with a certain, often deliberate recklessness; in Africa with excessive caution, to the point of bordering on fear of engaging with the enemy, who at that moment was certainly inferior, in decisive battles, and at the first sign of difficulty, at the first reactions and counter-offensives of the enemy, the first thought was to flee.

It should also be added that, as was demonstrated in the Italian Social Republic, Masonic and anti-fascist sabotage extended to the supply of clothing suitable for the climate and areas where our soldiers were to be deployed, as well as to the weapons they were to be equipped with.

The Germans immediately began to despise us, noting how our generals tended to show off at opportune moments, often exploiting their sacrifices and military successes without taking too many risks or engaging in battles, while at the slightest difficulty they would get bogged down or retreat.

**The British noticed that in Africa our generals had only one thought: that di fuggire ("but quanto corrono", notarono),**

**worrying only, in the event of surrender, that the British officers who were to take them into custody were of adequate rank.**

Mussolini, with his dual title of First Marshal of the Empire and head of the Supreme Command, where Badoglio was actually the one in charge, was literally overwhelmed by this uncontrollable and slimy situation.

The Duce had never been an expert in weapons and military strategy, so it was easy for the traitorous generals to deceive him in every way. In this situation, clearly caused by the nervous strain of the setbacks and humiliations of war, he developed a violent and persistent form of "nervous ulcer," frequent spasms, and excruciating pain, which robbed him of his lucidity: "My pain is the sinking of the steamships," he said one day, but be that as it may, Mussolini, in those circumstances, lost much of his renowned ability to sniff out deception and react appropriately.

There would have been countless traitors or repulsive liars to dismiss, send to prison, if not to the wall, who justified his failures or reversals with the most implausible excuses, but none of this happened. On the contrary, Mussolini often tried to fix things by handing out promotions. After all, the entire military environment surrounding him was rotten, so where would he have found the men and the means for a violent crackdown?

**And mind you, it was often not just betrayal, it was also incompetence, cowardice, and selfish defense of their positions and careers that led the officers, these high commanders, to lie, to hide the truth, to ensure that nothing and no one could damage their privileges. In short, the worst of the worst of the Italian character.**

Today, with the war lost and episodes and characters who played a dirty role in it coming to light, we can make a definitive judgment on the facts and men of that historical period. Our political, social, institutional, and military class of those years can in fact be divided as follows:

1. in those, such as Mussolini, who acted, perhaps sometimes mistakenly, with the interests of the nation exclusively in mind, even sacrificing the ideological aspects of fascism, which was identified with the destiny of the homeland, for this purpose. And today we know from declassified British documents how the British aimed their propaganda precisely at destroying Mussolini, whom they perceived as the only true enemy, and this is to the Duce's credit;
2. in those who, on the other hand, cared only and exclusively about their particular caste and shop interests (the House of Savoy, the Vatican, big industry and finance, the bourgeois elements of the country and the Fascist Party) and who were inclined to support only *safe* actions, with the *wind in their sails*, involving no excessive risks and, in any case, if their privileges were in danger, they were prepared to throw overboard not only fascism, but

even their homeland: they all became traitors, without exception. It is no coincidence that the vast majority of them were Anglophiles and Francophiles by tradition and natural inclination.

3. And finally, those who, ideologically, deliberately and consciously took action, either from the outset or at a later stage, to sabotage and betray their country (Freemasons, military leaders who sold out to the Allies, anti-fascists, etc.).

Mussolini can perhaps be blamed for having led us into war without having managed to obtain complete control of power or at least the certainty that his directives would be respected, as well as for the inadequate way in which he reacted to the deceptions and many failures. These were certainly serious faults during wartime.

The House of Savoy was in fact a foreign body to the nation, to which it was linked only by virtue of its caste interests.

The national industry had practically exploited and deceived the regime in order to enrich itself excessively. Industrialists, in particular Fiat and Ansaldo, the largest companies involved in the war effort, had demanded and enjoyed every facility: social peace in the factories, a monopoly on products with respect to foreign competition, customs protection, etc. And all this without providing an adequate product in return, as they had also committed to do, because they preferred to encourage the production of war equipment that was more profitable for them, to the detriment of more advanced equipment suitable for modern warfare. This "little game" was also possible thanks to Mussolini's lack of technical knowledge of armaments and to all those henchmen, even in the PNF, who played along with him for their own petty interests. The damage that the industrialists did to our war effort was enormous and was never repaired.

Freemasonry, the true cancer of the nation, had been forced by fascism to go into "hibernation," but it was certainly not eradicated. And its old, historic ties with the Anglo-French and with international High Freemasonry reawakened it to



The right moment to have him criminally sabotage the Italian war effort.

A photo from 1943 is emblematic, when in Caserta the Allies unearthed Masonic flags and banners from the ground where they had been hidden (*photo on the side*).

The Freemasons could count on support and contacts in elements scattered throughout the hierarchical scale

of the armed forces, in government offices, in institutions, in the social and industrial fabric, in diplomacy, in the Fascist party, etc.

Imagine the consequences.

It was not difficult for them to sabotage orders for war goods and materials, hide the resources needed for the war effort (after September 8, warehouses full of hidden materials were discovered), delay or boycott certain measures, instill defeatism, in short: sabotage the Italian war effort in every way possible.

Generals, admirals, and many senior officers in our armed forces, many of whom were Freemasons, starting with Badoglio, were not prepared for modern warfare, not to mention their character traits. All of them often proved to be opportunists, taking advantage of the situation, the funds, and the privileges that the fascist regime had created to propel Italy to great historical and geographical heights, automatically placing them at the highest levels and honors of the nation, where they were indispensable. Needless to say, the result was predictable.

And the PNF itself, a mammoth popular party with millions of members, trade unions, colonies, after-work clubs, etc., could be said to be largely in the hands of elements who revelled in rhetoric, certainly not in revolutionary commitment. And the more time passed in this cursed war, the more corruption advanced, the search for a 'way' to get by. In the confidential memos to the General Command of the Royal Carabinieri Lieutenant Colonel Giovanni Frignani, the same man who later arrested, or rather kidnapped, the Duce in Vila Ada on the orders of the King, compiled from January 1943 until the armistice, this carabinieri, who obviously took care not to monitor and investigate the military and the House of Savoy, lucidly analyzed the situation that had arisen in Italy and in particular in Rome, where corruption was rampant and the Fascist party was falling deeper and deeper into a coma. On July 25, 1943, everything came to a head.

These failings, of not having carefully monitored, of not having *intervened* drastically, of not having carried out sacrosanct purges, are the 'faults' that can be attributed to the Duce, provided, however, that it can be demonstrated that Mussolini was capable, with what 'human' resources he had at his disposal (party, militia, and Italian people), to give that *second wave* push to take all the power and proceed with his "night of the long knives."

At the end of April 1945, Mussolini, effectively abandoned without adequate military escort in the Como area, in the small lakeside village of Menaggio, by pseudo-fascist commanders eager to surrender to the Allies as soon as possible and perhaps recycle themselves in the post-war period as anti-communists and anti-Sovietists, inevitably found himself at a crossroads of death:

**The British wanted him dead** in order to hide their agreement with Churchill, an agreement that, once revealed, would have overturned the entire historiographical interpretation of World War II and discredited the British in the eyes

and complicated British international policy, especially with regard to Tito's Yugoslavia.

**The Americans wanted him dead**, as we know from an intercontinental telephone recording between Churchill and Roosevelt on July 29, 1943, even though, apparently and officially, the Americans said they wanted to capture him to put him on trial and humiliate him, but did nothing! Roosevelt also had a lot to hide about his past "dealings" with Italy, not to mention that he was acting on behalf of the high finance that was the Duce's sworn enemy.

**The Soviets** (and the Italian communists, who did not move a finger without Stalin's approval) **wanted him dead**, since Stalin wanted to keep certain "secret agreements" with Italy during the twenty-year period hidden, dating back to 1923 and which had practically protected our country from attacks by communist cells (the only attacks were those by the Freemasons and Giustizia e Libertà), but they also wanted to hide certain contacts that took place in the first half of 1943, when Italy and the USSR agreed to explore the possibility of getting the Soviets out of the war.

**Morto wanted the King**, who feared that his responsibilities in the war would come to light, where he, who had all the Crown's financial interests in London banks, had shared, and how, the 'agreement' with Churchill (the King was certainly one of those five people, indicated by Mussolini and aware of the agreements with the British).

**Finally, Wolff's Germans were not sorry to see him dead either**, having betrayed him with their ignoble surrender, negotiated in secret in Bern, and in fact ensured that he was captured by the partisans, as had probably been promised during those negotiations.

Are we surprised that he ended up in Piazzale Loreto?

The historian Alessandro De Felice, a distant relative of the famous Renzo, recounted a confidence shared with him by Leo Valiani: << ***Mussolini's death must remain a mystery. And it is better that way... London played the music, and the PCI danced to the beat!***>>.

It is no coincidence that another famous historian, Renzo De Felice, stated:

*&lt;&lt;The documentation in my possession all leads to one conclusion: Benito Mussolini was killed by a group of Milanese partisans at the urging of the British secret service. There was an interest in ensuring that the leader of fascism never came to trial.*

*There was a British suggestion: 'Take him out', while the terms of the armistice stipulated his surrender. It was much better for the British if Mussolini were dead. At stake was the national interest linked to the explosive compromises contained in the correspondence that the British Prime Minister had exchanged with Mussolini before and during the war*>>.

Seventy-five years have passed since those events. The war was lost, and Italy was colonized and incorporated into the Western NATO system. Another part of Europe was subjugated to the Soviet system of the Warsaw Pact. For

About 40 years ago, all of Europe had borders, populations, governments, political parties, and cultural circles that were divided and opposed: NATO fans on one side and Warsaw Pact partisans on the other: *Fools & More Fools*.

It was a perfect system for keeping the whole of Europe subjugated, disrupting it, reshaping it into a New World Order that would also affect the very foundations of peoples' existence, and finally diluting it into a multi-ethnic mixture.

And after the "fall of the wall" and the collapse of the USSR, this New World Order finally showed its true face: that of the unchallenged domination in every field of cosmopolitan high finance, those financial interests that were already at the root of the real causes of World War II.

In one of Mussolini's last writings, we read:

*<<Among the main causes of the collapse of fascism, I would cite the relentless and implacable struggle waged by certain industrial and financial groups, which, in their mad selfishness, feared and hated fascism as the worst enemy of their inhuman interests. I must say, for the sake of justice, that Italian capital, the legitimate kind, which is sustained by the capabilities of its enterprises, has always understood social needs, even when it had to stretch itself to meet new labor agreements>>.*

In one of his pencil annotations, as was his custom, to a speech by Churchill to the House of Commons in May 1944, Mussolini highlighted the following:

*Justice must be done, and punishment will fall on the wicked and the cruel. The wretches who plotted to subjugate first Europe and then the world must be punished. So too must their agents, who have committed horrible crimes in so many countries. They must be brought to face the judgment of the peoples they have outraged, on the very scenes of their atrocities."*

**We are still waiting for justice to be done.**

# NEWSPAPER FAIRY TALES IN A ROW

It is painful to note how, over the years, historical journalism, in order to avoid admitting or at least hypothesizing Churchill's warmongering strategy, in the presence of various clues and some evidence that clearly attested to the existence of compromising "correspondence," has clung to this conjecture, namely that the British leader's "sin" probably consisted in offering Italy a rich territorial booty at France's expense, so that Italy would remain neutral.

Others, however, hypothesize that there were controversial agreements between Mussolini and Churchill to overturn the front in an anti-Soviet sense in 1944. But we will talk about that later. □

After denying for years the existence of a compromising "correspondence," when too many clues and some concrete evidence attested to its existence, even if it then disappeared, many historians and especially historical journalists, obtorto collo, had to take it into consideration, but minimized it with the "fairy tale" for the naive of a rich booty in exchange for remaining neutral.

In reality, Churchill's previous "offers" and proposals, which were entirely temporary and did contemplate this type of concession in exchange for our neutrality, responded to other previous diplomatic and military needs. They were part of a long-standing discussion that Mussolini and Churchill evidently analyzed and took into consideration during the period of our non-belligerence.

As we shall see, however, there is no doubt that Churchill, at least from a certain critical military moment onwards, was no longer interested in Italian "neutrality"; he had other, far more devastating objectives, and at the same time Mussolini knew full well that it would be absolutely impossible for him to "gorge himself" on territories and mandates at France's expense without having fought.

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◆ For the events surrounding the Mussolini-Churchill correspondence and for consideration of its very existence, we refer to some important texts:

- F. Andriola: *Mussolini Churchill Carteggio segreto (Mussolini Churchill Secret Correspondence)*, Ed. Piemme 2007;
- D. Campini: *Mussolini Churchill I carteggi*, Ed. Italpress 1952;
- G. Cavalleri: *Ombre sul lago (Shadows on the Lake)*, Ed. Piemme 1995;
- R. Festorazzi: *Churchill Mussolini Le carte segrete (Churchill Mussolini: The Secret Papers)*, Ed. Datanew 1996;
- R. Festorazzi: *Mistero Churchill (The Churchill Mystery)*, Ed. Macchione 2013;
- L. Ricciotti: *The Sack of Italy*, Ed Mondadori 1994.
- E. Curti: *Il chiodo a tre punte (The Three-Pronged Nail)*, Iuculano publisher, 2003 (for the attestation of important documents that Mussolini had in his pocket on April 27, 1945).

**Therefore, the conditions for remaining neutral, while also gaining territorial expansion, did not exist.**

However, let us consider this convenient interpretation, which, put forward by historians and embedded historical journalists with obvious levity, shows a certain sloppiness and superficiality, if not bad faith.

**Therefore, it is argued that Churchill, at a certain point, would have abandoned France, even though it had not yet surrendered, and would have even offered Italy the whole of Dalmatia and Istria, definitive possession of the Dodecanese islands, Tunisia, Corsica, Nice, and anything else in order to avoid this much-feared Italian intervention. It is therefore logical, according to the supporters of this thesis, that he did not want to reveal the nature of the barter proposals, which ultimately did not materialize, despite the fabulous offers, precisely because Italy entered the war despite everything.**

Anything is possible, but it seems unlikely that Churchill could have made such offers and promised such substantial compensation without France's knowledge, especially when France was not yet in serious difficulty and he himself had not yet joined the Military Coordination Committee (i.e., before April 1940).

**But before we go any further, let's clarify one thing.**

**The substantial "Correspondence" concerning Churchill (but not only him) and Mussolini, starts from afar and also spans years when the British leader did not hold government office. It can be divided into "State Papers" and unofficial "correspondence" between Italy and representatives of His Majesty. As mentioned, all of Churchill's "signatures" as Prime Minister are highly compromising.**

**However, the papers in which Churchill negotiated and signed as "personal representative of His Majesty" are certainly not insignificant.**

Returning to the exorbitant offers of spoils made to Italy, it is true that at that time it may have been convenient for the British to avoid Italy's entry into the war, but in fact England was convinced of the relative resistance of the French front and therefore of the possibility of a military counteroffensive as soon as the conditions were ripe. In that contingency, at most, we can speak of *generic and propagandistic* invitations to *neutrality* on the part of Her Majesty's government to Italy, which, however, were of little consequence.

This is also attested to, during that period, by the closed attitude of British diplomacy towards Italy and by the aggressive behavior of the British navy towards our merchant traffic: **those who are effectively pursuing the essential goal of excluding Italy from the war move and act differently!**

As we have seen, albeit with the reservation that it is probably a forgery, but indicative of the intentions that had matured, in mid-April, with the so-called *top-secret Agreement*, Churchill's other strategy took shape: to steer Italy into the war, a strategy that then became effective as soon as Churchill became Prime Minister.

It would therefore be more credible to argue that negotiations between Italy and England on this basis, i.e., for Italian neutrality, could have taken place well before Churchill became Prime Minister (early May 1940) and perhaps even alongside opposing and more secret negotiations, namely those of *the Agreement*, which were of a totally opposite nature.

It is not unreasonable to argue that during that period, with sudden and convulsive changes as a result of military events, negotiations were taking place on several fronts.

But when France's inevitable collapse became apparent, the situation became critical for the British, and with Churchill becoming Prime Minister, the decision was made to widen the conflict and go all out, involving our country in the war.

**And this is the secret negotiation that was highly compromising for Churchill!**

However, the fact remains that, in the first case, it is also extremely difficult to believe that real negotiations with such an exaggerated reward were finalized in order to obtain our neutrality, for the simple reason that **we do not see how Italy, remaining outside the conflict, could have enriched itself in this way at France's expense.**

**It is unthinkable that Italy, in order to cash in on those disproportionate promises, would have had to wait and hope for a victory (which, incidentally, was considered unlikely at the time) by England, nor would Germany have allowed it, in the event of a solo victory, to annex those territories.**

It is well known that during the peace negotiations with France (which, incidentally, did not result in the terrible impositions and spoliations that had been feared), the Germans waited, as a sign of respect, for Italy to be ready to sit down at the negotiating table, but they acted resolutely to curb Italian demands.

This was both for reasons of political expediency towards the French and because they did not consider Italy worthy of making excessive demands given its limited contribution to the war. With the creation of the Vichy government and the German obligations associated with it, the Germans respected all the agreements and treaties that had been signed, and there was therefore no room for any further Italian claims against France, even though Italy had entered the war: **imagine if it had remained outside the conflict!**

The matter, if you look at it closely, would have taken on ridiculous proportions because, in practice, Mussolini would have had to 'appear' at the peace negotiations table with a speech like this:

*"Dear German comrades, while we congratulate you on your victory in the war, we Italians, who were unable to help you (due to an agreement with your enemies, editor's note), are here to pocket, without having lifted a finger, what the British promised and signed!"*

Any further comment is superfluous!

Therefore, offers of this kind, made by Churchill, which were not generic but concrete, may instead have been re-proposed, in a completely different context, precisely on the eve of Italy's entry into the war (late May/June 1940) because, due to a bold and unscrupulous last-minute war strategy, this intervention was also urged by the British themselves, and therefore the offers should now be seen **not as a reward for staying out of the conflict, but as an incentive to enter it**, perhaps in view of a much-vaunted imminent peace.

**In this case, and only in this case, Churchill's offers might have been enforceable in the future and, moreover, being truly *controversial*, if they had come to light, they would have put the British statesman and the very position of Great Britain in great difficulty.**

In fact, simple bargaining, through attractive offers to Italy at France's expense, so that our country would remain neutral, may have taken place in early May 1940, at the time of France's collapse, but it is, above all, almost irrelevant to the importance and delicacy of the correspondence in relation to the serious responsibilities and faults to be attributed to the British.

It is highly probable and logical that the British Prime Minister knew he could make certain offers even with the consent of a desperate France, so much so that, in Carissimi-Priori's testimony, previously reported, it was stated that:

*<<the significance of the deal at France's expense shows that Churchill personally guaranteed Paris' favorable attitude>>.*

It is therefore crucial to note that even if the content of these offers, which were *so unkind* to France and made to keep us out of the conflict, had become known to the public and to international diplomats, **Churchill, once the war was over (and won!), even if with some embarrassment, would have defended himself brilliantly by citing *reasons of state* and the danger England was facing at that time, which forced him to abandon France in order to avoid Italy's intervention.**

**On the other hand, this kind of accusation would have been meaningless, since no French territory had actually been ceded, nor had Italy refrained from intervening, and Churchill himself could have claimed to have made**

**Mussolini nothing more than a bluff by signing a promissory note that he would never honor!**

Did Churchill not also display a cynical and unscrupulous attitude in early July 1940, when he sank the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, causing nearly 1,300 deaths and hundreds of injuries among his former allies?

And how did Churchill defend himself in his memoirs, recounting this ignoble gesture?

*<<It was a hateful decision, he wrote, the most inhumane, the most painful I have ever had to share. Just the day before, the French were our dearest allies... but our national existence and the survival of our cause were at stake.*

**Well, in light of these events, how is it possible to imagine that proposals for territorial concessions at the expense of France (which was probably willing to agree) that never materialized could have been a cause of extreme concern for the British statesman?**

But above all, we repeat once again, it is difficult to understand how Mussolini and the King, despite any guarantees that had been given to Italy, and unless they were complete idiots, could trust such a commitment and how it could possibly be honored, given that an English victory was considered unlikely at that time, while in the event of peace or a German victory, **it would have been impossible for Italy, without having fought, to enrich itself at France's expense!**

**In any case, and this is another crucial observation, what use could such documentation have been to Mussolini, if, despite attesting to fabulous offers to Italy at France's expense, it had nevertheless prompted the Duce to enter the war?**

**This, in fact, while being a relative disgrace for the British, was an aggravating factor for Italy and a clear example of Mussolini's ineptitude!**

**Far from being *material full of possibilities* to be played at the peace table!**

It is so obvious that if the Duce, in order to defend himself before a hypothetical international tribunal, had brought up Churchill's offer of large territorial promises to stay out of the war, he would have worsened his situation, brought no advantage to his own nation, and at best would have thrown some discredit on the British prime minister, who, as we have just seen, would have defended himself with some ease!

So in that infamous correspondence, in the last-minute exchanges of letters, **there was much more** than just costly offers of booty to stay out of the war! We must not dwell on a few indiscretions, a few lines of letters where these proposals may be expressed, because what matters is the substance of what

is then ratified, not what is discussed and proposed on an interim basis.

**And what may eventually turn into an actual agreement cannot possibly be something that has no chance of actually being pocketed.**

But above all, let's be logical: if, for example, the entire "Correspondence" were contained in Carissimi-Priori's statement, namely that he read and had translated the famous 62 letters or sheets of correspondence between Mussolini and Churchill Churchill up until the eve of the war, finding offers made to Italy at France's expense to remain neutral, it is already an exaggeration to say that Churchill damned his soul to get this kind of correspondence, which was not overly compromising, back, but it is totally absurd that its existence was hidden and denied to historians, even after the fateful 50 years! There was no political or historical need to prevent the public, after so many years, from taking note of facts and circumstances already assumed and hypothesized by many.

**It is therefore obvious that the "Correspondence" contained such compromising material that it would irreparably ruin Churchill's image and career, compromise the arrangements that were to be imposed on Europe at the end of the war, and completely overturn the convenient historiography imposed by the victors.**

It is no coincidence that Mussolini, in his final days, attached great importance to the documents in his possession and, as we have seen from the German wiretaps, the men in his entourage who are aware of this and with whom he often discusses it clearly share this view. He also tried to keep them safe by making photocopies of them and explicitly stated that **these papers attested to the "real reasons why Italy entered the war" and not, mind you, why it should not have entered the war!**

This statement, in any case, unequivocally suggests much, much more than *simple offers of booty* in exchange for neutrality, such as the same offers made to invite Italy to enter the war!

A draft of an unscrupulous agreement, the basis of which can be found in **that** decisive, albeit false, **Agreement** of late April 1940.

The agreement between Mussolini and Churchill, therefore, was more of a last-minute "understanding," made possible by the unacknowledged British need to expand the theater of war and anticipate American intervention, and by Italy's real need to enter the war without taking too many risks. In fact, it was a convergence of interests. The quid pro quo of this agreement is more than anything else here, and any offers of future concessions to Italy (which were not lacking in any way) are entirely secondary, not least because they would have had to reckon with Germany.

Franco Bandini, in his interesting *"Vita e morte segreta di Mussolini"* (*The Secret Life and Death of Mussolini*) Mondadori 1978, reports that in May 1940, the industrialist Alberto Pirelli, commenting with his doctor, the Milanese endocrinologist Prof. Alcide Frascini, on the international situation at that time, which saw France's defeat now almost definitive and Italy still on the sidelines, reassured the doctor's concerns:

*"Don't worry, dear professor! The 'big head' has already come to an agreement with Churchill. A few months ago, I myself traveled back and forth to London as a 'secret courier,' and I can guarantee you that nothing will happen. Everything has already been settled."*

It was certainly no coincidence that in September 1945, Churchill came to Italy, ostensibly to paint, but in reality to oversee the search for valuable compromising documents, and also found a way to visit Pirelli at his villa in Liguria.

The young historical researcher Emilio Gin rightly notes:

*<<The fact that a state declares war, giving the ambassadors of enemy countries a week's notice, without doing anything afterwards, appears to be an enigma that cannot be explained solely by a lack of preparation for war.*

**This demonstrates how Mussolini, faced with the dire military and geopolitical situation in which he found himself, doubtful that the British (backed by the US) could ever be definitively defeated and fearful that the Germans would win and become the absolute rulers of the situation, had long been seeking such an agreement with the British, namely the possibility of waging a "fake" war, without any particular risks, which would guarantee us the minimum necessary for our post-war political needs and which would possibly be the prelude to peace in Europe, without upsetting the old balance of power too much.**

**The opportunity was offered to him by Churchill in early June 1940, when several hypotheses and concessions were being frantically discussed.**

This is not our arbitrary interpretation, but the result of research, deductions, and analysis of the diplomatic and military situation at the time.

Obviously, the fact that Churchill, having regained possession of all the compromising documents, made all traces of these negotiations disappear, makes historians rather skeptical, as they are accustomed to considering only objective documentation.

Churchill then, to avoid misunderstandings and surprises, raided all the documentation preceding and following our entry into the war, but essentially the only compromising documents can only be a few letters signed by the British in early June 1940, which were therefore easy to make disappear.

From this perspective, documents that have been obtained indirectly, for example, cause historians to turn up their noses, especially since, as is obvious, there is no trace of certain top-secret negotiations in the British archives, let alone in ours.

However, consideration and analysis of all the facts, the few traces that remain, and analysis of the events preceding and following our entry into the war leave no doubt on the matter.

In essence, everything revolves around a strategic necessity on the part of the British, perfectly understood by Franco Bandini, who wrote:

&lt;&lt;[in the interests of Britain] ***"widening the conflict was a vital necessity, and this would inevitably involve Italy sooner or later (...). Only as enemies and weak opponents could we have been used as a distraction for the Wehrmacht, drawing it out of its central European defensive perimeter and wearing it down in a series of peripheral clashes of no interest. Only as enemies could we have done England the immense favor of consuming the oil and raw materials that were indispensable to Germany. Only as enemies, finally, could we have offered those who knew how to take advantage of it, at the right time and place, a 'soft underbelly' of vast operational possibilities."***

While waiting, we might add, for the inevitable American intervention.

Certainly today we can say, with hindsight and meta-historical considerations, everything that was at stake, that it would have been better to have in mind, even before petty nationalistic interests, the destinies of humanity that certain "forces" behind the scenes, winning the war with the Allies, intended to overturn with all the values of our culture and traditions, imposing that "society of specters" that we see today.

Therefore, the alliance with Germany should have taken on, but obviously not only on our part, the characteristics of a true ideological struggle, so much so that it was clear that Germany's victory was much better, regardless, with our role as junior partners, rather than the triumph of democracies.

But at the time, this awareness had not fully matured. Nations were moving in their nationalist and pan-Germanic perspectives for the Germans, and in Italy, moreover, Fascism was in power, revealing obvious limitations in its men and certainly not holding all the power in its hands.

That's how it went, as it went.

## ***Anti-Soviet agreements between Mussolini and Churchill?***



**February 1945 – The infamous Yalta Conference (Crimea). Let's look at the three great leaders: Churchill, Roosevelt (who would die a couple of months later) and Stalin. Churchill's "anti-communism" took a back seat to the demands of Yalta.**

Let us now consider this other hypothesis, which is somewhat 'misleading' in the sense that it minimizes the true importance of the 'Correspondence'.

Among the many hypotheses formulated about the possible contents of the 'Correspondence', one that has often been put forward is that of a possible secret negotiation between Mussolini and Churchill concerning an anti-Soviet plot which, once revealed, could have caused the British leader serious difficulties with his Soviet allies.

The correspondence that Mussolini carried with him probably included documents of this kind, but as we shall see, they are entirely secondary and do not constitute truly "sensitive" material, above all because there are no "letters" between Mussolini and Churchill **after** Italy's entry into the war, nor could there be.

It is natural that both Italy and Germany may have considered the possibility that the Allied front would break down due to the Soviet threat, although this hope was unfounded given that the causes and interests of the war

greater than any conflicts with communism, and in fact the great strategic and political agreements of Yalta were eventually reached.

However, let us examine the hypotheses that revolve around these issues, where there are only a few testimonies that, historically, do not prove much.

Perhaps, based on the little that has emerged, a certain interest lies in the discreet intervention of the government, which was extremely significant given the complete subordination of that government to the Allied authorities who, towards the end of 1944 in Rome, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of the South, Ivanoe Bonomi, entrusted the industrialist Gian Riccardo Cella, who was about to return to the North, with a strange mission, as evidenced by this testimony:

*<For the good of Italy, I beg you to do everything possible to ensure that Mussolini is entrusted to the Italian government. In addition to him alive, we are interested in the secret documents relating to his personal correspondence with Churchill: he should have one or more letters in which the British Prime Minister invited him to press Hitler to divert his plans of conquest eastward, toward Russia, and not elsewhere....*

***Do everything possible, therefore, to save Mussolini, but above all to recover these precious documents.***

Note, in this testimony by Riccardo Cella, relating to what he claims was reported to him by President Bonomi, how they wanted to make people believe that Churchill's *compromising* correspondence consisted essentially of invitations to Mussolini to work to *divert* Hitler's aims *against Russia*. A detail of little historical importance.

This was probably nothing more than an excuse to hide the **real reasons** why the government of the South, and therefore Churchill, was interested in the *correspondence*.

However, this leitmotif of the *anti-communist* Churchill's alleged desire to come to an agreement with the Duce in order to find a way to counterbalance the intrusive increase in the Soviet presence in Europe also recurs in other guises or motivations and in reference to subsequent periods of war, when the Soviets were allies of England.

All the more so because, between 1944 and 1945, Mussolini, finding himself in need of a way out of a war that was now lost, probably made inquiries with the British, or vice versa, the British sought contact with him (perhaps precisely because of the secret correspondence in his possession or for tactical reasons at the time) regarding the possibility of a truce behind the alleged need to contain the Soviet invasion of southern Europe (a hypothesis, as we shall see, that was completely far-fetched given the Allies' interest, with which Churchill agreed, in using the Soviets in the post-war control and division of Europe, a strategy that was then implemented at Yalta).

These *contacts* and *inquiries*, which were common practice in all *underground diplomacy* and between belligerent nations, are attested to by several testimonies and

can also be deduced from telephone and letter interceptions carried out on the Duce, in particular, but not only, the telephone call with Hitler on November 22, 1944, and Mussolini's letter to Hitler on February 28, 1945.

Without confirming their authenticity, their content leaves many doubts. In the November phone call, Mussolini asks Hitler for permission to sound out Churchill who, according to him, would realize the danger of a Soviet invasion of Europe (a completely erroneous assessment), and in the letter he repeats the same theme.

Both intercepted communications would therefore indicate that the Duce was waiting for and pleading for the Führer's approval to venture into actual agreements with the British, in an anti-Soviet sense, and hinted at his chances of success in this regard with Churchill, but we also know that Hitler did not consider it appropriate to bring these preliminary approaches to a conclusion.

It can also be deduced that Mussolini, considering the press reports on the recent Yalta conference, believed, but we know he was wrong, that strong disagreements had emerged between the Allies (but these were only superficial), precisely with regard to the Soviet position, and therefore asked Hitler to attempt an approach with the British in order to get out of the difficult war situation, perhaps counting on a "reversal of the front."

However, if the "wiretaps" sold after the war by General Wulff contain falsehoods, doubts, or manipulations, it is precisely these letters and phone calls that require great caution, especially since we know for certain that **during that period Mussolini was urging Hitler to increase German intervention in Italy against the Anglo-Americans, whom he believed could be stopped and indeed inflicted heavy losses on.**

Given the exquisitely *anti-communist* nature of the whole affair, one can imagine how these events are welcomed by various right-wing and far-right circles, which have willingly acted as a sounding board for them.

We must therefore clarify a few points in order to refine all these inferences and try to distinguish the true from the possible and the false, and above all to reaffirm the fact that the only real compromising factor for Churchill, present in the secret correspondence, refers exclusively to the period of our entry into the war in June 1940. Everything else, whether or not it appears in the correspondence, is important but secondary.

To simplify and hypothesize, therefore, in their true light, any anti-Soviet approaches between Churchill and Mussolini, we must divide the war years into three periods:

- a first period: from the moment Churchill became Prime Minister (May 1940) until the German attack on Russia (June 1941);
- a second period beginning with the German military crisis in the winter of 1941 and ending with the fall of Mussolini (July 1943);
- A third and final period concerning 1944/45 during the Italian Social Republic.

**Before analyzing these historical periods, we must state that we exclude the possibility that Churchill, after the compromising exchange of letters relating to the agreement on Italy's entry into the war in 1940, may have entered into other agreements with Mussolini, signing them through documents and correspondence.**

At most, during the war, there may (perhaps) have been various approaches involving *suggestions, explanations, and false advice*, disguised as convenient phrases and propaganda, on the part of the British, who may sometimes have gone too far, but we are far from believing that there were any actual signed and compromising documents, in terms of *agreements*, such as those of May/June 1940.

### • **May 1940 / June 1941**

This was a period of war in which, theoretically, Churchill would have had every interest in Hitler committing the impudence of turning against the Soviets and therefore letting himself go with Mussolini, in order to encourage Hitler in this sense, so that he would "break" the agreements with Stalin.

In any case, however, there are two contradictions: the first excludes that this possibility, referring to that period, could constitute controversial material for the British, and the second excludes Mussolini's actual interest or convenience in pushing Hitler into war against Russia. At most, Mussolini could, and in fact did, advise Hitler not to go too far with his agreements with Stalin.

With regard to Churchill's responsibilities, it should be borne in mind that this was at a time when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was still in force, with its geographical implications benefiting the Soviets (who, among other things, were supporting the German war economy), had annexed half of Poland, had issued a joint declaration with Germany in which they effectively blamed the Anglo-French themselves for the war (and its possible continuation), and, moreover, had also attacked Finland at the end of 1939.

In this context, it does not seem to us that any anti-Soviet scheming on Churchill's part, even if it did occur, could have been held against him by his future Soviet ally. Secondly, once Italy had entered the war, Mussolini's interest was diametrically opposed to that of pushing Germany to attack Russia.

In this regard, it is worth noting Mussolini's concern when he learned, without prior warning from his ally, of the German attack on Russia (during a meeting in early June 1941, Hitler had informed the Duce, only in general terms, of the imminence of a war with the Soviets, to which Mussolini, putting on a brave face, promised his participation).

Paradoxically, the events of the war now imposed on us forced us to ask, after the invasion and it could not be otherwise, to participate in the war against Russia, above all so as not to be left out of the oil of the Caucasus.

Renzo De Felice himself, in his monumental biographical work on Mussolini, wrote that once Mussolini was sure that Hitler would clash with the Soviets, he had no chance of opposing this decision, otherwise in a different situation he would certainly have tried to dissuade him.

His attitude to the news that Germany had attacked Russia is indicative, as his wife recounted at that moment, alone with him listening to the radio: *"Rachele, the Germans are attacking Russia, which means that the war is lost."*

We find the same concept in a telephone conversation he had at 3:30 p.m. on June 22, 1941, with Clara Petacci, which was secretly recorded by the Germans (Mussolini was at the seaside in Riccione, while Claretta was in Rome):

- Here is a recorded telephone conversation at 3:30 p.m. on June 22, 1941, with Clara Petacci:

**Claretta** asks him: "<< " *How are you, are you happy?*>>"

**Mussolini:** " << " *Far from happy, haven't you heard the radio?* ">> " (referring to the news of the German attack on Russia).

**Claretta:** "<< " *"What do you mean... aren't you happy?"*>>"

**Mussolini:**<< *How could I be... The downward spiral has begun because the Germans are stubborn and always repeat the same mistakes. They stray too far from their supply bases, open up new fronts, thereby dividing their forces, win many battles, and will end up losing the war*>>.>

In conclusion, any exchanges of views and opinions, invitations, and other interactions that may have taken place during this early period of the war between Churchill and Mussolini, despite being enemies at war, are of very little significance in terms of placing particular blame on the British leader. It is not worth dwelling on this further.

## • ***Winter 1941 / July 1943***

This was a long period of war in which, in the Russian-German conflict, phases of serious crisis in the German war machine alternated with phases of recovery of the German offensive. During this period, England, aware of the delays in the Allied war machine in opening another front in Europe, as Stalin wanted, feared a request for a truce from both Stalin and Hitler which, if

accepted, would have closed the eastern front and allowed hundreds of German divisions to be moved west, blowing up the entire Allied war strategy.

This possibility of a truce could also have occurred after the German defeat at Stalingrad (between December 1942 and February 1943), which, although significantly important, was by no means decisive for the outcome of the war in Russia. Moreover, Stalin found himself grappling not only with subsequent and effective German counterattacks, but above all with a situation of human resource depletion that had reached apocalyptic proportions.

During this period, however, there was very little to propose to the Duce, both because it had not yet happened and therefore there was no fear of a Soviet invasion of Europe, and because it was clear that Mussolini, well aware of the gravity of continuing the war in Russia, was not interested in continuing it at Churchill's suggestion (and in return for what?) but rather, exclusively and reasonably, in wanting to end it, as he would in fact begin to do in early spring 1943, when he insistently but unsuccessfully asked the Führer to end the war with the Soviets.

Mussolini's interventions and his interest in an armistice with the Soviets, in this sense (the opposite of what Churchill would have liked), are historically documented.

So here too there is nothing that can give importance to the correspondence; in fact, for this period, there is absolutely nothing.

## • **Period 1944/1945**

It is in this last historical period that any secret proposals for an agreement with the British can be traced back, considering that they would have been a *means* for Mussolini to somehow get out of the war, believing, moreover and wrongly, that the conservative Churchill was highly concerned about a Soviet invasion of Europe following the break with the Germans.

In this further context of hypotheses, however, controversial facts and, above all, an obvious strategic contradiction stand out:

**Firstly**, any approaches made by the Duce in this regard cannot have gone beyond simple soundings or contacts between countries at war, as is common in any conflict. Some attest to this, but here too we are dealing with unproven testimony (the most important and plausible of which is perhaps that of the Duce's former aide-de-camp Pietro Carradori, a public security brigadier seconded to his private secretariat), even a personal intervention by Mussolini, who allegedly held secret meetings with British emissaries in Porto Ceresio near Varese, close to the Swiss border, but even if this were true, it would not change much.

There is talk of some secret meetings with British emissaries, in which Bombacci also participated with Mussolini, which is possible, but the lack of definition

of these phantom negotiations, moreover, deprives any possible documentation on the subject of any concrete effectiveness;

*secondly*, in the overall strategy of the war, which was then finalized at Yalta, there was no possibility of achieving such reversals, and Churchill was well aware of this. Italy had been assigned to the West and, as would happen in Greece and Yugoslavia, any local dissent or clashes between communist and anti-communist forces would have been suppressed with Soviet consent;

*thirdly*, and as a consequence of the second point, any alleged British (Churchill) interest in a generic containment of the Soviets, **if it existed at all**, was certainly put forward in bad faith and for other tactical reasons.

Therefore, for Mussolini, playing the Soviet threat card, which was now overflowing in Europe, could have been a *means*, a *hope* (which, however, we now know to be completely unfounded and uncertain) to seek a solution to a war that was now lost.

And indeed, as mentioned, from the wiretaps that remain on record today, it is clear that Mussolini (mistakenly and failing to imagine the strategic significance of the Yalta agreements) counted on the fact that Churchill, a notorious anti-communist, might be somehow interested in stemming the Soviet invasion of Europe.

On this basis, the Duce proposed this to Hitler, adding that he was in possession of documentation that would force the British to reach an agreement. These hopes were unfounded, as was confirmed after the war when the Yalta agreements were implemented.

To begin with, the Soviets were strategically necessary to the Allies for the conduct of the war, but above all they were **indispensable** in future plans for the partition and occupation of Europe.

**These plans, which later resulted in the Yalta agreements, had already been part of the Allies' war strategies for some time. In fact, the Allies deliberately delayed some of their military initiatives in Europe precisely to allow the Soviets to be the first to occupy the areas of influence that were to be definitively assigned to them in the future. In fact, in 1945, they stopped or withdrew some American divisions that had pushed too far into geographical areas that were supposed to be occupied by the Soviets.**

**The Soviet occupation of Europe was therefore desired and planned by the Allies themselves, behind a subtle *globalist* strategy to control the whole of Europe.**

It was a means of dividing the world into two spheres of influence and thus keeping it subjugated, while at the same time permanently disrupting Europe, which would be divided into two entities, with states, governments, peoples, and political parties that were apparently opposed (*the so-called Free World and the Iron Curtain*), but in

reality dominated by the US and the USSR, which cooperated perfectly in maintaining the status quo. There is no doubt about this.

Any disagreement or apparent resistance that occurred at the Yalta Conference was only tactical or sectoral in nature, just as the post-war disputes that led to *the Cold War*, a war of spies and propaganda, often bloody but always contained within those strategic limits, were only tactical in nature, i.e., the containment of the areas of influence and domination thus assigned and delimited.

**The war strategy of the last year of the war was, in fact, as mentioned, aimed at allowing the Soviets to reach Berlin and the Eastern European countries assigned to them first, while slowing down the advance of the Allies where necessary.**

At Yalta, the Americans played the part of the *feigned naive* who did not realize the *Soviet danger*, and the British played the part of those who offered some resistance by virtue of their national interests and a generic anti-communism, but things were quite different, and Churchill, manipulated by certain lobbies, knew this perfectly well and was part of this strategy, whatever his ostensible anti-communism might have been. His direct approval of those geographical divisions is well documented.

To believe that Churchill would have come to terms, because he was anti-Bolshevik and/or for his own strictly national interests (limiting Soviet interference in Europe), may have had a certain logic, but it was completely inconsistent and unworkable in the geopolitical framework that the forces involved in the outcome of World War II had planned.

Churchill, whatever his conservative and anti-communist views may have been, whatever his actions and statements aimed at defending British interests may have been, was essentially *part of* these globalist strategies, manipulated as he was by the lobbies that, behind the scenes, orchestrated and directed the entire war strategy of the Allies and, from Yalta onwards, imposed the post-war order.

Certainly, the Soviet advance in Europe, which began as soon as the front with the Germans was broken, was a *delicate* and complex matter. It caused dissent among the Allied nations, and so it is logical that there was resistance, misunderstanding, and friction, and even risks of clashes between the Russians and the Anglo-Americans, but these were, when they occurred, only tactical and/or local conflicts (as in Greece) and were never strategic in nature. These mutual commitments continued throughout the post-war period until the end of Yalta, when neither the Russians nor the Americans interfered in each other's spheres of influence.

The real basis of Yalta, its geopolitical strategy, even if it was intended to be transitional (it lasted about 45 years), was peaceful coexistence (with the relevant secret agreements) between the US and the USSR and implicit Russian-American cooperation in the agreements, certainly not the destruction of the rival. These arrangements, thus defined, could have been restrictive for England, **a n d** they reduced its scope as a

great power, causing it to lose its empire, but the British never expressed any real dissent or concrete opposition to Yalta!

After all, the lobbies that, behind the scenes, firmly controlled the Allies' entire war strategy were there precisely to ensure that these *differences* did not go beyond the tactical or local level.

**Why then did the British, assuming that these approaches to Mussolini really took place, lead him to believe that a reversal of the front was possible?**

We can only assume that during *contacts* or *soundings* with Mussolini, Churchill may have hinted at some *tactical* diversionary *tactics* with an anti-Soviet slant, especially if this is seen as a ploy to deceive and appease Mussolini on the much more serious and important matter of *the Carteggio*, sensitive documentation in the Duce's possession, to be recovered by force at the appropriate moment; or who knows what other ploy.

Alternatively, we can also hypothesize that there were some British elements who wanted to explore the possibility of pursuing anti-Soviet initiatives, which were then stopped, but these are always and only conjectures.

**In any case, since the strategic conditions for feasibility (Yalta, to which Churchill had agreed) for an "anti-Soviet" agreement did not exist, it is unlikely that these *approaches* between the two statesmen, or those acting on their behalf, went beyond their theoretical and tactical limits (and in fact they did not!), and therefore they are of little importance.**

Nor can traces of such approaches be considered a weapon of blackmail against the British: the mere *discussion*, draft, or proposal of British *betrayal* of the Soviets (it is unthinkable that any written agreements were ratified), which, incidentally, did not materialize, are not uncommon among the secret diplomats of nations during wartime, and often occur between states engaged in war and in the immediate postwar period.

The Americans, for example, in Bern in April 1945, secretly obtained the surrender of the Germans in Italy from the Soviets, but apart from protests from the Soviet government for not having been involved, there were no particular reactions.

So, to conclude this topic, even if the Mussolini-Churchill correspondence contained exchanges of views, notes from talks with emissaries, preliminary agreements, or similar documents on a possible reversal of the front (which ultimately did not happen), in order to curb Soviet expansion in Europe, it would constitute material that was absolutely not "explosive" and of little interest, which at most would have provoked notes of protest from the Soviets and perhaps some limited complications in the peace agreements, but above all, personally, would have done little to compromise Churchill's prestige as a true anti-communist.

Therefore, they cannot constitute controversial material for the 'Correspondence'; at most, they constitute a curiosity historical in hypothesizing why,

possibly, the British played along, in part and for a certain period of time, entering into secret talks with Mussolini in this regard.

Just to give you an idea of Churchill's false anti-communism, false because it was subordinate to the Yalta agreements that were about to be ratified less than four months later, let us recall this anecdote from **the evening of October 9, 1944, when Churchill and Eden arrived in Moscow and were invited to dinner by Stalin at the Kremlin:**

*<<It was towards the end of the evening, spent, according to the British delegation's documents, in a lavish gastronomic atmosphere, that Churchill got straight to the heart of the matter. Stalin declared himself ready to discuss everything.*

*He said he understood Britain's need to regain control of the Mediterranean routes and to have a say in Greece. For their part, the British had to understand Russia's needs in Romania and Bulgaria.*

*Taking half a sheet of paper, Churchill scribbled down the terms of the agreement, indicating the percentages of Anglo-American and Russian influence in the various countries of Central and Southeastern Europe: Hungary 50 and 50, Romania 10 and 90, Bulgaria 25 and 75, Greece 90 and 10, Yugoslavia 50 and 50. Stalin read the note without comment and marked it with a blue pencil, which stood for "seen" but also for a substantial acceptance of the method of allocation.*

*"Won't we be considered cynical for deciding matters so fraught with consequences for millions of people in such an improvised manner? Let's burn the paper," said Churchill. "No, you keep it," said Stalin.*

[See: *"How Churchill and Stalin decided the fate of Europe. The partition of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans at the Moscow Conference in October 1944: was it true cynicism or realpolitik?"*, La Voce del Popolo, Monday, October 7, 2002].

## MUSSOLINI'S RESPONSIBILITIES

*<<During the twenty years of Fascism in Italy, power was regulated by a kind of "diarchy" between Fascism and the House of Savoy, but alongside and behind this diarchy, two other powers were no less important: the Church and Freemasonry. Objectively, there were neither the men nor the conditions for a "second wave" of revolution. Thus, Mussolini settled on a policy of step-by-step innovation and reform, which, however, proved unsuccessful in the face of war.*

Certainly, reading about the many betrayals or failures to fulfill duties leads one to blame Mussolini for the grave responsibility of having led the nation into war with the highest-ranking officers of the armed forces tainted by treason or, rather, by individuals who were not up to the task, devoted more to their own interests and, above all, inclined to ally themselves with the Anglo-French.

But then the discussion changes perspective and we should consider the failure to eliminate the monarchy in 1922 and the failure, in the following years, to truly implement a fascist revolution that would have overturned all the political and military structures of the country.

But here another question arises: was Mussolini capable of proceeding in this direction? Of doing away with the House of Savoy, which was popular among Italians and had linked its name to Vittorio Veneto?

Were the Blackshirts, either in 1922 or perhaps in 1937-38 after the proclamation of the Empire, when Mussolini and fascism reached their peak of support among Italians, in a position to prevail in a confrontation with the Army, the Carabinieri, and anyone else loyal to the House of Savoy who would have confronted them?

When the composition of the fascist movement, due to the need to fight for power, was filled with elements that came from the ranks of the army itself, the middle classes, largely linked to bourgeois circles, hierarchs linked to the monarchy and others to the Church or Freemasonry. And there was certainly no shortage of Anglophiles. When fascism collapsed on July 25, 1943, in addition to its transformation into a massive, elephantine party with all the flaws that entailed, these situations also had an impact. Not to mention that many circles, many influential figures of power, from the previous liberal regime, from the previous bourgeois classes, had remained in their places or had been replaced elsewhere, perhaps pretending their adherence to fascism and devotion to the Duce.

The answer to all these questions is therefore certainly negative, and the fact that Mussolini was certainly not surrounded by 'revolutionary cadres' capable of such a task is also not insignificant. One day, Mussolini was asked why he had not pushed the party to carry out a "second wave" of revolution, and he simply replied that "you can't make statues out of mud," but he did not use the word "mud."

In a valuable essay by Alberto Mariani:

*"Who has led Italy to political and military disaster?"*

([http://www.abmariantoni.altervista.org/storia/f\\_Le\\_responsabilita\\_del\\_di\\_sastro.pdf](http://www.abmariantoni.altervista.org/storia/f_Le_responsabilita_del_di_sastro.pdf)), the author recalls and summarizes all the shortcomings, betrayals, and everything else that led us to the and also shows Mussolini's unfortunately ineffective attempts to remedy it.

What we can also say, however, is that the Duce did not fully perceive the meta-historical nature and scope of that war, which was almost an epoch-making clash between "being and not being" and therefore the need to face that test in a certain way.

If we then consider that he was well aware of our military unpreparedness and economic deficiency to face a war, and that the war had fallen upon him prematurely for a series of reasons and events that he could not control, so much so that he tried to adapt to it with every expedient in order not to cause irreparable damage to the nation (including the "agreement" with the British to enter the war almost as a pretense, for a short period and without suffering too much damage), if we evaluate all this, then we can understand how Mussolini may have put aside or been forced to put aside his "second wave" revolutionary ambitions.

**Today, with hindsight, we can say and observe all this and make our assessments retrospectively and with full knowledge of the facts, but at the time it was not so easy because the ideological and meta-historical aspects of the war were the concern of only a few, while many still reasoned only with the usual diplomatic and geopolitical canons behind the events leading up to war.**

Hitler himself, had he been fully aware of what was at stake, which he was towards the end of the war when it was already too late, would certainly not have saved the British at Dunkirk, would not have granted France so many concessions and courtesies in the surrender agreements, would not have sought so stubbornly to reach a "global agreement" with the British, and so on, all things that ultimately backfired on him.

But the so-called great democracies, backed by forces and lobbies, especially financial ones, that had plans for global domination and saw Fascism as a dangerous enemy to be destroyed immediately, were fully aware of the significance of that war.

Unfortunately, history does not take leaps; it follows its course, inexorably set by the men of its time.

And there is no going back.

\* \* \*

Maurizio Barozzi was born in Rome in 1947. Now retired, he worked in the construction and reinsurance sectors, where he was also a regional trade union official. For years he devoted himself to historical studies and research.

He has collaborated with the daily newspaper *Rinascita*, publishing many articles on historical counter-information.

Co-author of the book *Storia della Federazione Nazionale Combattenti RSI* (*History of the National Federation of RSI Combatants*), he has also published investigations into the death of Mussolini in the magazine *Storia del Novecento* and articles in *Storia in Rete*.

He published for Edizioni della Lanterna: "*La guerra del sangue contro l'oro*" (The War of Blood Against Gold) and "*Interview on the Mystery of Mussolini's Death*."

For Edizioni Pagine, 2017:

"*Morte Mussolini Fine di una Vulgata*" (The Death of Mussolini: End of a Vulgate)

**Some of his essays, which can be viewed online, are particularly noteworthy:**

**THE LAST HOURS OF MUSSOLINI, FASCISM, AND THE ITALIAN SOCIAL REPUBLIC**

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**SPOTLIGHT ON THE MORO CASE**

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**SEPTEMBER 11: THE GREAT DECEPTION**

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**N.B.:**

**There are some old copies of this essay online, which have been subsequently supplemented and corrected. The correct copy is this one dated October 2022.**